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A b s t r a c t
This thesis presents results on the economics of poverty and labour mar-
kets, using data from Argentina in the 1991-2002 period for empirical appli­
cations. The thesis is divided into two Parts.
The first Part concentrates on poverty and the effects of income fluctu­
ations on well-being. The 1995-2002 period in Argentina was characterised 
by recurring economic crises that produced large fluctuations in household 
income. The empirical applications of this Part rely on a rotating panel 
dataset from the Greater Buenos Aires region to study the effects of this 
variability.
The first Chapter introduces the data and its characteristics, and de­
scribes the economic context of the period. The second Chapter defines a 
family of indicators of well-being, based on the theory of choice under un­
certainty, that account for the negative impact of income fluctuations on 
household welfare. Chapters 3 and 4 present risk adjusted measures of in­
come and the transient-chronic poverty decomposition, respectively, two 
methodologies for the study of poverty with panel data which are related 
to the indicators defined in Chapter 2. In Chapters 3 and 4, the house­
hold characteristics associated with income fluctuations and their impact 
on well-being are identified through regression analysis.
Part II deals with fertility and wom en's labour supply from an empirical 
perspective, and uses data from the 1991 Argentine Census for its applica­
tions. Chapter 5 presents the theoretical and econometric framework em­
ployed to deal with the endogeneity of the fertility decision. This identifica­
tion strategy exploits parental sex preferences as instrumental variables for 
further child-bearing. Chapter 6 discusses its validity in developing coun­
tries, and provides empirical evidence for Argentina. Chapter 7 presents the 
main results of the estimation, which state that additional children cause a 
reduction in their m other's labour supply. Finally, Chapter 8 proposes a new 
test for the generality of instrumental variables results, which is illustrated 
with the same dataset.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
This thesis presents methodological developments and empirical findings 
on the economics of poverty and labour markets, using data from Argentina 
in the 1991-2002 period for empirical applications. It is divided into two 
Parts, which deal with related issues.
The Chapters in Part I focus on poverty as a dynamic phenomenon, mo­
tivated by the recurring economic crises that affect developing countries 
and the incidence of income fluctuations on household welfare. In the In­
troduction to a pioneering volume on panel data on incomes, Atkinson and 
Cowell (1982) noted that these datasets "provide a unique opportunity" for 
modelling the instability of family well-being and the incidence of poverty, 
among other economic phenomena. While the increasing availability of 
household panel data has been exploited in theoretical analysis and em­
pirical applications, the methodological and applied literatures still lack a 
unified framework. Echoing Atkinson (1987), Part I addresses the question 
of how poverty should be measured over time -  or, in more general terms, 
how to measure well-being based on repeated observations of household in­
come. The aim is to develop and illustrate a set of tools for empirical work 
based on theoretically sound extensions of the existing methodology for sta­
tic distributional analysis. Since the proposed family of measures does not 
rely on a specific functional form, the framework developed in the following 
pages encompasses some of the existing approaches as special cases.
These tools are illustrated with longitudinal data for Argentina in the 
1995-2002 period, which is well suited for this type of analysis given the 
large fluctuations in household income. As described in Chapter 1, during 
the 1990s the country's economy underwent a process of market-oriented 
structural reforms. The resulting openness of the economy and the hard 
peg of the local currency to the US dollar contributed to a high degree of
14
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vulnerability to the succession of international financial crises of the second 
half of the decade, which was characterised as a period of "boom and bust." 
This series of external macroeconomic shocks and the weaknesses of the 
Argentine economy led to a severe economic and social crisis that started at 
the end of 2001 and continued well into 2002. Chapter 1 describes the trends 
in poverty and its dynamics during this period, and sets up the basis for the 
analysis of the following three Chapters: it discusses the methodological 
issues of poverty measurement in Argentina, introduces the main dataset 
employed in Part I (a rotating panel from the Greater Buenos Aires region), 
and covers the existing literature on poverty in Argentina.
Chapter 2 presents a general framework for the evaluation of well-being 
based on panel data on incomes. The methodology relies on a formal anal­
ogy with the theory of choice under uncertainty, and on the existing litera­
ture on distributional analysis. It defines a family of indicators that account 
for the negative impact of income fluctuations on household welfare. The 
methodology is illustrated with the Greater Buenos Aires panel. The fol­
lowing Chapters present two examples of more detailed empirical analy­
sis, which can be interpreted as special cases of the evaluation framework. 
Chapter 3 accounts for risk and the effect of fluctuations on household wel­
fare by defining risk adjusted measures of income. The evolution of these 
indicators is complemented by a regression analysis, which sheds light into 
the household characteristics associated with the impact of risk on well­
being. Finally, Chapter 4 provides a decomposition of poverty into its tran­
sient and chronic components, and studies their correlates by means of re­
gression analysis.
The research presented in Part II is motivated by some of the stylised 
facts in distributional analysis that emerge from regressions of this type. 
While most poverty profiles find strong links between poverty, childbear­
ing and labour market status, these links cannot be interpreted as causal 
relationships given the problems of endogeneity and simultaneity that are 
pervasive in applied economic research.
The Chapters in Part II establish the determinants of the income-genera­
ting process of women as primary and secondary earners in the household. 
Specifically, these Chapters make a series of methodological and empirical 
contributions by studying the causal effect of fertility on female labour sup­
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ply from an empirical perspective, based on data from the 1991 Argentine 
Census.
Chapter 5 presents the theoretical and econometric framework emplo­
yed to deal with the endogeneity of the fertility decision. The simultane­
ity problems in the economic analysis of fertility and labour supply arise 
from the fact that the two are joint decisions: while children provide util­
ity to their parents, they enter the household's budget constraint through 
the costs in terms of goods and time. Moreover, fertility and labour supply 
decisions might be driven by unobservable factors, such as preferences and 
ability, which imply selection problems in the estimation. The identification 
strategy in Part II exploits parental sex preferences as instrumental variables 
for childbearing, based on the observation that parents of two children of 
the same sex exhibit a higher propensity to have another child to obtain a 
gender-balanced offspring composition.
However, the nature of sex preferences in developing countries poses 
some challenges to the application of this strategy to the Argentine case: in 
particular, a stronger preference for boys might have implications in terms 
of lifetime income and labour supply, invalidating the postulated exogene­
ity of the instrument. Chapter 6 discusses these problems in the context of 
developing countries. It provides original evidence in support of the valid­
ity of the identification strategy for Argentina, studying the plausibility of 
the untestable identifying assumptions by means of auxiliary evidence. Ba­
sed on these results, Chapter 7 presents the instrumental variable estimates 
of the causal effect of fertility on labour supply. Finally, Chapter 8 proposes 
a new test for the generality of instrumental variable results, which is illus­
trated with the same dataset.
The Conclusion reviews the main contributions of both Parts, highlight­
ing their implications for theoretical analysis, empirical application and pol­
icy formulation, and outlining possible avenues for further research.
Part I
Poverty and Income Fluctuations, 
Argentina 1995-2002
17
C h a p t e r  1
A r g e n t i n a ' s  C r is e s  a n d  t h e  P o o r
1.1 In t r o d u c t io n  to  Part  I:
K ey Ec o n o m ic  Ev e n t s , A r g e n t in a  1991-2002
The objective of this introductory Chapter is to set up the context for the 
rest of Part I, which presents original developments in the measurement 
of poverty and well-being over time. The main motivation is the effect of 
the recurring economic crises that affect developing countries and the in­
cidence of income fluctuations on welfare. For this reason, the empirical 
applications of this Part exploit the longitudinal dimension of household 
survey data for Argentina in the 1995-2002 period. Since the empirical work 
of Part II is based on Argentine data from 1991, the following pages present 
the main economic events of the 1991-2002 period.1
The 1980s represented a "Tost decade" for most of Latin America. In 
the case of Argentina, the decade ended in political instability and a series 
of hyperinflation episodes that extended into 1990 and 1991, as can be ap­
preciated in the evolution of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), presented in 
Figure 1.1. In March 1991, the country adopted the "Convertibility Plan," a 
currency board where the Argentine peso was pegged to the US dollar. This 
plan was accompanied by a series of market oriented structural reforms that 
included privatisations of public utilities and the opening of the economy to 
flows of goods and capital. These reforms and the liquidity of international 
credit markets prom pted a steady inflow of capital, which sustained growth 
between 1991 and 1994. This is depicted in Figure 1.2, which presents the
lrrhis summary draws on Lewis (2002), Bonvecchi (2003) and Gerchimoff and Llach 
(2004a), which are recommended for further reference on the economic history and the 
political economy of Argentina.
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—  Consumer Price Index (1999=100)
Source: INDEC (2003).
evolution of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annotated with the main eco­
nomic events of the 1990-2003 period for Argentina.
The Convertibility's currency board, however, made the economy highly 
vulnerable to external shocks. At the end of 1994, Mexico devalued its cur­
rency and triggered an international financial crisis (the "Tequila crisis") 
that affected most emerging markets. Argentina rapidly suffered from con­
tagion, with runs against the peso and significant capital flights, but the 
currency board resisted this large external shock. As shown in Figure 1.2, 
a brief recovery followed during 1996 and 1997, but the economy was hit 
again by the economic crisis in South-East Asia, which started in Thailand 
in early 1997, and its aftermath. Russia, in turn, entered a severe financial 
crisis in August 1998, and its sovereign debt default prompted yet another 
contagion to Argentina, which was -  like most emerging markets -  badly 
hit by capital outflows and interest rate rises. In January 1999, Brazil, Ar­
gentina's main trading partner, was forced to devalue its currency, worsen­
ing a recession that started around 1998.
After three years of negative growth, the Argentine government was
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forced to impose restrictions on bank accounts in late 2001. This precipitated 
events, which converted the recession into an economic meltdown. The de­
cision to freeze bank deposits was followed by social unrest and political 
instability, and lead to the resignation of President De La Rua. The currency 
board could not be sustained in this context, and in early 2002 the new gov­
ernment put an end to the parity between the peso and the US dollar and 
announced a default on the country's sovereign debt. The subsequent fall 
in confidence and the disruption of productive activity resulted in a fall in 
GDP of 10.9 per cent during 2002.
The sources of the crisis can be traced back to, among other factors, the 
exchange rate parity with the US dollar and the resulting over-valuation of 
the local currency, the vulnerability of the country to external shocks, and 
the economy's own structural weaknesses (Galiani et al., 2003).
As discussed in detail in this Chapter, the crisis was reflected in the po­
verty rates, which reached 53 percent of the population in May 2002, 15 
percentage points higher than in October 2001. This increase in poverty mir­
rored a large fall in household income, caused by two factors (World Bank, 
2003). On the one hand, labour market conditions deteriorated sharply: in 
May 2002, the unemployment rate exceeded 21 percent, more than 3 per­
centage points higher than in October 2001 (see the discussion of Figure 1.3 
below). On the other hand, real incomes fell because of the large increase in 
consumer prices induced by the devaluation (Figure 1.1).
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces 
the survey data and the income aggregate. It also discusses methodological 
issues on poverty measurement in Argentina, and proposes an extension to 
the official methodology that allows the construction of consistent national 
poverty figures for the 1995-2002 period. The Section also describes a ro­
tating panel dataset from the Greater Buenos Aires region, which is used 
extensively in the following Chapters. Section 1.3 builds on the data and 
income aggregate to present the main trends of poverty during the period 
at the national and regional levels. It also provides a presentation of the 
short term poverty dynamics. Finally, Section 1.4 briefly covers the existing 
literature on poverty in Argentina for this period. Conclusions follow.
Figure 1.2: Yearly Change in Real GDP and Key Economic Events, Argentina, 1990-2003
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1.2 H o u se h o l d  D ata  a n d  M e a su r e m e n t  of 
P overty  in  A r g e n t in a
1.2.1 National cross sections and the Greater Buenos Aires rotating panel
The empirical analysis conducted in Chapters 1 to 4 (Part I) is based on data 
from the Argentine Permanent Household Survey ("Encuesta Permanente 
de Hogares," EPH). This is a labour market and living conditions survey 
that has been collected since 1975 in the Greater Buenos Aires region, which 
covers the country's capital and adjacent municipalities, and constitutes the 
country's largest urban centre. The EPH is one of the longest running hou­
sehold surveys in Latin America, and is considered to be of relatively high 
quality (World Bank, 2000a). The data is collected by the national statisti­
cal agency, the Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos (INDEC), which 
is responsible for household, expenditure and manufacturing surveys, the 
national Census, price indices and the national accounts.
During the 1980s and 1990s, other cities were added to the EPH's sam­
pling frame, reaching a maximum of 28 urban centres in 1995 (INDEC, 
1996). This made the EPH representative of the urban population of the 
country -  about 80 percent of the total. While some of the estimates in this 
Part will be referred to as "national," it should be stressed that the results 
correspond to the urban areas covered by the EPH and are representative 
at the urban level only.2 Relatively little is known about the small but not 
negligible fraction of the population residing in rural areas. Fiszbein et al. 
(2002), discussed in Section 1.4, provide some limited evidence on living 
conditions in these areas. The main urban centres covered by the EPH are 
divided by INDEC into six statistical regions, and it is thus assumed that 
the cities and provinces within each region share some structural character­
istics. The regions are Greater Buenos Aires, Pampeana, Noreste, Noroeste, 
Cuyo and Patagonia. Appendix B lists the main urban centres covered by 
the EPH, and places the regions in a map of the country.
During the 1995-2002 period, the survey was collected every year in two 
waves, in May and October (denoted waves 1 and 2 for each year), and all 
estimates in this Part are based on the fifteen waves available between May
2The empirical application of Part II is based on the 1991 Census and thus covers urban 
and rural areas.
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Table 1.1: Unweighted Sample Sizes for National Cross Sections, EPH
Wave Households Individuals
May 1995 22,023 82,721
October 1995 29,509 112,439
May 1996 29,861 113,209
October 1996 27,200 103,847
May 1997 29,506 110,487
October 1997 29,362 109,307
May 1998 28,511 105,399
October 1998 26,810 99,035
May 1999 24,918 92,371
October 1999 24,715 91,512
May 2000 22,834 83,571
October 2000 22,763 83,583
May 2001 22,833 83,264
October 2001 22,998 83,988
May 2002 22,814 83,349
Source: EPH household survey data (INDEC).
1995 and May 2002. The EPH is structured as a rotating sample, where 25 
percent of households surveyed are replaced in each wave, and the data is 
treated as a series of repeated cross sections (INDEC, 2002). The INDEC 
provides household weights, which are used in all the estimates presented 
in this Chapter. Table 1.1 presents the unweighted sample sizes for the fif­
teen waves, both in terms of the number of individuals and the number of 
households surveyed.
The rotating structure of the EPH's sample implies that households stay 
in the sample for four consecutive waves, a period of about a year and a half. 
A consistent series of panels, however, can only be constructed for the Gre­
ater Buenos Aires region (GBA), since for other urban centres INDEC did 
not release all the matching codes, and changes were made to the sample 
rotations. The Greater Buenos Aires region represents around 60 percent of 
the total population and 70 percent of the urban population of the country.
The fifteen waves between May 1995 and May 2002 contain data for 
twelve "cohorts'' of households observed in the same four consecutive wa­
ves. Table 1.2 illustrates the structure of the panels and clarifies the distinc­
tion between waves and cohorts. Only households observed four times and 
with complete information on income for every member of the household 
in the four waves are kept in the sample, which results in an average of 453
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Table 1.2: Rotating Sample: Cohorts and Waves in the GBA Panel
W a v e : 95-1 95-2 96-1 96-2 97-1 97-2: 98-1 98-2 99-1 99-2 00-1 00-2 01-1 01-2 02-1
Cohort:
1 95-1 to 96-2 1 1 1 1
2 95-2 to 97-1 2 2 2 2 A
3 96-1 to 97-2 3 3 3 3
4 96-2 to 98-1 4 4 4 4
5 97-1 to 98-2 5 5 5 5
6 97-2 to 99-1 6 6 6 6
7 98-1 to 99-2 \ J
Wa v
7 7 7
8 98-2 to 00-1 1 e <3. 8 8 ^ 8 ^  Cohort
9 99-1 to 00-2 9 9 9 9
10 99-2 to 01-1 10 10 10 10
11 00-1 to 01-2 11 11 11 11
12 00-2 to 02-1 12 12 12 12
retained households per cohort -  about 60 percent of the theoretical total 
for the GBA region. Cruces and Wodon (2003c) argue that the attrition from 
the panel is compensated by the INDEC's weighting structure, and does not 
bias income and poverty measures in a significant way. Moreover, given the 
relatively short span of the panels, the problems identified by Cowell (1982) 
with respect to changes in family structure do not affect the results. Cruces 
et al. (2004) discuss alternatives for dealing with these issues in a long panel.
1.2.2 Income aggregate and equivalence scale
The EPH collects information on the income and labour market status of 
every member of a household, as well as some dwelling and individual 
characteristics. To obtain results which are comparable to official figures 
and to the literature on poverty and labour economics in Argentina, this 
Chapter employs INDEC's methodology for the computation of household 
income aggregates, which is critically assessed below.
The aggregation of income at the household level is not a trivial task, as 
witnessed by the long discussion in the poverty literature (Ravallion, 1994; 
Deaton, 1997, cover these debates and most of the issues raised in this Sec­
tion). While some authors base their estimates on per capita income, this 
is problematic as an indicator of well-being because it does not allow for 
economies of scale in the household, nor for differences in needs between 
members of different age and gender. Ignoring these aspects may result 
in an over-estimation of the neeative impart r»f hmmphnlH ctiyp on r>nvprtv
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(Coulter et al., 1992; Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1995) and inequality (Cowell 
and Mercader Prats, 1999).
Following Cowell (2000, Section 2), total family income t/>z must be ad­
justed by the characteristics of the household and its members by means of 
an equivalence scale. This process results in equivalised income y\, which 
represents a suitable money metric of utility. The procedure of equivalisa- 
tion is defined by a function x  such that:
yf =  x(a  i,ipi)
where az- represents a list of demographic and other attributes of the house­
hold and its members. Equivalised income is often obtained as
* = &  « • »
where v (az) is a function that defines the number of equivalent adults in the 
household. INDEC follows this methodology in the construction of its in­
come aggregate, and accounts for differences in needs between household 
members by adopting an equivalence scale based on calory intake by age 
and gender (INDEC, 2002). Specifically, the number of equivalent adults 
for each household i with kj members is defined as v (a ;) =  XyLi *?;'/ where 
each qj is determined by member j 's  age and gender. These adult equivalent 
coefficients qj are given in Table 1.3 (reproduced from Morales, 1988) for dif­
ferent categories. The coefficients are defined as the ratio of each category's 
caloric intake requirements to those of men aged 30 to 59 (2,700 kcal per 
day), which are defined as an equivalent adult. For instance, a three year 
old girl requires 1,500 kcal per day, and thus represents 0.56 of an equiva­
lent adult. INDEC's adjustments for differential needs are within the range 
of those employed in the distributional literature, and they are robust to 
adjustments for economies of scale in the household.3
3While INDEC choses not to adjust household income for economies of scale, this is 
relatively straightforward to implement by means of a parameter s, 0 < s < 1, with each 
extreme representing full and no economies of scale respectively. The number of adult 
equivalents is then computed as [XyLi tfjY' where qj is the coefficient in Table 1.3 and k is 
the size of the household. This is not implemented in this Chapter to maintain compatibility 
with official statistics and existing academic work. Gasparini (2003a) conducts a sensitivity 
analysis with EPH data and finds that most income and poverty measures are robust to
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Up to 1 year old 1,170 0.43
2 Girls 1,360 0.50
3 and 1,500 0.56
4 to 6 Boys 1,710 0.63
7 to 9 1,950 0.72
10 to 12 2,230 0.83
13 to 15 Men 2,580 0.96
16 to 17 2,840 1.05
10 to 12 1,980 0.73
13 to 15 Women 2,140 0.79
16 to 17 2,140 0.79
18-29 2,860 1.06
30-59 Men 2,700 1.00
60 and + 2,210 0.82
18-29 2,000 0.74
30-59 Women 2,000 0.74
60 and + 1,730 0.64
Source: Morales (1988). The adult equivalent units are defined as the
ratio of the age-gender category caloric needs with respect to those of an 
adult male aged 30 to 59.
To complete the definition of y\ in Equation 1.1, total household in­
come is computed by INDEC for each household i with ki members as
i t  * /  i'ipi =  XyLi y\f where y\ represents each individual member's total monetary 
income. Most individuals have only one source of income which consists 
of salaries for the active population and pensions for those who are retired. 
Combining this figure and the number of equivalent adults in the house­
hold given by the function v, total household equivalent income is defined 






This aggregate is attributed to every member of the household, which is 
why the text refers interchangeably to households and individuals. By ad­
justing for differences in household composition, y\ represents a better mea­
sure of well-being than per capita income (Deaton, 1997).
reasonable deviations from INDEC's implicit choice of s =  1.
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As an index of income, INDEC's y\ satisfies the basic criteria of measur­
ability and comparability among different individuals (Cowell, 1995, Chap­
ter 1). However, the Chapters in this Part deal with observations spanning 
the period 1995 to 2002, and y\ as defined in Equation 1.2 is not comparable 
across regions or in different periods if prices differ geographically or over 
time. While it is possible to deflate y\ with respect to prices at a given period 
to express it in constant units (i.e., in terms of real income), this Chapter and 
the rest of Part I adapt INDEC's (2002) methodology to time and geograph­
ical variations by normalising the adult equivalent income normalised by 
the contemporaneous poverty line z*. This income aggregate is defined as:
This formulation is known as the "welfare ratio" in the literature and has a 
number of advantages (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1987; Ravallion, 1998). In 
addition to making equivalised incomes comparable over time and space,4 
Equation 1.3 can be given an interpretation in terms of poverty measure­
ment: l/a <  1 indicates that a household's income is below the poverty line, 
and thus its members can be classified as poor.5 For these reasons, the choice 
of the poverty line as the unit of measurement is preferable to deflating in­
comes with respect to the CPI.
Finally, the quality of the income aggregate ya is given by INDEC's val­
idation process, which checks each of the components of individual income 
for consistency and discards households for which a complete total income 
cannot be computed, adjusting the sample weights accordingly. The small 
fraction of households reporting zero total income are kept in the final sam­
ple since they are considered valid by INDEC.
4 As discussed in the following pages, poverty lines vary between regions, and Equation
1.3 should refer to the income of a household living in region r and the regional poverty 
lines z rt. The notation in the text is preferred for being more compact.
5The denominator of the right hand side of Equation 1.3, zIf = zt SyLi Qj/ can be inter­
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1.2.3 Poverty lines and regional heterogeneity
The rest of this Section covers the construction of poverty lines in Argentina, 
which establish the fundamental partition of the population between the 
poor and the non-poor (Cowell, 2003). For each wave of the EPH, INDEC 
reports the cost of an extreme (or "indigent") poverty line, z \ , which is based 
on a basic food basket (INDEC, 2002). The components of this basket are 
constructed from a household expenditure survey,6 and its cost is updated 
with changes in prices between each wave of the EPH.
The poverty line z* is derived from the basic food basket z\ using the 
inverse of the Engel coefficient to incorporate the cost of basic non-food 
goods.7 The idea behind this approach is that the extreme poor cannot af­
ford a minimum food basket, whereas the moderately poor, while able to 
cover their basic nutritional needs, cannot afford other essential goods and 
services. While other alternatives for the definition of poverty lines exist, 
this Chapter follows the literature on distributional analysis in Argentina 
and adopts INDEC's methodology to ensure comparability with previous 
results.
As argued in the discussion of Equation 1.3, normalising incomes by the 
poverty lines facilitates comparisons over time. Poverty lines are also used 
in distributional analysis to reflect geographic heterogeneity in prices and 
in the purchasing power of income, by means of region and time specific 
lines zrt.
INDEC's geographic coverage, however, is incomplete for most of the 
1995-2002 period. While the EPH is collected in the major urban areas of 
the country, INDEC only constructed poverty lines for the Greater Buenos 
Aires region. From that wave onwards, INDEC provides official poverty 
lines for the six statistical regions based on the purchasing power parity of 
income. The lack of regional poverty lines implies that INDEC only com­
puted official poverty statistics for the GBA region before 2001, even though 
the regional survey data is available for the 1995-2000 period. These statis­
tics are presented in Appendix C (Table C.l, page 226).
This Chapter proposes a simple method to fill in the gaps in regional esti­
6This survey, the "Encuesta National de Gasto de los Hogares," is carried out only every 
ten years by INDEC. Part II presents some results based on it.
7Ravallion (1998) and INDEC (2002) discuss this procedure in detail.
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mates. The aim is to complement INDEC's methodology to provide regional 
and nationwide poverty measures for the period 1995-2000 accounting for 
the geographic heterogeneity in costs of living. The proposed method relies 
on an updating rule. The rate of change of the GBA poverty line over the 
period May 1995-May 2001 represents an implicit GBA poverty line defla­
tor. This deflator can be applied retrospectively to the five remaining official 
poverty lines of May 2001, applying the GBA rate of change to obtain re­
gional values for the previous waves. The official poverty and extreme po­
verty lines, and those obtained with the updating procedure, are presented 
in Appendix C (Table C.l).
A drawback is that this simple rule implicitly assumes that the change in 
poverty lines over time in all regions is the same as that of the GBA region. 
While this appears to be a strong assumption, the changes in official poverty 
lines from May 2001 to May 2002 are strongly correlated across regions, as 
shown in Table C.l and depicted in Figure 1.4. The main advantage of this 
simplifying assumption is that it provides consistency and continuity with 
INDEC's estimates for 2001 and onwards.8
The income aggregate and poverty lines described in this Section are 
used in the following pages to estimate poverty figures for each region and 
the country as a whole over the period 1995-2002, complementing the offi­
cial statistics for 2001-2002.
1.3 P overty  Tr e n d s  a n d  Sh o r t  Term  D y n a m ic s
1.3.1 Income, prices and poverty lines
This Section presents the main trends in poverty for the period 1995-2002. It 
first discusses the evolution of the income aggregate and the poverty lines, 
and then describes the evolution of regional and national poverty figures. 
The final subsection deals with the short term dynamics of poverty over this 
period.
The impact of the series of crises and recoveries described in the Intro­
duction to this Chapter can be appreciated in the evolution of the unem-
8Cruces and Wodon (2003a) discuss this procedure in more detail, and compare it to 
the approach developed by Lee (2000). While the latter is more sophisticated, it does not 
ensure a continuity between the pre- and post-May 2001 measures.
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ployment rate, which mirrors the changes in household income and GDP, 
as depicted in Figure 1.3. In the aftermath of the Mexican crisis, the unem­
ployment rate reached 18.8 percent in May 1995, and remained high until 
October 1996. It fell to 12.4 percent in October 1998 during the recovery, but 
from that wave onwards it increased again, reaching the highest recorded 
rate of 21.5 percent in May 2002, with the largest rise between waves of over 
3 percentage points between October 2001 and May 2002.
Figure 1.3 also depicts the evolution of the sample average of yeit, the 
adult equivalent income defined in Equation 1.2, in nominal (current pesos) 
and real terms, for all the large urban areas covered by the EPH. Real val­
ues are adjusted by the CPI (Figure 1.1) and correspond to September 2001 
prices.9
The yeit aggregate decreased almost 4 percent from May 1995 until Oc­
tober 1996, as a consequence of the contraction that followed the contagion 
from the Mexican crisis (Figure 1.2). Household income recovered briefly 
until May 1998, but from then on it fell almost continuously in both nomi­
nal and real terms, with the exception of a brief recovery between May and 
October 2000. The sharpest decrease corresponds to the crisis of 2001-2002, 
as captured by the May 2002 wave of the EPH (the last in the Figure).
Between October 2001 and May 2002 nominal income fell 10 percent, 
but it is interesting to note in Figure 1.3 that the sudden surge in consumer 
prices caused by the crisis of 2001-2002 and depicted in Figure 1.1 was re­
flected in a much larger fall in real income of 25 percent. This increase in 
prices is also reflected in Figure 1.4, which shows the evolution of the offi­
cial and constructed regional poverty lines along with the Consumer Price 
Index.
The poverty lines followed the trend in the CPI for most of the period: 
for instance, from October 1998 to October 2001 the poverty lines and the 
CPI fell in a similar manner, reflecting the deflationary pressures of the pe­
riod's recession, which also explains why nominal income is above real in­
come in Figure 1.3. Between the last two waves, corresponding to the 2001- 
2002 crisis, both the CPI and the nominal poverty lines grew sharply. The 
two effects do not cancel out completely: the Figure also portrays the evo-
9The CPI, poverty lines, equivalent income and poverty estimates are available in Tables 
C.l and C.2 in Appendix C.
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lution of the GBA poverty line in real terms (bold line), which increased by 
7.5 percent in real terms from October 2001 to May 2002. This reflects the 
fact that the rise in the cost of goods consumed by the poor was larger than 
the overall increase in the CPI, hitting them more than the rest of the society. 
The Figure also illustrates the regional differences in living costs: the GBA 
and Patagonia regions have higher poverty lines than the rest of the coun­
try for the whole period, while the Noroeste region always has the lowest 
value.10
While Figure 1.4 indicates some geographical heterogeneity in living 
costs, Figure 1.5 depicts the trend of real adult equivalent income y\t in Sep­
tember 2001 pesos by region, showing the substantial regional differences in 
living standards. The urban centres in the GBA and Patagonia regions have 
the highest levels of income, staying above the national average over the 
whole period. Those below the average are, in descending order, the Pam- 
peana, Cuyo, Noroeste, and Noreste regions. While there are large regional 
differences in levels of income -  for instance, the average over time for the 
Noreste region is just above half of that of the Patagonia region -  the time 
trends are nevertheless similar for all the regions. The regions with higher 
and lower incomes are also those with higher and lower poverty lines, and it 
is not clear a priori which of the two effects prevails in the resulting poverty 
measures. This is covered in the following pages.
2.3.2 Poverty trends
Before discussing the poverty figures for 1995-2002, this Section presents the 
methodology followed by INDEC to compute its official statistics, which is 
adopted in this Chapter to provide comparable results.
According to Cowell (2003), the measurement of poverty requires three 
components: an income estimate, a poverty line, and a measure or index, 
which represents a device for aggregating the poverty evaluations obtained 
at the household level into a population figure. The first two components 
were covered from the methodological and empirical points of view in the 
preceding pages. Regarding the third element, a household i's poverty eval­
uation is given by a function defined over its equivalised income y? and a
10Appendix B presents a set of regional socio-economic indicators and provides some 
background on the heterogeneity of Argentina's regions (Table B.l, page 223).
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poverty line z as (Cowell, 2003):
p(y?,z) i f y ? < z  (14)
0 otherwise
The Chapters in this Part rely on the decomposable poverty measures pro­
posed by Foster et al. (1984), which belong to the general class defined by 
Atkinson (1987). These FGT measures imply the following functional form 
for the poverty evaluation:
, e \  I"max(z—y ; , 0 ) l a
p(yf-2) =  — (L5)
where <x is a sensitivity parameter (a >  0).11 The resulting poverty measure 
is given by the sample average of p, which can be represented as:
1 N
F G T ( / /Z/«) =  - X
i = i
max(z — y e:, 0)
(1-6)
where N  denotes the total number of households or individuals in the pop­
ulation.12 With the parameter set to ot =  0, Equation 1.6 represents the 
poverty headcount. With a  = 1 and oc — 2, the resulting measures are the 
poverty gap and the squared poverty gap, which take into account not only 
the proportion of the poor in the population (as the headcount does) but 
also the intensity of poverty.
The following Figures were constructed using the equivalent income y\ 
in the FGT measures in Equation 1.6. Both the poverty lines z* and extreme 
poverty lines z\ were allowed to vary by region.
Figure 1.6 presents the headcounts of poverty and extreme poverty (indi­
gence) for the urban areas covered by the EPH, corresponding to FGT with 
oc = 0 (Equation 1.6).13 As in the official statistics provided by INDEC, both
11 If the income aggregate y \ is normalised by the poverty line as in Equation 1.3, p sim­
plifies to p (y it, z ) =  [max(l -  y iu 0)]“.
12The resulting FGT  measure can refer to the number of households or the number of 
individuals in poverty. The latter is derived from computing Equation 1.6 with weights 
reflecting household size. This procedure is equivalent to defining FGT in terms of N j, the 
number of individuals in the population, since the poverty status and the income aggregate 
are defined at the household level and then assigned to every member.
13This Section discusses only the evolution of the poverty headcounts. The poverty gap 
and squared poverty gap measures for each region are reported in Appendix C (Table C.2).
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headcounts are calculated as fractions of the total number of households 
(share of households in poverty or extreme poverty) and the total number 
of individuals (share of individuals in poverty or extreme poverty).
As is usually the case, the proportion of individuals under the poverty 
and extreme poverty lines is always higher than the proportion of house­
holds, reflecting the fact that poor households tend to be larger than non­
poor households.14
Since the income aggregate and the poverty lines were affected by the 
repeated crises and recoveries of the 1995-2002 period, the measures of po­
verty based on those numbers were also sensitive to the evolution of the 
economy. During the contagion from the Mexican crisis, the poverty and 
extreme poverty headcounts increased significantly from May 1995 to Octo­
ber 1996, then fell slightly from October 1996 until May 1998.
The May 1998 wave of the EPH represents a turning point in the data: 
the individual-based poverty headcount grew steadily from 28.6 percent to
38.3 percent in October 2001, with a similar trend for extreme poverty and 
for household-based measures. This rise in poverty of almost 10 percent­
age points in a little over three years reflects the worsening of the labour 
market conditions and economic activity during the recession, depicted in 
Figures 1.2 and 1.3. Over the same period, the proportion of the population 
in extreme poverty doubled from 6.8 percent to 13.6 percent.
These increases, however, are relatively minor when compared with the 
changes occurring between the October 2001 and May 2002 waves of the 
EPH. At the national level, the individual-based poverty headcount jumped 
from 38.3 percent to 53 percent (13.6 to 24.8 percent for extreme poverty), 
with household measures following the same upward trend. This jump in 
poverty rates is the result of the sharp increase in prices and hence poverty 
lines (Figure 1.4), coupled with the fall in real and nominal income of the 
households (Figure 1.3).
Finally, with respect to the geographical heterogeneity previously ob-
Their trends are very similar to those observed for the headcounts.
14A full poverty profile is beyond the scope of this Chapter, which focuses on the con­
struction of consistent poverty figures at the national level. Tables C.3, C.4, C.5 and C.6 in 
Appendix C present some characteristics of the samples in general and for the non-poor, 
the poor and the extremely poor for four of the fifteen waves under study. These descrip­
tive statistics are for illustration only -  for more detailed poverty profiles, see World Bank 
(2000a), World Bank (2003) and Cruces and Wodon (2003a).
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served, Figure 1.7 presents a consistent series of individual-based regional 
headcounts.15 While the areas with lower incomes were also those with 
lower poverty lines, the former prevails: the regional ranking of adult equi­
valent income of Figure 1.5 is reversed for poverty measures. There are 
significant differences in poverty rates within the country, with the GBA 
and Patagonia regions faring systematically better, and the North (Noreste 
and Noroeste regions) being consistently poorer than the rest of the coun­
try. Through most of the period under review, the ranking of the regions 
in terms of poverty estimates did not change, with fairly similar regional 
trends. However, the increase in poverty in the GBA area from October 2001 
to May 2002 was larger than the rise observed in any of the other regions.
2.3.3 Poverty transitions and short term dynamics
The analysis of cross section data usually results in discussions of changes 
in poverty rates between two periods, as in Figure 1.6. The rotating sample 
structure of the EPH, however, allows for a deeper analysis in terms of the 
poverty transitions of households between two periods. The evidence for 
Argentina is depicted in Figure 1.8, which is based on a special version of 
the EPH dataset where households were paired in two consecutive waves, 
resulting in a series of two-period panels. This dataset is representative at 
the national level, and because of the sample rotation it contains about 70 
percent of the observations listed in Table 1.1.16
Figure 1.8 presents the basic poverty transition between two waves (a 
six-month period). Starting from the October 1995, it decomposes the pop­
ulation into four transition categories, according to their current and past 
poverty status: the non-poor who stayed non-poor, the poor who stayed 
poor, the poor who escaped poverty, and the non-poor who became poor in 
the following period. The Figure represents a decomposition of the change
15These regional measures match the official INDEC statistics from 2001 onwards. For 
1995-2000, the regional and national poverty rates were constructed using the methodology 
described in Section 1.2.
16This paired dataset was prepared and kindly provided by Juan Martin Moreno, from 
the Argentine Ministry of Labour. It should be noted that the resulting poverty rates are 
slightly different from the ones presented in Figure 1.6. This is due to the nature of the 
rotating sample: since the dataset consists of observations paired accross two waves, only 
a maximum of 75% of the total observations for each wave is available, as illustrated in 
Table 1.2.
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in poverty between two waves of the EPH, which is equal to those who en­
tered poverty minus those who escaped poverty -  for this reason, the latter 
appears as negative in the Figure.
This evidence complements the description of the main poverty trends 
in Figure 1.6. Excluding the change between the last two waves, which 
cover the unusual circumstances of the 2001-2002 crisis, the proportion of 
individuals switching poverty status is fairly stable throughout the 1995- 
2001 period. In each wave (representing a period of about six months), 
an average of 7 to 8 percent of the population manages to escape poverty, 
while an average of 8 to 9 percent of the population enters poverty. These 
fluctuations are relatively large when compared to the changes in the cross- 
sectional headcounts, which were never higher than 2.4 percentage points 
for the same period (Figure 1.6). These large movements in and out of po­
verty compensate each other and result in relatively low net changes in the 
static cross-sectional poverty rates. Moreover, it should be noted that these 
large fluctuations occur even when aggregate rates were falling, as shown 
in Figure 1.8 for the years 1996-1998.
These relatively high and stable levels of switching in poverty status 
were affected by the worsening of the economic conditions over the 1995- 
2001 period. This is manifested in the almost continuous increase in the 
fraction of the population in poverty that stayed in poverty in the following 
wave of the survey.
Figure 1.8 also presents interesting results on the effects of the 2001-2002 
crisis, which are captured by the changes in poverty status between Oc­
tober 2001 and May 2002. The Figure indicates that the recession and the 
subsequent crisis affected the persistence of poverty and not only its level. 
The proportion of individuals who were poor and remained poor increased 
from 26.4 percent between the waves of October 2000 and May 2001 to 36.6 
percent between October 2001 and May 2002. Moreover, 18.3 percent of the 
population was non-poor in October 2001 but was recorded as poor in May 
2002, a major increase when compared to the average of about 8 to 9 percent 
for the 1995-2001 period. This is also reflected in the proportion of the pop­
ulation that was above the poverty line and remained at that level, which 
fell from a fairly stable 60 to 65 percent to a low 42.6 percent between the 
last two waves.
Individuals as a Function of Previous Poverty Status, Urban Argentina, 1995-2002
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Finally, Cruces and Wodon (2003a) provide evidence on movements wi­
thin the poor using the same paired dataset. An average of around 3 per­
cent of the population was found to switch between extreme poverty and 
poverty, and vice versa, in every wave of the EPH in the 1995-2001 period. 
From May 1998 onward however, there was a continuous increase in the 
share of individuals who were moderately poor and became indigent.
1.4 G u id e  to  th e  Literature  o n  P o verty  in  A r g e n t in a
1.4.1 Income distribution and poverty in Argentina
This Section provides a background for the analysis presented in the fol­
lowing Chapters by covering a selection of the literature on poverty in Ar­
gentina during the 1995-2002 period. The aim is threefold. Firstly, this Sec­
tion introduces some of the key contributions on distributional analysis in 
Argentina for further reference. It also covers some of the related issues 
that are not explored in the following Chapters, notably the social assis­
tance programmes and active strategies adopted by households to face the 
repeated economic crises of the period. Finally, it focuses on the few exist­
ing studies based on panel data for Argentina, to complement and provide 
a benchmark for the empirical findings of the following Chapters. Rather 
than providing a full summary of each article, the Section reviews only the 
results that are connected to the analysis of Part I.
The availability of household survey data since the mid 1970s has re­
sulted in a substantial literature on income distribution and poverty in Ar­
gentina. Nonetheless, most of it focuses on the Greater Buenos Aires region 
since the EPH was not systematically extended to the rest of the country un­
til the 1980s. Among these studies, Gasparini et al. (2001) cover the whole 
extension of data available from the EPH, from the mid 1970s until the end 
of the 1990s. The book details trends in poverty, inequality and social wel­
fare measures. It describes the available data and the methodology for the 
construction of these measures, and studies the robustness of the identified 
movements with respect to changes in poverty lines, economies of scale and 
equivalence scales at the household level. Gerchunoff and Llach (2004b) 
goes further back in time, providing a long term perspective on equality 
and growth, from 1880 until the present, in the context of the economic his­
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tory of Argentina. Given its historical coverage, the book builds on national 
accounts, tax and a multitude of other data sources.
With respect to the recent past, the articles presented in FIEL (1999) cover 
different aspects of distributional issues during the 1990s. The volume fo­
cuses on the impact of the structural changes in the Argentine economy in 
this period, and presents an in-depth analysis of poverty, social expenditure 
and the incidence of the tax system on the income distribution.
Another good source of data and analysis on household welfare can be 
found in the labour economics literature. Galiani and Hopenhayn (2003) 
provide a thorough analysis of unemployment risk and duration in the 
1990s based on the EPH, while Galiani and Gerchunoff (2003) present a his­
torical account of the evolution of labour market institutions and their role 
in the economy during the twentieth century in Argentina. Finally, Macken­
zie (2004) presents an account of the aggregate economic shocks and labour 
market responses during the 1995-2002 period.
These volumes and articles provide exhaustive accounts of distributio­
nal and household welfare issues in Argentina. For a comparative perspec­
tive, Thorp (1998) and World Bank (2004) constitute comprehensive studies 
of the evolution of poverty, inequality, and their causes and consequences 
in the context of Latin America, the former in a historical perspective and 
the latter concentrating on the more recent experience. Finally, Heckman 
and Pages (2003) and IADB (2004) focus on labour market and employment 
issues in the countries of the region.
1 A.2 Economic crises, household welfare and coping strategies
The studies cited above are mainly descriptive, identifying trends and cor­
relates of poverty. The analysis in World Bank (2000b) assesses the manage­
ment of social risks in Argentina, studying private and public interventions 
to derive policy recommendations. This article highlights the fact that al­
though Argentina had the highest GDP per capita in Latin America and 
some of the region's highest levels of social expenditure during the 1990s, 
poverty was still widespread as a consequence of the gaps in the provision 
of basic infrastructure and in the social insurance system. Based mainly on 
data from the EPH, the article identifies the main risks faced by different age 
groups, and analyses the social protection programmes designed to prevent
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and mitigate them.
The study finds that infants (0 to 5 years old) have higher rates of poverty 
and extreme poverty than any other group in the population, and points 
to the relative lack of early child development programmes in comparison 
with other Latin American countries. For the groups ranging from 6 to 14 
years and 15 to 24 years, World Bank (2000b) focuses on educational out­
comes and how these might lead to low levels of human capital accumu­
lation. While the coverage of primary education is almost universal (98.9 
percent), the study questions its quality and efficiency in the poorer regions 
of the country. The figures for secondary level enrolment and completion 
are much lower, with the lowest corresponding to the poorest areas.
Moreover, the article identifies employment issues as the main risk for 
the population aged 25 to 64 years old. While unemployment is one of the 
most important determinants of poverty in Argentina, World Bank (2000b) 
reports that a large proportion of the poor and extreme poor are emplo­
yed, so besides joblessness, this group also faces low levels of wages and 
underemployment. While some social insurance programmes exist (for in­
stance, unemployment insurance and family income supplements), access 
is granted mainly through formal work, which limits their impact given the 
high rate of informality among the population in general and the poor in 
particular. For the group of those aged 65 years old and more, the main risk 
is the low level of state pensions.
Finally, for the population in general, social programmes concentrate 
mainly on housing, with very low coverage, and on the provision of public 
health. While access to the latter is generally good, the article argues that its 
quality is relatively low. World Bank (2000b) recommends a social protec­
tion strategy based on early child development, retention in the education 
system and the promotion of formality in the labour force, concentrating the 
assistance in fewer programmes with better coverage.
While this study concentrates on the years before the economic crisis of 
2001-2002, Fiszbein et al. (2002) present the results of a special survey carried 
out in June and July of 2002, which focuses on the impact of the crisis on 
household welfare and the strategies adopted to cope with its consequences.
The changes in employment patterns are striking: Fiszbein et al. (2002) 
find that more than half of those who entered employment during the crisis
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were secondary workers within the household, implying a change in family 
roles. They also find evidence of deterioration in the quality of jobs, mani­
fested in an increase in the number of temporary and informal workers, and 
a reduction of work-related benefits for those in permanent jobs.
An original feature of the survey is that it collects information about sub­
jective welfare and social unrest. Fiszbein et al. (2002) find rising levels 
of discouragement and pessimism, an increase in participation in various 
forms of social protest, and high levels of violent crime, which are all at­
tributed to the economic crisis. Another original characteristic of the survey 
is the collection of data on coping strategies. Most of the households in 
the sample changed their consumption patterns to cope with the effects of 
the crisis, resorting to less expensive products. Other active strategies in­
cluded the addition of a new worker to the family group, although this was 
not very effective given the fall in labour demand and the high rate of un­
employment at the time. The poorest households were those who resorted 
the most to social networks, relying on assistance from friends, family, non­
governmental organizations and the government.
An innovative feature of the data is that, unlike the EPH and most other 
surveys for Argentina, the study carried out by Fiszbein et al. (2002) covers 
smaller towns in rural areas. A notable result is the high inequality between 
rural and urban areas, with the average income in the former only 60 percent 
of urban average. However, this appears to have only a marginal effect on 
national poverty and income figures, given the relatively small proportion 
of the population living in the countryside.
Finally, two articles evaluate the two major public intervention program­
mes carried out in Argentina during this period. Ravallion and Jalan (2003) 
review the Plan Trabajar, a public works programme introduced in the wake 
of high unemployment levels after the Mexican financial crisis of 1995. Tra­
bajar provided short-term jobs at low wage in infrastructure projects. The 
central government allocated the programme's budget across provinces ba­
sed on the unemployment levels among the poor. For practical purposes, 
Trabajar operated as a poverty alleviation programme targeted through un­
employment (de Ferranti et al., 2000b).
Ravallion and Jalan (2003) present an evaluation, based on propensity 
score matching methods, of the programme's efficacy in reducing poverty.
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Their results indicate that the Plan Trabajar generated income gains among 
the poor, and that its targeting was relatively good, with 80 percent of bene­
ficiaries in the poorest quintile of the population. Ravallion and Jalan (2003) 
find that the average gain is one half of the average wage, allowing for the 
foregone income in the form of jobs displaced by the programme. In terms 
of the distribution of gains from the programme, the gains are similar for 
men and women, but they are higher for younger workers.
Galasso and Ravallion (2003) review the Plan Jefes y  Jefas de Hogar Desem- 
pleados, implemented in January 2002 as a safety net for those most affected 
by the crisis of 2001-2002. The programme consisted of direct income sup­
port for unemployed heads of households with dependent children. It was 
designed as a universal programme, and it eventually reached more than 2 
million beneficiaries (INDEC, 2003b).
Galasso and Ravallion (2003) evaluate this programme with counterfac- 
tual samples created with matching techniques. The Plan Jefes y  Jefas de 
Hogar Desempleados was successful in reducing unemployment, although 
half of its beneficiaries -  mostly women -  would have been inactive (and 
not unemployed) without the programme. The authors found a substantial 
number of beneficiaries who were ineligible in principle, but its targeting 
performance, while not as good as that of the Plan Trabajar, was still better 
than the average for social spending in Argentina. Galasso and Ravallion 
(2003) find that half of the participants in the Plan Jefes y  Jefas belonged to 
the lowest quintile of the income distribution. While its design was not 
completely respected in practice, and it covered more than those unem­
ployed, the programme was successful in providing income support to most 
of those affected by the crisis, reducing the aggregate levels of extreme po­
verty.
2.4.3 Longitudinal studies of poverty and well-being in Argentina
The longitudinal dimension given by the rotating structure of the EPH sam­
ple, described in Section 1.2, has only recently started to be exploited in the 
literature on poverty analysis in Argentina.17 This Section focuses on stud­
17Studies based on the EPH panels concentrate mostly on labour markets and employ­
ment (Galiani and Hopenhayn, 2003; Mackenzie, 2004). Some exceptions are Lavergne et al. 
(1999), who discuss the variability of income at the individual level along a cohort of the
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ies of EPH panels and deals mainly with poverty spells and dynamics: they 
can be considered complementary to the results presented in this thesis.
Paz (2002) covers the dynamics of poverty within one cohort of the EPH, 
using the four waves of the period October 1998 to May of 2000 at the na­
tional level. The article provides an analysis of simple transitions similar to 
the one provided in the previous Section, reaching comparable conclusions 
about the magnitude of movements into and out of poverty.
The most interesting aspect of the article is a regression analysis of the 
determinants of poverty duration and entry and exit rates. Paz (2002) finds 
that persistently poor households tend to be headed by younger individu­
als with low education and higher unemployment levels, and tend to have 
fewer income earners. The Noreste and Noroeste regions are significantly 
correlated with higher levels of persistency. In terms of serial correlation, 
the poverty status at one point in time is highly correlated with that of previ­
ous periods, and that the effect is stronger for periods closer in time. Besides 
its effect on the duration of poverty, the unemployment of the household 
head is also found to substantially increase the probability that a household 
falls into poverty. Finally, older heads with higher education levels signif­
icantly increase the probability of leaving poverty (for the poor) and not 
entering poverty (for the non-poor).
Gasparini (2003b) also uses data from one cohort of the EPH at the na­
tional level, although the article concentrates on the yearly change between 
the October 2000 and October 2001 waves of the survey. Its aim is to iden­
tify and describe the characteristics of the households that entered poverty 
between these two waves, and to study the effects of the deepening of the 
recession during that period.
An interesting finding of the analysis is that the structure of the house­
hold does not have a major impact on the switch in poverty status between 
the two periods after controlling for other characteristics, with the exception 
of single-parent households headed by women with low education levels, 
for which the probability of becoming poor is significantly greater than for 
others. As in Paz (2002), Gasparini (2003b) finds that households headed by 
better-educated individuals have a lower probability of falling into poverty,
EPH, and Albomoz and Menendez (2004), who analyse income mobility and its relation­
ship with inequality.
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and also finds that the probability of being poor is highly correlated with 
the previous poverty status.
Finally, Corbacho et al. (2003) use a series of two-period panels from May 
1999 to May 2002, covering the recession of 1999-2001 and the economic 
crisis of 2001-2002 to study which groups bore the burden of the crisis. They 
also consider the transmission channels from macro shocks to individuals 
and the smoothing mechanisms adopted by the households to cope with the 
crisis.
Their measure of the effect of shocks on household welfare is the change 
in household income between two waves of the EPH. This proxy for vulner­
ability is regressed on household characteristics and geographic and time 
controls. The results show again that households headed by better-educated 
individuals are less vulnerable, as are those with heads employed in the 
public sector. Geographically, the inhabitants of the Noreste and Pampeana 
regions experienced the largest declines in income.
Corbacho et al. (2003) also identify employment status as the main trans­
mission channel between macroeconomic shocks and individual welfare, 
and provide some evidence on labour market outcomes. They find that un­
employment was higher among individuals with lower levels of education, 
and that younger workers were more likely to lose their jobs over the period. 
Public employees were those with higher job stability, whereas within the 
private sector unemployment was higher in the construction sector. Finally, 
the authors also study whether other income sources allow households to 
smooth the shocks to the labour income of the household head, finding that 
almost a third were not able to do any smoothing, with the extremely poor 
faring worse in this respect than the rest of the population.
1.5 C o n c l u s io n
This Chapter has discussed the methodology of poverty measurement in 
Argentina, presented the main datasets to be employed in this Part and doc­
umented the evolution of poverty measures and its components over the 
1995-2002 period. Its aim was to provide a framework for the analysis of 
Chapters 2 to 4, in terms of the characteristics of the data and the economic 
context.
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The Chapter has described the large fluctuations of household income 
over this turbulent period, and reported evidence of high volatility in move­
ments in and out of poverty The 2001-2002 crisis was found to have a large 
impact on the persistence of poverty. An important finding was that rela­
tively modest changes in poverty rates between two periods were the result 
of large but offsetting movements into and out of poverty. Moreover, these 
large fluctuations were not restricted to periods of crisis: a substantial frac­
tion of the population was found to enter poverty even when aggregate 
rates were falling. The use of panels revealed some features of the data that 
could not have been captured with the cross-sectional datasets usually em­
ployed in poverty analysis.
These large fluctuations in household income and poverty status are the 
main motivation for the following three Chapters, which explore the theo­
retical basis for the incorporation of income variability in poverty measure­
ment and the definition of well-being, and illustrate different methodologies 
with empirical implementations based on the Argentine case.
C h a p t e r  2
I n c o m e  F l u c t u a t i o n s , P o v e r t y  a n d  
W e l l - B e i n g  O v e r  T i m e
2.1 In t r o d u c t io n
The previous Chapter covered the movements into and out of poverty in 
two consecutive periods in urban Argentina (Section 1.3, page 29). This 
Chapter, and the following two, address a related but different question: 
echoing Atkinson (1987), they deal with the problem of how poverty should 
be measured over time -  or, in more general terms, how to measure well­
being based on repeated observations of household income. The framework 
developed in the following pages accounts explicitly for the negative effects 
of income variability. This welfare criterion is based on the intuition, de­
rived from the risk aversion literature, that households will prefer a steady 
stream of income to a variable one with the same mean, at least in a second- 
best world with incomplete insurance and capital markets (Cowell, 1989).
The evaluation of well-being with panel data can be thought of as an ex­
tension of the standard model of distributional analysis. Cowell (2000) de­
scribes the welfare theory of income distribution in terms of T , "the space of 
all univariate probability distributions" F of income yIr and defines a "wel­
fare ordering" W : T  —> R as a function that maps income distributions into 
the real line. The analysis of repeated observations is based on the distrib­
ution of N  vectors of T  observations over the period t = 1 to T, defined 
as Yi = [y ii,-/y fr]/ a population with N  households. Accordingly, let 
T t be the space of distributions FT of vectors y. The methodology focuses 
on a mapping from T t into the real line, with a transformation of the form 
W T  : T t  -► M .
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The contribution of this Chapter is to define a transformation W T in two 
steps, exploiting analogies with well-established results in economics and 
distributional analysis theory in each stage. The first step is the definition 
of an aggregate of the observations of income over time for household i that 
maps each vector y* into the real line. As discussed below, the average y,- 
does not account for the welfare effects of income variability: the insight is 
to exploit the formal analogy between states of the world in the expected 
utility model and past incomes in a multi-period setting, in a procedure 
that echoes the social welfare function approach in distributional analysis 
(Atkinson, 1970). Building on the concept of the certainty equivalent of in­
come, the first step reduces a distribution FT of N  vectors y/ to F, a distrib­
ution of N  scalars y/. The second stage of the proposed W T transformation 
involves an additional analogy: by showing that these scalars are appro­
priate money metrics of well-being, all the available tools of distributional 
analysis can be directly applied to the distribution F. The W T transforma­
tion is done first from each vector y,- to a scalar y,-, and then from F(y,) into 
some distributional index.
This methodology owes a great deal to the standard model of risk (Pratt, 
1964; Arrow, 1970) and to its reinterpretation in the social welfare context 
(Atkinson, 1970), as well as to the literature on lifetime income (Cowell, 
1979). In terms of recent work in the poverty literature, the methodology 
is related to (and draws from) the concept of expected poverty (Ravallion, 
1988), the transient-chronic decomposition (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998) and 
the recent body of work on economic vulnerability (Ligon and Schechter, 
2003; Calvo and Dercon, 2003). The approach proposed below is discussed 
in the light of this literature, and it attempts to unify some of the existing 
methodologies under a general framework.
The discussion starts in Section 2.1 with a simple expected utility model 
to establish the main intuitions behind the methodology. Section 2.3 then 
presents the proposed framework for the evaluation of past incomes. Sec­
tion 2.4 compares this method with existing approaches, which are inter­
preted as special cases of the evaluation framework. Finally, Section 2.5 
specifies functional forms for the general evaluation function of Section 2.3, 
and illustrates the uses of the methodology with data from the Greater 
Buenos Aires region in the 1995-2002 period. Conclusions follow.
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2.2 Ex - a n t e  a n d  E x - p o s t  In c o m e  Va r ia b il it y
2.2.1 Prospective evaluation of well-being: ex-ante utility and income risk
The objective of this Chapter is to develop tools for the analysis of well­
being based on panel data on household income. To reduce this problem to a 
tractable form, the proposed methodology aggregates these repeated obser­
vations into a single indicator for each household by means of an evaluation 
function. This Section presents a simple model of choice under uncertainty 
to introduce the intuition and some formal results for deriving such an indi­
cator, and to clarify the difference between ex-ante and ex-post evaluations 
of well-being.
The standard expected utility framework, due to von Neumann and 
Morgenstem (1944), specifies a household's utility function u(y), where y  
is income, consumption or wealth (henceforth denoted income).1 In this 
formulation, utility is defined over a single argument, in the tradition of 
Friedman and Savage (1948), Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1970).2 The function 
u represents a reduced form that encapsulates the utility level resulting from 
behavioural responses in savings, labour supply and other choice variables 
(Cowell, 2005, Chapter 9): the focus is placed on the outcome and not on the 
process through which it is reached.3
Following the standard risk literature, the function u is assumed to be 
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Uncertainty enters 
this model as a countable set O  of possible future states of the world. The 
household evaluates its future prospects in time t = 0. These uncertain 
prospects are defined as state-contingent incomes y w that materialise in 
t = 1. Each of these possible states of the world cu G O  has an associated 
probability t w.
The function u is an ex-post utility function, since it evaluates the utility
lrThe discussion could be based on income or consumption. As money metrics of wel­
fare, the two are used interchangeably in this Chapter. See Ravallion (1994) and Deaton 
(1997) for discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of using either for evaluating 
well-being.
2A concept lost in this formulation is the function of assets to link consumption in 
different periods. Kimball (1990), however, demonstrates the formal equivalence of the 
model of precautionary savings under income risk (Leland, 1968; Sandmo, 1970; Dreze and 
Modigliani, 1972) and models of choice under uncertainty.
3See Besley (1995) and Browning and Lusardi (1996) for reviews on responses to risk, 
de Ferranti et al. (2000c) covers the empirical evidence for Latin America in recent years.
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of a determinate income y  (Felli, 2003). The household's ex-ante utility is 
defined as the expectation over the ex-post outcomes: u is defined on certain 
incomes, but ex-ante utility is defined on lotteries over incomes. By means 
of the expected utility theorem (first due to von Neumann and Morgenstem, 
1944), ex-ante utility can be expressed as:
where E is the expectations operator, y  the uncertain income prospect and 
y w the contingent income associated with state of the world cv4
A  key result in the theory of choice under uncertainty is that expected 
utility depends not only on E[y], the expectation of future outcomes, but 
also on their distribution. A simple example clarifies this assertion. The 
random variable 1/ is equal to either y n  = y  +  h or y i  = y  — h with equal 
probability, and h > 0, so that a change in h represents a mean-preserving 
spread in future income.5 Then U can be written as If =  \u { y n )  +  \u ( y i) ,  
which depends on the value of h in the following way:
where u' represents the first derivative of u. Risk aversion follows from the 
concavity of u, which implies that uf is decreasing, and results in a nega­
tive value of dU /dh. The intuition is that greater uncertainty about future 
income makes a risk averse household worse-off, since by the concavity of 
u the possibility of a gain is outweighed by the prospect of a loss.
An important implication of risk aversion is that the expected value of 
income -  E[y] = y  in the example above -  is not a suitable money metric 
measure of well-being since it does not reflect the effects of risk on util­
ity (Cowell, 1979). As shown in the example, an increase in h reduces ex­
4Altematively, the set of outcomes can be continuous. In that case, the expectation is 
defined over the integral of the distribution of y. It is assumed throughout that this distrib­
ution is well-behaved, that Xa>en Pa> =  1/ and that all functions have the regularity condi­
tions of the standard model of choice under uncertainty (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981b). See 
Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Chapter 6) for a detailed presentation of the expected utility model 
and its underlying axioms.
5These results hold under the much more general conditions of second order stochastic 
dominance (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1969), of which this example is a special case.
U =  E[u({/)] =  £  r wu (yw) (2.1)
we ci
(2.2)
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pected utility, yet leaves E[y] unchanged. However, the concept of certainty 
equivalence -  a fundamental notion in the theory of choice under uncer­
tainty -  provides an intuitively appealing indicator of well-being. The (non- 
random) certainty equivalent income yce is implicitly defined by:
U =  E[u(y)] =  u(ycc) (2.3)
An expected utility maximising household with preferences defined by u 
would be indifferent between receiving y ce with certainty in the future or 
facing the uncertain prospect y. For a risk-averse household, Equation 2.3 
implies, by the concavity of u and Jensen's inequality, that yce < £ [y] - More­
over, since E[u(I))\ is decreasing in the level of risk, it follows from Equation
2.3 that y ce is also negatively affected by greater uncertainty. The certainty 
equivalent is thus better suited than E[y\ as a money metric indicator of 
well-being, since it captures the disutility arising from uncertainty.
Risk aversion and the certainty equivalent, however, are ex-ante con­
cepts, and this Chapter's aim is to measure well-being based on (ex-post) 
panel data: the following pages deal with the distinction between ex-ante 
prospects and ex-post outcomes.
2.2.2 Retrospective evaluation of well-being: ex-post utility and income fluctua­
tions
The expected utility U in Equation 2.1 is defined over events that have not 
occurred, while the underlying utility function u is defined over certain 
ex-post outcomes. This is an aspect of the theory that is often overlooked 
(Hammond, 1981; Milne and Shefrin, 1988; Ravallion, 1988, constitute some 
exceptions). It is necessary to distinguish between "income risk," an ex-ante 
concept based on variability in future prospects, and "income fluctuations," 
defined as experienced variability in the past. Panel data on incomes is in­
herently linked with both concepts: it reflects income fluctuations and thus 
it is ex-post by definition, but these fluctuations result from the presence of 
ex-ante income risk, as discussed below.
The setting described by Equation 2.1 corresponds to the case of income 
risk: once the state of the world cv materialises in t = 1, the random variable 
1/ takes a value and ex-post utility becomes u( yw), either u(yn)  or u(y i )
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Figure 2.1: Ex-Ante Risk and Ex-Post Variability: States of the World and 
Realised Incomes
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in the example above. To introduce the idea of income fluctuations, it is 
necessary to consider multiple past periods. It is assumed that a household 
at T +  1 has faced a series of consecutive independent realisations of states 
of the world draw n from the set D, which results in a past stream of income 
y =  [y i/- /y r ] .  While every yt is a random variable before its realisation, 
from the retrospective point of view of t +  1, every y t is just a determinate 
quantity given by the materialised state of the world cvt.
Well-being over time is determined by the experienced income stream y. 
The average of experienced utilities, while not accounting for time prefer­
ences, provides a simple aggregate of utility over the T periods:
“ =  ?  £  (2-4) 
1 t=1
Equations 2.1 and 2.4 are formally similar. However, the two represent the 
distinct but related concepts of income risk and income fluctuations.
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The example in Figure 2.1 illustrates this point. The Figure depicts the 
past outcomes and the future prospects for a household from the point of 
view of the present (t = 0) according to the formulations of Equations 2.1 
and 2.4. The income variable i/f is assumed to have the same distribution 
in each period t = {—3, —2, —1,1}, being either y# =  y  +  h or y i  = y  — h 
with equal probability.
While both U and u are determinate quantities, Equation 2.1 reflects the 
expected utility of the household in t = 1 from the point of view of t =  
0, while Equation 2.4 is the evaluation of a series of past outcomes at t — 
{—3, —2, —1} from the same point of view. To stress this difference, u in 
Figure 2.1 is the result of two y n  and one y i  realisations, which differs from 
the expected utility U =  E[u], represented by the average of u(yif)  and
“ (yt)-
While income risk as summarised in Equation 2.1 and income fluctua­
tions in Equation 2.4 are different in their nature, the connection between 
the two is that (ex-ante) risk is the source of (ex-post) fluctuations: with no 
risk, the distribution of yt would be a fixed value at every point in time, and 
the resulting stream of past income would be flat.
Moreover, while a risk averse household would prefer lower variability 
for a given value of expected future prospects (Equation 2.2), a similar intu­
ition applies to the simple aggregate of past utilities given by Equation 2.4: 
a risk averse household would trade off a reduction in the average for lower 
variability in past incomes, at least in a second-best world with incomplete 
insurance and capital markets (Cowell, 1989).
The following Section develops a framework for the evaluation of past 
incomes based on this analogue of risk aversion in an ex-post setting and 
on the formal similarity between the formulations of expected and average 
experienced utilities.
2.3  A  Fr a m e w o r k  fo r  th e  Ev a l u a t io n  o f In c o m e  Fl u c t u a t io n s
2.3.1 The structure of the evaluation function
A  general formulation for an aggregate of household income over time, y =  
[yi, ...,yr], is given by an evaluation function V  that maps a vector of T
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observations into the real line:
V(y)  = V( Vl , . . . , yT) (2.5)
In terms of the terminology used in the Introduction, V  defines a transfor­
mation W  : T  —> R, from the distribution of past incomes for a household 
into the real line.
The problem remains in defining a functional form for V , which deter­
mines the normative criteria associated with the evaluation of y. The pres­
ence of the time dimension introduces a higher degree of complexity with 
respect to the analysis of an income distribution at one point in time.
The framework proposed here concentrates on a series of intuitive cri­
teria. As a starting point, it is reasonable to assume that V  should be non­
decreasing in its arguments. Moreover, the aggregate level of welfare over 
the T  periods should depend not only on the level of y, but also on its vari­
ability. The idea, pervasive in economic theory, is that risk averse agents 
are willing to trade off a reduction in expected income for certainty. In an 
ex-post setting, the concept of risk aversion translates into a "dislike" of 
fluctuations, or variability aversion (to be formally defined below).
These two basic normative principles can be incorporated into the evalu­
ation function V  based on the results and intuitions of the previous Section. 
The evaluation framework, however, does not rely on utility functions u : 
the function V  is interpreted within a social welfare context as a judgement 
on the welfare value of the experienced income stream. This approach, fol­
lowed by Cruces and Wodon (2003b) and Ligon and Schechter (2003) among 
others, implies that it is not necessary to impute a utility function and as­
sume homogeneous preferences in the population.
In the evaluation framework, the stream of past income y =  [y\ , ..., yj]  
is assessed retrospectively from the point of view of period T  + 1 . The par­
allelism of V  with the expected utility formulation in Equation 2.1 means 
that each past income yt is evaluated by an instantaneous evaluation v{yt),  
assumed to be continuous, strictly increasing and twice-differentiable.6 The 
result is the following characterisation of V:
6While the emphasis is on panel data and thus on the evaluation of past incomes, the 
methodology can be applied to a certain but fluctuating future income stream.
CHAPTER 2. INCOME FLUCTUATIONS A N D  POVERTY 58
Definition 2.1 Additive, time-separable evaluation function. The evaluation 
of the observed stream of past income y =  [y\, V(y)/ is the discounted
average of the instantaneous evaluation function vfor each period from t = 1 to T:
% )  =  S a  (t)®(yt) (2-6)
t= 1
77ze weights are given by a discounting function A(f), wif/z 0 < A(f) < 1, and 
normalised (without loss of generality) so that J)j=i A (f) =  1.
The structure imposed by Equation 2.6 implies the following analogy: 
the model of choice under uncertainty in a single period (Equation 2.1) and 
the evaluation of past incomes based on an additive, time-separable evalu­
ation function as in Equation 2.6 are formally equivalent. The results from 
the former can be applied to the latter by: a) replacing the function u by its 
analogue v, b) replacing state-contingent incomes y w by observed incomes 
yt, and c) replacing probabilities by A(f).
This analogy is established by inspection of Equations 2.1 and 2.6: rank­
ing vectors of past incomes y according to V  is formally identical to ranking 
probability distributions according to the expected utility criterion. From a 
formal point of view, Equation 2.6 can be treated as a special case of Equa­
tion 2.1 with u = v, cv =  t, y w =  yt and r w =  A(f), i.e. "as if" past 
incomes were drawn from T events with outcomes y t . The formulation for 
V  in Equation 2.6 implies that the formal results from risk theory can be 
applied directly to the evaluation framework, although the interpretation 
of these results differs. The connection between the theory of risk and the 
evaluation framework stems from the discussion of income risk and income 
fluctuations in the previous Section.7
The main difference between risk and the formulation of Equation 2.6 
is the presence of the discounting function A(f), which accounts explicitly 
for the time dimension of the problem of evaluating past incomes. The mo­
tivation for the incorporation of A(f) into V  is the presence of pure time 
preferences: in the example of Figure 2.1, a household would not be indif­
7The idea of borrowing results from risk theory is at the basis of Atkinson's (1970) re­
interpretation of choice under uncertainty in a social welfare context. However, a social 
welfare function aggregates the distribution of income at a point in time for a population, 
while V  is a social evaluation of household welfare as defined by Equation 2.5.
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ferent to the ordering of past incomes, giving more weight to more recent 
events.8 The function A(t) is thus required to increase as t approaches T. 
Since the discount factors are normalised to sum 1, they can be interpreted 
as "discounting weights." In the simplest form of aggregation, every period 
of time is given an equal weight so that A(t) =  1 /T . Section 2.5 below 
discusses specific functional forms for v(y)  and A(f).
The parallel with the theory of risk is completed by the following Propo­
sition, which is the evaluation framework's analogue of risk aversion, and 
specifies a key condition for v\
Proposition 2.1 Variability aversion. The function v is assumed to be strictly 
concave, which implies that V (y) is strictly decreasing in the dispersion of y =  
[yi, ..., y j\  weighted by the discounting function A (t). The dispersion is defined in 
the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1969) second order stochastic dominance.
This result derives from the concavity of v, and it is equivalent to the risk 
aversion result (dU/dh <  0) in Equation 2.2. The curvature of v determines 
the degree of variability aversion, and its magnitude can be quantified by 
defining measures of absolute and relative aversion by analogy with the 
canonical model of risk (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1970).
Proposition 2.1 implies that for a given average discounted income over 
time, i/A =  S L i A(0y*/ a higher variability in the underlying stream re­
duces welfare as captured by V.  The properties of V  and v given by De­
finition 2.1 and Proposition 2.1 adapt the concept of risk aversion to the 
intertemporal setting, incorporating in the evaluation framework the prin­
ciple that past fluctuations reduce welfare, and should be penalised by an 
evaluation function. While not all fluctuations might be considered bad, 
for instance when income grows over time (Cowell, 1989), the variability 
aversion is based on the discussion of the effects of riskiness on household 
utility in Section 2.2. Moreover, the presence of the discounting function 
A(t)  in V  ensures that the evaluation of past incomes is not invariant with 
respect to the ordering of the components of y, except for the special case 
in which A(t) = 1/T.  For instance, in a setting with T = 2, if 1/2 >  yi
8Alternatively, A(t) can also be motivated by the presence of imperfect storage tech­
nologies, in which only a limited amount of income can be kept for future use.
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then V{yi ,  y2) > V{y2> 3/i): an increasing income stream results in a higher 
evaluation of well-being than a decreasing stream.
The following pages build on the additive structure of the evaluation 
function to specify measures of well-being and its variability over time.
2.3.2 Evaluation of well-being and variability over time
The concept of variability aversion and the structure of V  given by Defini­
tion 2.1 imply that another important notion from the theory of choice under 
uncertainty can be adapted to the evaluation of past incomes. The analogue 
of the certainty equivalent income (Equation 2.3) is given by:
Definition 2.2 The stability equivalent income y se is a real number such that
v(y) =  * (yse) (2.7)
yse is the level of income that, if received in every past period t =  1 to T, as y =  
[yse, ..., yse], would result in the same level V(y)  of the evaluation function as the 
observed stream y =  [y\ , ..., yf\ .
The continuity of v guarantees that yse exists, and its concavity implies 
that it is decreasing in the dispersion of y. Both results are formally analo­
gous to those for the certainty-equivalent in risk theory (Pratt, 1964).9
The counterfactual stability equivalent yse is a function of the shape of 
v and the level and distribution of yt in y. Under the assumption that the 
variability of past income reduces well-being, the yse can be interpreted as a 
"variability adjusted" income. It constitutes a welfare-based counterpart to 
the statistical measure y&, and it is thus superior to the discounted average 
income as an indicator of well-being, just as the certainty equivalent y ce was 
deemed superior to E[y\ in the expected utility model of Section 2.2.10
Finally, another concept that can be adapted from the theory of choice 
under uncertainty is the risk premium. Since yse is lower than the average 
income y& because of the concavity of v, the difference between the two
9This stability equivalent income is formally equivalent to Atkinson's (1970) "equally 
distributed equivalent level of income," and it is closely related to Ravallion's (1988) notion 
of "stabilised income."
10This argument is derived from Cowell's (1979) discussion of a "lifetime welfare- 
equivalent current income" for an income stream (Definition 2, page 12).
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provides a money metric of the loss in household welfare attributable to 
income fluctuations, as described in the following Definition:
Definition 2.3 The variability premium n v and the relative variability pre­
mium TT are real numbers such that
M y )  = 9 a - y s e  (2.8)
n(y) =  ^  (2.9)
3/A
where is the weighted average income over time given by y& =  £t=i A(f)yj, 
and y se is the stability equivalent income defined above.
Since yse is decreasing in the dispersion of y, n v and TT are increasing in 
the same parameter. Moreover, the curvature of v also affects these quanti­
ties through its effect on yse: for a given y, the stability equivalent income 
falls and the premium increases with v's  degree of variability aversion. The 
premium n v can be considered to be a welfare-based measure of the vari­
ability of past incomes, while the relative premium TT shares the same prop­
erty and has the advantage of being unit-free.11
Figure 2.2 depicts yse and n v for T =  2 in the evaluation-income space.12 
As in risk theory, the stability equivalent falls and the variability premium 
increases with a higher dispersion in past incomes due to the concavity of 
v. For a fixed level of dispersion, the effect of an increase in the curvature of 
v is the same. While the Figure is identical to any textbook example of risk 
aversion, Figure 2.1 presents the setting in the utility-time (or evaluation­
time, setting u =  v) space, stressing the difference between future states of 
the world (Equation 2.1) and materialised outcomes (Equations 2.4 and 2.6). 
From this example, it can be seen that the certainty equivalent y ce depends 
solely on the distribution of one future outcome, whereas only actual re­
alised incomes matter for the stability equivalent yse, even if these realised 
incomes originate in repeated draws from the same distribution as y ce•
n Some manipulation shows that FT(y) =  1 — y se/ y A, which is formally equivalent to 
Atkinson's (1970) simple inequality index.
12For expositional convenience, all the diagrams in this Chapter are based on the no dis­
counting case, in which A(t) = 1 /T .  This implies that V(y) represents the simple average 
o i v { y t) and that y A = y  =  (1/T) j J =1 y t.
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Figure 2.2: Stability Equivalent Income and Variability Premium
v(y)
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The following pages complete the discussion of the evaluation frame­
work by studying the properties of the stability equivalent yse as a variabil­
ity adjusted income.
2.3.3 "Fluctuation adjusted" population measures of well-being
In terms of the Introduction's terminology, both V  and yse define transfor­
mations W : T  —» R  that result in scalar measures of well-being based on 
a household's past incomes. While V(y)  and yse provide equivalent mea-
_ l1  • l _ r  t  7 /  \  • _  _ •  l  . i_ _ ____ ; _ c___ __________ i c ______  _ r  __ nni  • • _ _
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Proposition 2.2 The stability equivalent income yse, given by Definition 2.2, 
is a sufficient money metric statistic of household welfare defined by the evaluation 
functions v and V.
The proof of this Proposition relies on the uniqueness of the certainty 
equivalent in risk theory (Pratt, 1964). With a well-behaved, standard func­
tion v, Equation 2.7 implicitly defines V  and yse as monotonic transforma­
tions of each other, because v is strictly increasing and continuous. Since v 
takes income as its argument, the scalar measure of well-being, yse, is money 
metric.
This implies that the stability equivalents yse and y'se, corresponding to 
two functions V(y) and V' (y) ,  are directly comparable because they are 
both measured in money terms. Besides this property, Proposition 2.2 and 
the nature of the stability equivalent imply that y se satisfies CowelTs (1995, 
Chapter 1) requirements for a measure of income, which must be "mea­
surable [...] and comparable among different persons."13 For this reason, 
Proposition 2.2 ensures that all the tools of univariate distributional analy­
sis can be applied to the distribution of yse-
This procedure constitutes a second W : T  —*■ R transformation. The 
problem of studying the distribution of vectors y in the population is re­
duced, by means of the evaluation function V,  to the study of T(yse), the 
univariate distribution of the stability equivalent income. This means that 
any poverty measure P, inequality measure I, and social welfare function W 
defined over the distribution of incomes y  at one point in time can also be 
applied to the distribution of y se (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000). More­
over, since yse is money metric, its distribution can be compared to that 
of the average over time for each household, y. This exercise is akin to the 
comparison of distributions before and after tax or transfers, for which there 
exists an extensive literature and a standard set of tools (Cowell, 1995).
The two-step methodology described in this Section is similar in spirit to 
the process of equivalisation in distributional analysis. Survey data usually 
contains information about a number of income-eamers in a household. The 
equivalisation process converts a vector of incomes from different members
13Incomes yt are adjusted for differences in household size and composition by an equiv­
alence scale, and normalised so that they can be compared over time. See Section 1.2 (page 
22) for details of these adjustments.
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of a household into a single measure, according to some welfare criteria -  
usually taking into account the gender and age composition of the house­
hold (see Section 1.2, page 22, for details on the Argentine case). The analy­
sis is then carried out on the distribution of the scalar equivalised aggregate.
The following Section compares the evaluation framework with the re­
lated methodologies in the poverty and distributional literature.
2.4  C o m p a r iso n  w it h  A lternative  A p p r o a c h e s
2.4.1 Ex-post measures: transient and chronic poverty
The evaluation framework has a series of advantages over the existing ap­
proaches for the analysis of panel data on incomes. This Section reviews the 
results from the two main alternatives in the literature.
The first approach, widely used in empirical applications, is the transi­
ent-chronic poverty decomposition. This methodology originates in Raval- 
lion's (1988) contribution on poverty and welfare variability, on which Jalan 
and Ravallion (1998; 2000) base their definitions of transient and chronic 
poverty. Chapter 4 builds on these categories to study the Argentine case.
The approach applies Atkinson's (1987) family of additive poverty mea­
sures to a multi-period setting. A household's poverty in time t is given 
by the evaluation function p(yt),  where p is required to be additive, strictly 
convex and decreasing up to the poverty line, and taking a value of zero 
thereafter. Intertemporal poverty Pi, chronic poverty Q  and transient po­
verty Tj are defined as:
Pi =  T ^  p ( y i t ) 't=1
Q =  p(yi)  and (2.10)
Tt = P i - Q
Intertemporal poverty is the undiscounted average of the poverty evalua­
tions over time for a household, while chronic poverty reflects the poverty 
evaluation at the average income over time for i, yz. Finally, transient po­
verty is calculated as the difference between the two. Jalan and Ravallion 
(1998) compute these measures for every household and then aggregate
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Figure 2.3: Transient, Chronic and Variability Adjusted Measures of Poverty
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them into population averages, using the squared poverty gap function for 
p (Equation 1.5).
In terms of empirical applications, the main difference with the evalua­
tion framework is that Jalan and Ravallion (1998) work with poverty evalu­
ations, whereas the methodology presented in Section 2.3 first derives vari­
ability adjusted measures of income with an evaluation function, and then 
computes poverty indices based on them (Section 2.5 below presents an ex­
ample of this procedure).
Despite this difference, the transient-chronic decomposition represents a 
special case of the evaluation framework. The poverty evaluation function 
p can be interpreted as an evaluation function by setting v = — p, which re­
flects an assessment of i's well-being that gives zero weight to income above 
the poverty line. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3, which presents an example 
for T = 2, w ith no discounting (A(t) =  1/T) and w ith y \ and 3/2 below 
the poverty line. In the Figure, the poverty evaluation p is m irrored by the
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evaluation function v = —p. This representation highlights the connection 
between the two methodologies: the money metric indicator yse based on 
v = — p represents the fixed level of income that would result in the same 
intertemporal poverty P as the observed stream y.
A disadvantage of the Jalan and Ravallion (1998) approach is that the 
aversion to variability is implicitly built into the poverty evaluation func­
tion p, which amalgamates the poverty and time dimensions. This func­
tion, however, may not be appropriate for evaluating income over time. 
For instance, most of the transient-chronic applications are based on the 
squared poverty gap, which is akin to a quadratic utility function and thus 
implies the possibly undesirable property of increasing relative risk aver­
sion (Kurosaki, 2003).14 On the other hand, the two-step procedure pro­
posed here ensures that these two facets are accounted for by a separate set 
of principles. The stability equivalent is derived from a set of principles spe­
cific to the time dimension, summarised by v, and the measure of poverty 
is then obtained by applying a function p, specific to the income dimension, 
to this household aggregate.
Finally, the evaluation framework has two additional advantages. On 
the one hand, it allows the computation of variability adjusted measures of 
income for the whole population, while the transient-chronic decomposi­
tion by definition applies only to the poor. On the other hand, the incor­
poration of a discount factor in Equation 2.6 accounts for the trajectory of 
income, whereas the measures in Equation 2.10 are invariant to changes in 
the ordering of incomes yt in y.
Some of the advantages of the evaluation framework over the transient- 
chronic decomposition are also present when compared with the vulnera­
bility approach, analysed in the following pages.
2.4.2 Ex-ante measures: risk and vulnerability
The vulnerability approach, as defined by Ligon and Schechter (2003), at­
tempts to capture the ex-ante risk faced by households.15 They rely on a
14The properties of the quadratic utility function in terms of risk aversion are analysed 
by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, page 400).
15Thorbecke (2003) and Ligon and Schechter (2004) provide extensive overviews of the 
literature, including its relationship with Ravallion's (1988) concept of "expected poverty."
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"welfare function" U defined over household income yz. The vulnerabil­
ity of a household i, V f s , is given by the difference between U^s evaluated 
at the poverty line z and the expectation of UjjS(yi):
V t s = Uf-s ( z ) - E [ U j - s (Vi)} (2.11)
which is decomposed into "poverty" and "risk" components:
V f s =  {U p(2) -  U{s (E{Vi})} +  {U p(E [yf]) -  E[UP(y;)]} (2-12)
' ------------------------ v ------------------------ '  ' ----------------------------v  '
Poverty Risk
The expectation operator in Equations 2.11 and 2.12 refers to the distrib­
ution of future income: V f s is meant to capture ex-ante risk and is thus 
"inherently forward-looking" (Ligon and Schechter, 2004). This is the main 
difference between the vulnerability approach and the evaluation frame­
work: the former attempts to capture ex-ante income risk, while the latter 
evaluates ex-post fluctuations, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 and discussed in 
Section 2.2.
Since observed data is ex-post by definition, this approach requires an 
identifying assumption to use past realisations "to estimate the probability 
of possible future outcomes" (Ligon and Schechter, 2003). The assumption 
made by these authors is stationarity, which imposes the restriction that "the 
probability distribution of income in one period is identical to the prob­
ability distribution of income in any other period" (Ligon and Schechter, 
2004). This implies that the last term in Equation 2.11, E[lt}“s (yi)], becomes
( i /T) s L i  u p (y« )-
However, whether trying to capture past variability or future risk, from 
an applied point of view only realisations of income y are available to the 
researcher. The vulnerability approach and the evaluation framework me­
thodologies differ conceptually, but the identifying assumption made by the 
former implies that the two result in similar empirical applications. This 
means that, as the transient-chronic decomposition, Ligon and Schechter's 
(2003) vulnerability measures can be interpreted as a special case of the eval­
uation framework. This is illustrated in Figure 2.4 (based on Thorbecke, 
2003), which presents an example with T = 2 and no discounting (A(t) = 
1/T). In this setting, the evaluation function defined in Equation 2.6 be-
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comes V( y)  = (1/T) Yj=i v {Vit)• The connection between the two metho­
dologies emerges from setting the evaluation and welfare functions to co­
incide: assuming U^s = v results in V(y)  = E[v(yt)] =  £ [li^s (yI)]/ the 
last term in Equation 2.11. As can be appreciated in Figure 2.4, Ligon and 
Schechter's (2003) measure of vulnerability is equivalent, in the evaluation 
framework, to the difference between the evaluation of the poverty line, 
v(z),  and that of the observed income stream, V(y).
The Figure also illustrates, in its vertical axis, the decomposition of vul­
nerability given by Equation 2.12. This example shows that the same exer­
cise can be carried out within the evaluation framework: along its horizon­
tal axis, the Figure presents a monotone transformation of the "poverty" 
and "risk" components of Equation 2.12 in money metric terms, z — y  and 
y  — y se respectively. The latter corresponds to the variability premium de­
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fined in Equation 2.8.16
A disadvantage of Ligon and Schechter's (2003) vulnerability measure, 
similar to that of the transient-chronic decomposition, is that the function 
l i P  determines not only the value of UjjS(E[yi\) — E [U P(yz)], the "risk" 
component in Equation 2.12, but also the functional form of the "poverty" 
component, UfjS(z) — U2LS(E[yz]). In the evaluation framework, however, 
the stability equivalent yse is derived from a function v, and the poverty 
measures are then based on y se, which ensures that fluctuations and poverty 
are disentangled.
Moreover, V p  in Equation 2.11 is derived in units of the cardinal welfare 
function IZp ("utils" in Ligon and Schechter, 2003), which implies that mea­
sures of vulnerability based on two functions U p  and U p  are not directly 
comparable. As discussed in Section 2.3, a money metric indicator like yse 
ensures the comparability of results for different evaluation functions.
Finally, by attempting to capture the ex-ante risk faced by the house­
holds, the stationarity assumption means that the measure of vulnerabil­
ity in Equation 2.11 does not take into account the dynamic dimension of 
the observed stream y: v p  is the same for the vectors y =  [y\, yf\  and 
y ' =  [1/2/ 3/1] with y\  3/2* While assuming stationarity is plausible in some 
contexts, the evaluation framework can account for the dynamic nature of 
y through the discounting function A(t). This is illustrated in the empirical 
applications presented in the following Section.
2.5 E m p ir ic a l  Im p l e m e n t a t io n  a n d  A p p l ic a t io n  t o  A r g e n t in a
2.5.1 Empirical implementation: alternative evaluation functions
This Section deals with the implementation of the evaluation framework. 
It adds structure to the formulation in Section 2.3 by stipulating a series 
of functional forms for v and studying the characteristics of the resulting 
stability equivalent incomes yse.
The definition of V  in Equation 2.6 relies on the functions v and A. The 
empirical applications presented below are based on an exponential dis­
16Moreover, the representation of V p  in terms of income on the horizontal axis of Figure 
2.4 reveals that this measure of vulnerability is a monotone transformation of the poverty 
gap (oc =  1 in Equation 1.5, page 35) evaluated at yse.
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counting function, although A(f) can in principle accommodate hyperbolic 
discounting or other suitable principles (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). In 
what follows, A(f) is given by:
with a bounded discount factor, 0 < 6 < 1. The weighted or discounted 
average of income is then defined as:
The formulation in Equation 2.13 and the bounds in the parameter 5 ensure
ter 5 is the discount factor, which defines the relative weight given to the 
recent past with respect to events further away in time. As 5 approaches 0, 
more weight is placed in the last period, T, and in the limit A$_>o (T) =  1 
and A$_>o{t ^  T) = 0. The opposite case is that of no discounting, which 
corresponds to 5 =  1: this implies that the "discount weights" simplify to 
A(t) = 1/T. In this case, the evaluation function V  becomes the average of 
v(yt),  and Equation 2.14 represents y.
Regarding the functional form of v, the prominence of choice under 
uncertainty in the evaluation framework implies that intuitive functional 
forms for v are derived from the instantaneous utility functions used in the 
theory of risk.
A first alternative is the analogue of the isoelastic utility function,18 the 
Constant Relative Variability Aversion (CRVA). The following Equations de­
scribe this function and the implied stability equivalent income:
more weight to more recent events. However, the formulation in Equation 2.13 allows for 
a decreasing A(t) if 5 ^ 1. In that case, larger values of 5 imply more weight for events 
further in the past. In the limit, A,j_>+00(1) =  1 and A^ _» + o o ( t  7^ 1 )  — 0*




that 'E j-i A(t) =  1 and that the function is increasing in t.17 The parame-
(2.15)
17The motivation for an increasing A(f) derives from pure time preferences, which give




tf=1 1-" i f p ^ l
n L i  y f w if p =  i
(2.16)
This functional form allows for a sensitivity parameter p, the analogue of 
the relative risk aversion parameter in the Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
(CRRA) utility function. Since yse is decreasing in p, it quantifies the effect of 
past variability on well-being: for a fixed dispersion of past incomes, higher 
values of p result in lower stability equivalent incomes.
The CRVA form implies that the degree of aversion to fluctuations is 
constant relative to the household's income, since the curvature of v is con­
stant. This is consistent with the intuition that "the rich are more tolerant of 
risks than the poor" (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, Chapter 14), and it is re­
flected in the fact that the relative stability premium TT (Equation 2.9) based 
on Equation 2.16 remains constant when all incomes in y are multiplied by 
the same positive factor (in the case of no discounting).
An alternative to the CRVA functional form is given by the analogue 
of the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility function, which is 
also widely used in the risk literature. The Constant Absolute Variability 
Aversion (CAVA) is given by:
Equation 2.17 also allows for a sensitivity parameter, r\ ^  0, which cap­
tures the degree of variability aversion, since larger values of rj imply lower 
stability equivalents yse. Moreover, this formulation is also consistent with 
the intuition mentioned above, namely that as income grows, households 
are willing to accept larger fluctuations. Compared to the CRVA, the CAVA 
functional form implies that the relative stability premium TT (Equation 2.9) 
falls w hen all incomes in y are multiplied by the same positive factor (again,
(2.17)
resulting in the stability equivalent:
y Se =  - ~ l n  £<= i A (t )e ny> (2.18)
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Figure 2.5: Evaluation Function Contours for Different Degrees of Variabil­
ity Aversion
Line o f income stability
ys’e yse y Yi
N o  a v e r s i o n  I n t e r m e d i a t e  a v e r s i o n  E x t r e m e  a v e r s i o n
in the case of 6 = 1).
Finally, two extreme cases are presented for illustration. The first case, 
in which v is not strictly concave, is given by a linear evaluation function:
v{y)  =  (2.19)
resulting in
yse — j/A =  ZfLi A( t )y t  (2.20)
This formulation can be interpreted as the limit case of the CRRA function
with p =  0, in other words, with no variability aversion, the fluctuation
adjusted income reduces to the discounted average over time.
The opposite case to Equation 2.19 is given by extreme variability aver­
sion, corresponding to the limit case of the CRRA function with p —> Too.
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In the case of no discounting, this formulation results in:
yse =  m in(yt) (2.21)
The implied evaluation function only takes into account the lowest of past 
incomes, and it is the analogue, in the evaluation context, of a "Rawlsian" 
social welfare function (Hammond, 1975).
Figure 2.5 highlights the difference between these different degrees of 
variability aversion, which are not readily apparent in the evaluation-inco- 
me space of previous figures. With T =  2, the Figure represents the stability 
equivalent income in the \)\, y i  space for evaluation function contours with 
different degrees of variability aversion and no discounting. The CRVA and 
CAVA cases are represented by the "intermediate aversion" curve in the 
Figure, while the contour implied by Equation 2.19 is the "no aversion" 
solid straight line, which results in yse = y. Finally, the extreme aversion 
case is depicted by the kinked contour in Figure 2.5.
2.5.2 Application to Argentina
The following pages present alternatives for empirical analysis using the 
evaluation framework and the functional forms discussed above. The re­
sults in Chapters 3 and 4, which can be interpreted in the evaluation context 
(as discussed in Section 2.4), provide further examples of empirical work.
The data corresponds to the Greater Buenos Aires dataset described in 
Section 1.2 (page 22) -  a series of rotating panels over the 1995-2002 period 
with twelve cohorts of households with four observations each (i.e. T =  4). 
The evaluation functions and stability equivalents defined above are ap­
plied to the equivalised and normalised income of these households, given 
by yn in Equation 1.3 (page 27).
The simplest analysis can be carried out over the population average 
of yse, depicted in Figure 2.6 for each of the twelve cohorts. The evaluation 
functions in this Figure are the CRVA (Equation 2.15), CAVA (Equation 2.17) 
and the extreme aversion (Equation 2.21) functions, while the average of 
income over time (Equation 2.19) is used as the benchmark case. For the 
CRVA and CAVA formulations, the parameters p and r\ are set to 2, a value 
adopted for empirical analysis in Chapter 3 and by Ligon and Schechter
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(2003), among others.19 This example concentrates on different functional 
forms, and thus the parameter 5 in Equation 2.13 is set to 1, resulting in
a  (t) = i / r .
As described in Chapter 1, incomes are normalised by their contempo­
raneous poverty lines so their unit is the poverty line. The four variability 
adjusted measures and the average income in Figure 2.6 follow the basic 
trends described in Section 1.3 (page 29), confirming the highly pro-cyclical 
nature of household income. Notably, the difference between the average of 
income over the four periods in which households are observed (bold solid 
line) and its minimum (solid line) is quite sizeable at about three quarters 
of the poverty line. This indicates the presence of strong within-panel fluc­
tuations in household income. Moreover, the difference between the two is 
large even in periods of income growth, for instance during the years 1996- 
1998.
This "minimum" stability equivalent can be interpreted as the result of 
an extreme aversion evaluation function, while the average income repre­
sents no aversion and the CRVA and CAVA constitute intermediate cases 
(see the diagram in Figure 2.5). This implies that in Figure 2.6 the stability 
equivalents based on these two formulations fluctuate between the average 
and the minimum. On average, the difference between the stability equi­
valent given by the CRVA function with p = 2 and the average income is 
around a quarter of the poverty line, while the difference between the lat­
ter and yse based on the CAVA with 77 =  2 is about half of this unit. These 
differences represent the population averages of the absolute variability pre­
mium defined in Equation 2.8, and they are relatively large with respect to 
the average income, which fluctuates between around 3 and 3.25 times the 
poverty line. Finally, while the four measures tend to move similarly, the 
CRVA is more sensitive to increases and decreases in the average income 
over time, magnifying its fluctuations.
Another type of empirical analysis based on the evaluation framework 
is presented in Table 2.1, which depicts the evolution of the relative vari­
ability premium IT (defined in Equation 2.9) by quintile of average income, 
based on a CRVA with p = 2 and no discounting. The advantage of this for-
19Section 3.3 (page 89) discusses the range of plausible values and the sensitivity of mea­
sures of this type with respect to p.
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Table 2.1: Relative Variability Premium by Quintile of Mean Income, Isoe­
lastic Evaluation Function with Aversion Parameter=2, Greater 
Buenos Aires, 1995-2002
Cohort Bottom Second Third Fourth Top OverallQuintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
95-1 to 96-2 16.7% 11.3% 9.0% 10.4% 7.8% 11.0%
95-2 to 97-1 25.5% 9.4% 8.2% 11.2% 8.2% 12.4%
96-1 to 97-2 22.9% 14.3% 9.5% 10.0% 7.5% 12.7%
96-2 to 98-1 19.2% 11.9% 9.8% 9.4% 8.8% 11.8%
97-1 to 98-2 24.6% 8.6% 7.6% 6.9% 6.9% 11.0%
97-2 to 99-1 22.1% 10.4% 7.2% 7.4% 5.3% 10.4%
98-1 to 99-2 24.4% 11.0% 8.1% 7.9% 5.2% 11.2%
98-2 to 00-1 21.9% 12.8% 7.2% 5.6% 7.1% 10.9%
99-1 to 00-2 24.3% 10.1% 7.3% 5.2% 7.4% 10.8%
99-2 to 01-1 22.2% 10.0% 10.1% 7.5% 5.1% 10.9%
00-1 to 01-2 20.7% 15.2% 7.6% 5.8% 7.0% 11.2%
00-2 to 02-1 34.9% 19.7% 13.2% 12.2% 9.8% 17.9%
Overall 23.3% 12.1% 8.7% 8.3% 7.2% 11.8%
Source: Author's estimations based on EPH household survey data (INDEC).
mulation is that the relative variability premium is constant with respect to 
proportional changes in the income vector y when 5 = 1, so that differences 
in its value at different points of the income distribution reflect the differen­
tial impact of income fluctuations as a proportion of total income. As can 
be appreciated from the Table, the poorest quintile bears the highest level 
of fluctuations in relative terms, with values of around 20 and 25 percent of 
the average income, and with a peak of almost 35 percent in the period cor­
responding to the 2001-2002 crisis (see Section 1.3, page 29, for details). The 
second quintile also has a relatively high level of the variability premium at 
around 12 percent, but for the three richest groups a pattern is not clearly 
discernible, remaining between 7 and 9 percent on average.
Figure 2.7 presents the population squared poverty gap for the different 
evaluation functions considered above, with p =  2,77 =  2 and <5 =  1. These 
poverty measures are based on the stability equivalent incomes presented 
in Figure 2.6: as expected, the order of the series is reversed with respect to
.7: Variability Adjusted Squared Poverty Gap with Different Evaluation Functions, Greater Buenos Aires, 1995- 
2002
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Table 2.2: Variability Adjusted Income for Different Values of the Discount 
Factor, Isoelastic Evaluation Function with Aversion Parameter=2
Observed Income Stability Equivalent, CRVA a=2
Income Profile t=l t=2 t=3 t=4 CT 5=1 5=0.9 6=0.5 6=0.1
Flat 1 1 1 1 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
"Early" MPS 1.5 0.5 1 1 0.35 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.99
"Late" MPS 1 1 1.5 0.5 0.35 0.86 0.83 0.69 0.53
Increasing 0.5 0.75 1.25 1.5 0.40 0.83 0.88 1.14 1.46
Decreasing 1.5 1.25 0.75 0.5 0.40 0.83 0.79 0.64 0.52
Note: MPS refers to a mean preserving spread of income over time. The constant relative 
variability aversion (CRVA) function and the stability equivalent are defined in the text.
that Figure, w ith the highest poverty when using the minimum income over 
the period and the lowest when using the average over time. The difference 
between these two series is again sizeable, but the most notable fact from the 
Figure is the evolution of the CRVA series. While the averaging of incomes 
over time smooths income and poverty measures -  a fact discussed at length 
in Chapter 3 -  the CRVA formulation is more sensitive than the CAVA to 
the variability of the underlying incomes. This can be appreciated in its 
higher curvature at the points where the poverty measure (based on average 
income) changes its trend.
Finally, while the previous examples concentrated on functional forms 
for v and thus considered cases with no discounting, Table 2.2 illustrates 
the effect of different values of 6 in Equation 2.13 on the evaluation of past 
incomes.20 The left hand side panel of the Table presents five benchmark 
cases of income trajectories with T =  4 (y =  [y\, yi ,  3/3/ 1/4]) and y  =  1 
and their standard deviations cr, while the right hand side panel reports the 
resulting stability equivalent based on a CRVA function with p — 2 and four 
values of the discount factor: 5 G {1,0.9,0.5,0.1}.
With 5 — 1, the discounting weight is equal to A(t) = l / T  for every 
period, which is the case for the previous applications. The first line of 
the Table represents a "flat" income trajectory, which results in a stability
20The introduction of A(f) with 5 ^  1 in the GBA examples given by Figures 2.6 and 
2.7 shifts the level of the stability equivalents and poverty measures. Table 2.2 is more 
informative since it illustrates the effect of 6 on household income trajectories.
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equivalent (given by Equation 2.16) equal to yse = y  = 1. The following 
rows of the Table illustrate the effect of a mean-preserving spread in y on yse: 
with a mean of y  =  1, the stability equivalent falls to 0.86 (second and third 
rows) and 0.83 (fourth and fifth rows) as the standard deviation increases.
The comparison between the second and third (and fourth and fifth) 
rows of the Table illustrates the invariance of the stability equivalent with 
respect to the ordering of incomes yt in y when no discounting is applied. 
The second and third rows represent mean-preserving spreads (MPS) of the 
"flat" income trajectory, the difference being that for the former the spread 
occurs at t =  1 and t = 2, while for the latter it occurs closer to the present at 
t = 3 and t =  4. The stability equivalent yse with 5 =  1 is the same in both 
cases, since this implies that A(t) = 1 / T  and thus V (y) =  V ( y f) when y; is a 
permutation of y.21 However, the introduction of discounting changes this 
invariance result: with 5 = 0.9, the stability equivalents are 0.85 and 0.83, 
respectively, and the difference between the two reflects the fact that more 
weight is given to the low realisation for t =  4 in the "late MPS" trajectory. 
The yse resulting from 5 =  0.5 and 6 = 0.1, in turn, reflects the trade-off 
between mean and dispersion: while y — 1 for all trajectories in the Table, 
the discount weights imply that y& changes with 5. With 5 =  0.1, most of 
the weight is placed on t =  4 and very little on t =  1, which explains the 
large difference in yse between the second and third rows 22
Finally, the fourth and fifth rows of Table 2.2 present the same incomes 
as an increasing and a decreasing trajectory. As discussed above, the dy­
namic structure of y does not affect the stability equivalent for 5 = 1, but 
as this parameter increases, yse is higher for the increasing case and lower 
for the decreasing trajectory. This example shows that the discounting func­
tion A(t) incorporates the dynamics of income streams into the evaluation 
framework.
21 See Cowell and Cruces (2004) for a study of the effect of mean preserving spreads in 
individual perceptions of risk and inequality.
22For <5 =  1 and T =  4, A(f) =  0.25 for all periods. For 6 =  0.9, the discounting weights 
are 0.21,0.24, 0.26 and 0.29 (for t =  1,2,3 and 4 respectively); for 5 =  0.5, the weights are 
0.07,0.13,0.27 and 0.53; and for 6 =  0.1, the weights are 0.001,0.01,0.09 and 0.90.
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2.6  C o n c l u s io n
This Chapter has presented a framework for the evaluation of well-being 
based on panel data on household income. The methodology relies on an 
analogy with choice under uncertainty and the expected utility model to de­
fine a family of welfare-based indicators of well-being and variability over 
time. This is achieved by means of a two-step procedure, which involves 
aggregating vectors of observations over time for a household into a scalar 
and then studying the distribution of this aggregate.
The methodology was discussed in the context of alternative approa­
ches, such as the transient-chronic poverty and measures of vulnerability. 
The evaluation framework differs from the latter in that its measures are 
money metric, and in that it explicitly recognises the ex-post nature of ob­
served data, allowing the incorporation of the dynamic nature of income 
processes through time preferences. Moreover, an advantage of the pro­
posed approach is its flexibility: the first step -  the derivation of a summary 
measure of well-being over time -  does not depend on an ad hoc statisti­
cal procedure but on an explicit normative evaluation function of past in­
comes. Finally, the researcher can choose the appropriate measure (poverty, 
inequality, etc.) for the analysis in the second step.
The empirical results from this Chapter indicated a relatively large nega­
tive effect of income fluctuations on household welfare in Argentina, assum­
ing only moderate levels of variability aversion in line with most estimates 
of risk aversion in the uncertainty literature. Moreover, the large fluctu­
ations of income over time had a significant negative effect on household 
welfare even during periods of aggregate growth.
The Conclusion to this Part (page 205) discusses some possible exten­
sions to the evaluation framework by incorporating other principles beyond 
variability aversion. The following two Chapters shift the focus from the 
measurement of well-being and income fluctuations to the study of its main 
correlates: Chapters 3 and 4 use regression analysis to study the determi­
nants of variations of the measures proposed in this Chapter.
C h a p t e r  3
R i s k  A d j u s t e d  P o v e r t y  i n  A r g e n t i n a
3.1 In t r o d u c t io n
In the introduction to a pioneering volume on panel data on incomes, Cow­
ell (1982) noted that these datasets "provide a unique opportunity" for the 
modelling of the instability of family well-being and the incidence of po­
verty, among other economic phenomena. Since then, ample evidence has 
been gathered showing that poor households have highly variable living 
standards, and are prone to suffering from adverse shocks. As suggested 
by Blundell and Preston (1998), if insurance markets were complete, hou­
seholds would be able to fully offset the impact of any shocks. While these 
perfect markets do not exist in advanced economies, the situation in devel­
oping countries is even worse since credit markets and social safety nets 
tend to be underdeveloped. Jalan and Ravallion (1999), for instance, find 
that household consumption is never fully insured against income variabil­
ity in rural China, and that poorer households are not as well insured as 
others. Despite the importance of income risk in these processes, much of 
the literature concentrates on the impact of specific shocks or on movements 
into and out of poverty -  see for instance Glewwe and Hall (1998), Dercon 
and Krishnan (2000), and Scott (2000), among others.
This Chapter does not rely on the analysis of insurance, shocks or po­
verty dynamics. Instead, it shares with Chapter 2 the aim of accounting for 
income variability in general, but it particularly focuses on the effects of risk 
on well-being. As Morduch (1994) notes, "while the economics of poverty 
and the economics of uncertainty are well developed, the nexus of issues 
at their intersection has been left relatively unexplored." This Chapter at-
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tempts to fill the void between the theories of poverty and uncertainty by 
following Morduch's (1994) proposal of measuring poverty in terms of the 
certainty equivalent of income, and develops a measure of income that re­
flects the disutility induced by risk. This modus operandi is similar in spirit 
to the model described by Cowell (1979), who defines the concept of lifetime 
income under uncertainty in a similar way
This Chapter describes the empirical implementation of the certainty 
equivalent as a basis for adjusting incomes for risk, under the assumption 
that insurance and capital markets are imperfect and that individuals are 
risk averse. This methodology can be interpreted as a special case of the 
evaluation framework presented in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4, page 64). The 
main difference is that the discussion in the following pages relies explicitly 
on choice under uncertainty in the expected utility model by assuming that 
past observations of income for a household are representative of its future 
prospects.
The estimates of risk adjusted income are aggregated into risk adjusted 
poverty measures for the population. The procedure also allows to assess 
the determinants of risk adjusted income by means of regression analysis. 
Variations of this methodology were applied to risk adjusted measures of 
inequality by Makdissi and Wodon (2003), and extended to comparisons of 
long term relative deprivation between groups by Cruces et al. (2004).
This framework is illustrated with panel data on household income from 
the Greater Buenos Aires region for the period 1995-2002. The use of Ar­
gentine data is especially appropriate given the repeated shocks that have 
affected the country during the period, which resulted in large fluctuations 
in household income as described in Chapter 1. These can be interpreted as 
increases in the risk faced by households.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the 
conceptual framework for the estimation of risk adjusted measures of in­
come and poverty, and for the analysis of their determinants. Section 3.3 
presents the empirical results using the Greater Buenos Aires panel. A brief 
conclusion follows.
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3.2  M e t h o d o l o g y
3.2.1 Risk adjusted income
The starting point of this methodology is the theory of choice under uncer­
tainty in the expected utility model, discussed in Section 2.2 (page 52). A 
household's utility is represented by the function u, which is assumed to be 
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. The household faces 
uncertainty with respect to its future income, represented by the random 
variable y. The distribution of 1/ is given by S possible future states of the 
world, each characterised by a state-contingent income y s and its probabil­
ity t s . The household's expected utility is defined analogously to Equation
2.1 (page 53) as:
U =  E[«(<?)] =  £  r s«(ys) (3.1)
S = 1
where E is the expectations operator. To avoid the problems implied by 
the assumption of homogeneity of preferences in a population (see the dis­
cussion in Section 2.3, page 56), the functions U and u in this Chapter are 
defined within a social welfare context as representing the social judgment 
on the welfare value of the random variable y  (Makdissi and Wodon, 2003).
As discussed in Section 2.2, the certainty equivalent income, y ce, is the 
amount of income that, if received with certainty, would provide the same
level of utility as the expected utility of # in Equation 3.1. With S possible
states of nature, y ce can be implicitly defined as in Equation 2.3 (page 54):
«(yce) = X Tsu(ys) (3.2)
S = 1
The certainty equivalent yce depends on the shape of u, and it is a function 
of the random variable y. Section 2.2 argued that y ce was better suited than 
the expectation of p as a measure of well-being, since the latter is by defini­
tion not affected by mean-preserving spreads in the distribution of p, while 
the certainty equivalent is a decreasing function of l/'s dispersion. This de­
sirable property for y ce reflects the principle of risk aversion, given in this 
framework by the assumed concavity of u.
The certainty equivalent y ce is determined by its underlying utility func­
tion u, and its properties as a measure of well-being depend entirely on
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those of u. The methodology presented in this Chapter relies on the Con­
stant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function, which is widely used 
in the risk literature and was discussed in the evaluation framework context 
in Section 2.5 (page 69). This function is increasing in its argument (reflect­
ing non-satiation) and concave (reflecting risk aversion):
The sensitivity parameter p represents the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative 
risk aversion for this function, which is constant for all values of y. This 
property is the main reason for the widespread use of the isoelastic formu-
in terms of the tolerable degree of risk at different levels of income is in­
tuitively sound and empirically plausible (Browning and Lusardi, 1996). It 
can be argued that other formulations might better capture risk aversion at 
certain points in the distribution: a constant absolute risk aversion formu­
lation, for instance, might be better suited for the limited range of income 
between zero and the poverty line. However, the purpose of this Chapter 
is to derive risk adjusted measures of income for all levels, and the CRRA 
formulation results in a parsimonious representation of utility along the in­
come distribution.
3.2.2 Identifying assumption and risk adjusted poverty measures
The previous discussion highlighted the relevance of a CRRA utility func­
tion for the certainty equivalent income yce as a measure of income adjusted 
for the disutility of risk. The elements of Equations 3.1 and 3.2, however, are 
inherently unobservable, and thus neither cross section nor panel data can 
be used for their empirical implementation without further assumptions on 
the nature of the underlying data generating process.
Some studies based on cross section data rely on the assumption that 
a household's distribution of future states of nature can be inferred from 
the observed distribution for the whole population (Elbers and Gunning, 
2003; Ligon and Schechter, 2004, discuss alternative assumptions employed 
in the literature). Following Makdissi and Wodon (2003), Cruces et al. (2004)
(3.3)
lation in the economics of risk: as discussed in Section 2.5, its implication
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and Ligon and Schechter (2003), the methodology presented in this Chapter 
relies on an operational version of Equation 3.1 derived from a stationar- 
ity identifying assumption, which is only possible to make when repeated 
observations are available for every unit. The stationarity assumption ex­
ploits the panel dimension of the data, allowing for heterogeneity between 
households. The identification relies on the assumption that the underlying 
income process for each household is stable: the probability distribution of 
income for a household -  the distribution of 1/ -  is identical at every point 
in time. Every past observation represents a typical outcome for the house­
hold, and its past experience can be extrapolated to represent the distribu­
tion of prospects at any future period (Ligon and Schechter, 2004).
Under stationarity, the series of observed past incomes for a household 
Yi — [y/i, •••/ yir]f represents a set of equally probable draws from the 
distribution of possible incomes for i. It is thus an empirical distribution 
of j/2, where each yn in yi is a possible state of the world ys in Equations 3.1 
and 3.2, with associated probability t s = 1/T.
The certainty equivalent income for a household i can then be repre­
sented in terms of observed quantities -  i's stream of past incomes y2- -  as:
“ (£«,■) =  T S  ) (3-4)f=l
A common practice in the risk literature (see, for instance, Newbery and 
Stiglitz, 1981a) is to use a Taylor approximation for the certainty equivalent 
implicitly defined in Equation 3.4, given by:
yce, ~  y; -  \ ^ A{p)o2yi (3.5)
where y2 is i's mean income over the whole period under consideration, (Ty. 
its variance and R& (p) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, 
equal to £  for the CRRA formulation. The problem with the Taylor approx­
imation is that it is only valid for small levels of risks (Pratt, 1964), and thus 
is likely to produce biased results for high values of p. Given the analyti­
cal convenience of the isoelastic CRRA formulation, this Chapter relies on 
the exact measure of risk adjusted income implied by Equations 3.3 and 3.4,
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which is a function of p and is equal to:
9 « M  =  < |T  2 f = i  Vit j “ K r *  (3 .6)
yt = Uj=i y it if p =  i
It is evident that the formulation of the certainty equivalent in Equation 3.6
is identical to the stability equivalent with a constant variability aversion
evaluation function given in Equation 2.15 (page 70). This derives from the 
stationarity assumption, which expresses the general formulation of y ce in 
Equation 3.2 in terms of observed quantities in Equation 3.4. The latter is 
observationally equivalent to Equation 2.7 (page 60) with no discounting 
(A(t) = 1 /T ), despite the conceptual differences between the two discussed 
in Section 2.2: while one estimates the effects of ex-ante risk, the other cap­
tures the negative impact of ex-post fluctuations. As noted in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.4), alternative approaches sometimes result in the same type of 
empirical implementations when they are based on the same observed in­
comes y.
The definition of the certainty equivalent income in Equation 3.6 pro­
vides a straightforward way of implementing risk adjusted poverty mea­
sures: y ce is a money metric of well-being, and thus represents a risk ad­
justed measure of income. The components of y, are given by the equiva- 
lised and normalised incomes yu of Equation 1.3 (page 27), so that house­
holds with i < 1 are considered poor at time t. Instead of focusing on this 
static condition, the methodology presented in this Chapter relies on the 
distribution of certainty equivalents y ce to define risk adjusted measures of 
poverty.
These measures are modified versions of the additive poverty indices 
of the FGT class defined in Equation 1.6 (page 35), and rely on the FGT 
evaluated at the risk adjusted incomes y ce• The new class of indices is thus 
implicitly a function of the distribution of the vectors y and of the risk aver­
sion parameter p:
FGTRA (y, p ,a ) = fa 2  [max(l -  yai, 0)]“ (3.7)
1 =  1
1
L - p
if P £  1
where N  is the total number of households and oc can be interpreted as a
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sensitivity parameter to the depth of poverty: with oc =  0, Equation 3.7 
defines a risk adjusted headcount, and oc — 1 and oc =  2 define the risk 
adjusted poverty gap and squared poverty gap respectively The special 
case of p = 0 corresponds to the FGT measure evaluated at the mean of 
each household's income over time, FGT (yf oc) =  b ^ = i \ m a x { l  -  y,-,0)]“ .
The measures defined in Equation 3.7 can be compared to Jalan and 
Ravallion's (1998) transient-chronic poverty decomposition, covered in Sec­
tion 2.4 and applied to the Greater Buenos Aires panel in the next Chapter. 
A virtue of this decomposition is that it presents the contribution of income 
variability to an overall measure of poverty, while the risk adjusted measure 
of poverty based on the certainty equivalent of income seems to merge the 
level and variability of income into one measure. However, a comparison 
between risk adjusted poverty with p = 0 (corresponding to FGT (y,oc)) 
and p > 0 allows an analysis which is similar in spirit to Jalan and Raval­
lion's (1998). This comparison captures the degree of poverty that is due to 
income risk and, as argued in Section 2.4 for the stability adjusted measures, 
the parameter p in the risk adjusted methodology allows for an extra degree 
of freedom over the transient-chronic approach.
Another characteristic of the risk adjusted poverty measures is their sen­
sitivity to fluctuations around the poverty line. With standard poverty mea­
surement procedures, a household with income just above the poverty line 
during the T  periods in which it is observed would not be considered poor. 
However, the risk aversion implicit in yce means that the same household 
may have a positive value of risk adjusted poverty if there is enough varia­
tion in income. Thus, even with an average just above the poverty line, the 
adjustment for risk might result in y ce < 1 for some value of p.
Finally, a potential problem arising from the use of panel data is that 
a trend in income over time may be interpreted as risk, since it leads to 
fluctuations in yu if incomes are not normalised (for instance, by the con­
temporaneous population mean) to neutralise the effect of a common trend. 
Moreover, this could invalidate the stationarity assumption, although it is 
possible to assume stationarity of normalised incomes. Cruces et al. (2004) 
discuss these issues in the context of a nine-year panel from the United 
Kingdom, where the use of relative poverty measures corrects the impact of 
growth in household income. In the present application to the GBA panel,
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however, this is not much of an issue since each cohort spans a relatively 
short period of 1.5 years, and as discussed in Chapter 1 there is no uniform 
trend in household income over the whole period.
3.2.3 Determinants of risk and risk adjusted income
Besides the estimation of risk adjusted measures of poverty, the derivation 
of the certainty equivalent from observed data allows to study its main de­
terminants and the correlates of risk. Poverty profiles are usually based on 
the effect of different individual and household characteristics on the proba­
bility of being poor, obtained by linear regression with the adult equivalent 
income (or its logarithm) as the dependent variable. It is then possible to in­
fer the probability of being poor while avoiding the specification problems 
that occur with probits and logits (Ravallion and Wodon, 1999).
The approach in this Chapter is similar, using the logarithm of the risk 
adjusted income as the dependent variable in the regressions. Denoting by 
X/ the vector of characteristics for a household i, and by y; its mean income 
over time, a comparison of the effect of the components of X, on average and 
risk adjusted incomes can be estimated by means of the following system:
log yi = X 'p  + a  (3.8)
=  XIPra + crai
where £; and £RAi are regression error terms, and Xj contains a constant. 
Differences in the parameters in (3 and PRA can be interpreted as differential 
impacts of the underlying variables on well-being as captured by y and y ce-
While these two regressions could be estimated independently by Ordi­
nary Least Squares (OLS), the analysis presented in the following Section 
exploits the theoretical relation between expected income and the certainty 
equivalent, and estimates the two equations jointly by means of Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) techniques. The insight arises from the defini­
tion of the risk premium in choice under uncertainty, given by n r = y  — y, 
which represents a measure of the impact of risk on well-being -  see the 
discussion of the variability premium n v (Equation 2.8, page 61), the coun­
terpart of n r in the evaluation framework, in Section 2.3. The difference of 
the logs of average and risk adjusted incomes can be interpreted as a "loga­
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rithmic" version of the risk premium.
Since the same set of independent variables X; are used in the two re­
gressions in Equation 3.8, SUR provides the same coefficients ft and j3RA as 
OLS. The advantage of using SUR to estimate the system of Equation 3.8 
is that it allows for a formal test for the difference in coefficient estimates 
between the two regressions, (5 — fiRA• Moreover, since the Equations in 3.8 
are linear, the estimation of the system is analogous to a regression with the 
"logarithmic" risk premium as the dependent variable:
log y, -  log yCe, = Xj P RP +  eRPj (3.9)
where (3RP = ft — 15RA. Testing for differences in the coefficients estimated 
by SUR is equivalent to testing for the statistical significance of the (5RP para­
meters in the risk premium regression defined in Equation 3.9. The advan­
tage over computing Equation 3.9 directly is that by definition 0 <  y / y  <  l , 
which implies that the error term in Equation 3.9 might not have a normally 
distributed error term.
The individual regressions in Equation 3.8 provide an assessment of the 
effect of each characteristic on average and risk adjusted incomes, while the 
SUR test of differences in coefficients reveals the impact of these character­
istics on the risk faced by the household. A positive and statistically signif­
icant value of (5 — (5RA implies that the related independent variable con­
tributes to an increase in the "logarithmic" risk premium. This provides a 
straightforward interpretation of the impact of various variables on income 
and risk: characteristics with a positive value of — (3RA are associated with 
higher risk and with a lower level of utility.
3.3  R isk  A d ju sted  P o verty: A g g r eg a tes a n d  D e t e r m in a n t s
3.3.1 Descriptive results
The risk adjusted framework described in the previous Section can be ap­
plied to the study of poverty in Argentina using the EPH data. This Section 
exploits the longitudinal dimension of the survey with the Greater Buenos 
Aires rotating panel, described at length in Section 1.2 (page 22). The ap­
plications are based on the fifteen waves corresponding to the period May
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1995-May 2002, which result in twelve cohorts as illustrated in Table 1.2 
(page 61). Each cohort represents a group of households that are observed 
over the same four waves: all observations in a cohort start at the same wave 
and span the same period, and they are indicated by the waves they follow 
(99-2 to 01-1, for instance, means that the cohort covers from the second (i.e., 
October) wave of the EPH in 1999 until the first wave (i.e., May) of 2001).
As discussed in Section 1.2, some aggregates of household income are 
equal to zero but still considered valid by INDEC. Of almost 5,500 house­
holds in the final panel sample, only two reported zero incomes in all four 
waves, and just 1 percent of the 21,788 observations of income were equal to 
zero. To minimize the loss of potentially important observations, the cases 
with valid zeroes were assigned a token value of 1 percent of the poverty 
line in the analysis. This correction is necessary for computational reasons, 
since yce is not defined for yn =  0 with p > 1 (Equation 3.6). The poverty 
measures presented below are virtually unaffected by this procedure since 
the focus in this Section is on the headcount index.1
Figure 3.1 presents the sample average by cohort of the risk adjusted 
income y ce of Equation 3.6 for p =  0,1, 2, and 4. The value corresponding 
to p =  0 represents the average of the normalised adult equivalent income, 
defined in Equation 1.3 -  the unit of the Figure is thus the contemporaneous 
poverty line.
The evolution of risk adjusted income by cohort is similar to that of equi­
valent real income by wave (Figure 1.3, page 30) and of variability adjusted 
measures for different evaluation functions (Figure 2.6, page 74). The down­
ward trend between the first two cohorts reflects the negative effect of the 
contagion from the Mexican crisis of 1995, while the recovery from this crisis 
explains the upward tendency for the following four cohorts. From the peak 
of the 97-2/99-1 cohort, the trend is almost continuously negative due to the 
prolonged recession of 1999-2001, and devaluation and subsequent crisis of 
2002. The increase between the 99-2/01-1 and 00-1/01-2 corresponds to the 
slight slowdown of the downward trend in GDP and employment between 
1999 and 2000 depicted in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 -  see Section 1.1 (page 74) for
lrThe results of this Section are robust to alternative token values in the 0.25-1.5 percent 
range. Since the lowest value of yzf for > 0 is 1.5 percent of the poverty line, the token 
value of 1 percent ensures the presence of strictly positive incomes without affecting the 
ranking of households in the income distribution.
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a summary of the key economic events of the period.
The differences between the risk adjusted incomes with p = 0,1, 2, and 
4 in Figure 3.1 contain valuable information about the risk faced by house­
holds in this period. The ordering of the series is due to the fact that yce is 
decreasing in p (Equation 3.6). It can be noted that each extra "unit" of p 
implies a reduction in the average of yce of 10 to 20 percent of the poverty 
line. These differences are not constant, which indicates the varying level 
of risk for different cohorts. For instance, the difference between incomes 
with p =  0 and p =  4 are constant at around 40 percent of the poverty line 
for most cohorts, but in the last one -  corresponding to the 2001-2002 crisis 
and arguably the one with largest fluctuations in income -  this difference 
increases to more than 50 percent of the poverty line.
Figure 3.2 presents the share of the population with risk adjusted in­
comes below the poverty line, corresponding to the FGTra measure with 
oc — 0 (Equation 3.7) based on the incomes presented in Figure 3.1.2 The risk 
adjusted headcount is computed for p =  0, 1, 2, and 4, with p =  0 repre­
senting the measure based on average income over time. Moreover, Figure
3.2 presents the headcount computed for each cohort by pooling -  but not 
averaging -  the four observations available for each household, which can 
be combined since incomes ya are normalised by their contemporaneous 
poverty lines.3
The first fact that stands out from Figure 3.2 is the difference between 
the cross-sectional measure (bold line) and the risk adjusted panel-based 
estimates: the use of the mean income (p =  0) reduces the headcount by 
about 5 percentage points with respect to the pooled sample estimate. This 
is due to the "smoothing" effect: poverty measures based on average in­
come over time are lower than the cross-sectional figures because the aver­
aging reduces the effect of transitory income shocks, which is not apparent
2The analysis in this Section concentrates on the headcount to emphasize the impor­
tance of changes in income around the poverty line. For the sensitivity of the "depth" of 
poverty based on the certainty equivalent, it should be noted that Figure 2.7 (page 77) can 
be interpreted as presenting the risk adjusted squared poverty gap (oc =  2 in Equation 3.7).
3A simple example with two households and two periods of time may clarify the set­
ting. The two households have observed streams of yn given by yi =  [1/1 1 , 1/12] and 
y2 =  [1/2 1 , 1/21 ]• These observations are used to compute the averages yi and y2, and the 
risk adjusted measures ycei (P) and ycez(p). Figure 3.2 presents poverty measures based on 
y and yce, but also on the cross-sectional use of the panel, which implies computing the 
FGT  measure of Equation 1.6 over the pooled incomes [yn, y \ 2, y2i, y2i]*
Figure 3.2: Risk Adjusted Measures of Poverty by Cohort, Greater Buenos Aires, 1995-2002
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in Figure 3.1.4 While this "smoothing" effect is well known in the distribu­
tional literature (Shorrocks, 1978), the interesting feature in the Figure is the 
subsequent increase in the poverty measures from p =  0 (based on average 
income) to p > 0: the introduction of risk aversion increases poverty sub­
stantially, with the "smoothing" effect practically neutralised with p =  1. 
Risk adjusted poverty headcounts with p =  2 and p =  4 are consistently 
greater than those based on the pooled sample.
In terms of general trends, the evolution of the poverty headcounts in 
Figure 3.2 mirrors that of the risk adjusted incomes in Figure 3.1, with rates 
varying between 12-23 percent (for p =  0 and 4, respectively) for the first 
cohort up to a high 29-37 percent (for p =  0 and 4) for the last one. As 
for income, however, the impact of changes in p differs markedly between 
cohorts. For instance, for the 96-2/98-1 cohort the difference between the 
headcount with p =  1 and the headcount with p =  2 is relatively small, 
while the difference between measures with p =  2 and p =  4 is large. For 
the 98-2/01-1 cohort, in turn, the latter is much smaller than the period's 
average. The sensitivity of the headcounts to the values of p reflects the 
concentration of incomes around the poverty line: some values of p imply 
large falls in risk adjusted income, which makes a substantial number of 
households become poor. Finally, it can be noted that the large fall in income 
for the last cohort implies that the "smoothing" effect almost disappears, 
with the difference between the pooled sample and the headcount based on 
average income reduced to less than one percentage point, compared to 3 to 
5 points over the period.
3.3.2 Regression analysis
This Section complements the analysis of trends in risk adjusted incomes 
and poverty by implementing the regressions defined in Equation 3.8. The 
aim is to establish the determinants of average and risk adjusted income, 
and to study which household characteristics are associated with larger or 
smaller effects of risk on well-being.
4By definition, the average of the pooled observations of yu  in a cohort and the average 
of y, (the average of yIf for households in the same cohort) are equal, given the linear­
ity of the expectation operator. In the example of the previous footnote, the average of 
[yii/yi2 /y 2 i /y 2 i] is equal to the average of [yi, 1/2 ]- This is not necessarily true for other 
functions of y, for instance for the FGT  measures.
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A s  discussed in the previous Section, the system of Equation 3.8 is es­
timated by SUR, with the logs of and y cei as the dependent variables of 
each regression. The twelve cohorts are pooled for the regressions, resulting 
in a dataset of 5,446 observations (each derived from four values of yn per 
household).
The independent variables Xz are: (a) household level variables, includ­
ing the number of infants, children, youths, adults, and elderly household 
members, and the square of their values; whether the household head has 
a spouse; (b) characteristics of the household head, including gender; the 
age of the head and its square; migration status in the last five years; level 
of education (where the omitted category is incomplete primary or no for­
mal education); whether he/she is unemployed or inactive (with employed 
as the omitted category); whether he /she  is an employer, a self-employed 
worker, an informal worker,5 or a wage earner (omitted); the type of qualifi­
cation (omitting the no qualification category);6 and whether he/she works 
in the public sector; and (c) the same set of characteristics for the spouse of 
the household head, when there is one. All these variables correspond to 
the initial conditions, that is, the values at the first observation in the co­
hort for each household. In addition, the regressions include controls for 
each of the cohorts, excluding the first one: given the degree of macroeco­
nomic volatility over the 1995-2002 period, each cohort has been affected by 
different aggregate shocks, and these controls aim to capture their effects.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the esti­
mation. The sample mean for the logarithm of average income over time is 
0.754 (corresponding to 2.13 times the poverty line), while the average log­
arithm of risk adjusted income with p =  2 is 0.549 (corresponding to 1.73 
times the poverty line). This suggests that assuming p =  2 as the coefficient 
for risk aversion results in a fall with respect to average income of almost 20
5There are several characterizations of informality in the literature -  see Moreno and 
Roca (2002) for the discussion of alternatives in the Argentine case. The definition emplo­
yed in this Chapter corresponds broadly to the International Labour Organization's rec­
ommendations: a worker is "informal" if he or she is non-professional and either self em­
ployed or a wage earner in a small firm (less than five employees), or working without a 
wage.
Education and qualification measures might appear to be highly collinear. The corre­
lation matrix, however, indicates a relatively low level of 0.46 between professional quali­
fications and higher education, with all other coefficients being lower. The results are not 
substantially affected by removing either group of variables from the regression.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for the Dependent and Independent Vari­
ables, Risk Adjusted Income Regressions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log of Average Income (p=0) 0.754 0.844 -4.610 3.951
Log of Risk Adjusted Income, p=0.5 0.720 0.866 -4.605 3.946
Log o f Risk Adjusted Income, p=l 0.669 0.921 -4.605 3.942
Log of Risk Adjusted Income, p=2 0.549 1.129 -4.605 3.933
Log of Risk Adjusted Income, p=4 0.441 1.251 -4.605 3.915
Number o f infants (ages 0-5) 0.349 0.693 0 6
Number o f children (ages 6-14) 0.543 0.922 0 8
Number o f youths (ages 15-24) 0.586 0.907 0 6
Number o f adults (ages 25-64) 1.552 0.940 0 6
Number of elderly (ages 65+) 0.395 0.677 0 4
Age of the head 51.002 16.061 15 96
Share of female headed households 0.242 0.428 0 1
Head is recent migrant 0.026 0.159 0 1
Head inactive 0.279 0.449 0 1
Head unemployed 0.069 0.254 0 1
Head: employer 0.032 0.177 0 1
Head: self-employed 0.143 0.351 0 1
Head: informal worker 0.232 0.422 0 1
Head in public sector 0.082 0.274 0 1
Head: operative (qualification) 0.350 0.477 0 1
Head: technical worker (qualification) 0.112 0.315 0 1
Head: professional worker (qualification) 0.068 0.252 0 1
Head with primary education - Complete 0.345 0.475 0 1
Head with secondary education - Incomplete 0.177 0.382 0 1
Head with secondary education - Complete 0.143 0.350 0 1
Head with further education - Incomplete 0.008 0.090 0 1
Head with further education - Complete 0.026 0.158 0 1
Head with university education 0.146 0.353 0 1
No spouse in the household 0.306 0.461 0 1
Spouse inactive 0.418 0.493 0 1
Spouse unemployed 0.048 0.215 0 1
Spouse: employer 0.007 0.081 0 1
Spouse: self-employed 0.056 0.229 0 1
Spouse: informal worker 0.103 0.303 0 1
Spouse: operative (qualification) 0.066 0.249 0 1
Spouse: technical worker (qualification) 0.050 0.218 0 1
Spouse: professional worker (qualification) 0.026 0.159 0 1
Spouse in public sector 0.044 0.206 0 1
Spouse with primary education - Complete 0.252 0.434 0 1
Spouse with secondary education - Incomplete 0.115 0.319 0 1
Spouse with secondary education - Complete 0.119 0.324 0 1
Spouse with superior education - Incomplete 0.010 0.097 0 1
Spouse with superior education - Complete 0.034 0.182 0 1
Spouse with university education 0.071 0.257 0 1
S o u r c e :  A u t h o r ' s  e s t i m a t i o n s  b a s e d  o n  E P H  h o u s e h o l d s u r v e y  d a t a ( I N D E C ) .
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percent. The interpretation of the other variables presented in Table 3.1 is 
straightforward: most of them are indicators, and so their means represent 
the share of the sample with these characteristics.
The dependent variable y ce is a function of the constant risk aversion 
parameter p. Arrow (1970) argues on theoretical grounds that p should be 
around 1, which is consistent with the results of Chetty (2003) based on la­
bour supply. However, Friend and Blume (1975) present empirical evidence 
based on portfolio holdings that the coefficient may be around 2, Hildreth 
and Knowles (1982) obtain estimates between 1 and 2, and in a review of 
the literature Cowell and Gardiner (2000) indicate a range of values from 
0.5 to 4 depending on the type of evidence. To allow for a sizeable effect of 
risk, the regressions presented in Table 3.2 are based on yce computed with 
p = 2, which is within the boundaries in the literature. This value is used in 
other empirical applications based on the CRRA utility function (Ligon and 
Schechter, 2003). A robustness check of the regression results for alternative 
values of p is discussed below.
Table 3.2 presents the results of the regression analysis of the system of 
Equation 3.8 by SUR in the first two columns, and the tests for statistically 
significant differences in the parameter estimates of the two models in the 
third column, which corresponds to Equation 3.9.
The first column of the table corresponds to the logarithm of mean in­
come over time (p =  0). The results are fairly intuitive. Larger households 
(whether having more infants, children, or adults) tend to have lower val­
ues of average income, but the impact is decreasing at the margin. In the 
case of elderly members, the impact on average income is not statistically 
significant, although part of its effect may be captured by the inactivity in­
dicators for the household head or spouse, which have negative coefficients. 
Households with older an d /o r female heads tend to have higher incomes, 
although the coefficient on female heads is only significant at the 10 percent 
level. There seems to be no statistically significant impact from the migrant 
status of the head.
The fact that the head or its spouse are inactive or unemployed is asso­
ciated with lower average income. The status of either of them as an em­
ployer or a self-employed worker does not have a statistically significant 
impact on average income, although the signs of the coefficients are posi-
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Log Average Income and Log Risk Adjusted 
come
L og average  
incom e [1]
L og  risk- 
adjusted  
incom e [2]
D ifference l lj -[2 ]  
and P-value
Household characteristics
Number o f infants (ages 0-5) -0.272 -0.297 0.024
[0.02661]*** [0.04225]*** 0.378
Number o f infants squared 0.028 0.030 -0.002
[0.01007]*** [0.01600]* 0.819
Number o f children (ages 6-14) -0.374 -0.365 -0.009
[0.01826]*** [0.02899]*** 0.640
Number o f children squared 0.040 0.034 0.006
[0.00539]*** [0.00855]*** 0.258
Number o f youths (ages 15-24) -0.209 -0.187 -0.023
[0.01913]*** [0.03038]*** 0.251
Number o f youths squared 0.038 0.042 -0.004
[0.00630]*** [0.01000]*** 0.521
Number o f  adults (ages 25-64) -0.096 -0.085 -0.011
[0.02706]*** [0.04295]** 0.695
Number o f adults squared 0.023 0.027 -0.004
[0.00642]*** [0.01019]*** 0.559
Number o f elderly members (ages 65+) 0.016 0.115 -0.099
[0.03901] [0.06194]* 0.014 **
Number o f elderly members, squared -0.021 -0.039 0.018
[0.01667] [0.02646] 0.293
No spouse in the household 0.103 0.059 0.044
[0.05138]** [0.08157] 0.402
Characteristics o f the head
Age 0.007 0.009 -0.002
[0.00355]** [0.00563]* 0.570
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.00004] [0.00006] 0.998
Female head 0.051 0.079 -0.028
[0.02658]* [0.04219]* 0.312
Recent migrant -0.010 -0.098 0.089
[0.04660] [0.07398] 0.065 *
Inactive -0.134 -0.157 0.022
[0.04082]*** [0.05242]*** 0.512
Unemployed -0.440 -0.866 0.426
[0.05073]*** [0.05790]*** 0.000 ***
Employer 0.071 0.020 0.051
[0.04619] [0.07333] 0.287
Self-employed -0.051 0.047 -0.098
[0.02762] [0.04386] 0.401
Informal Worker -0.147 -0.224 0.077
[0.02540]*** [0.04032]*** 0.003 ***
Public Sector Worker -0.063 -0.035 -0.028
[0.02927]** [0.04646] 0.350
Job Qualification: Operative 0.121 0.158 -0.037
[0.03997] [0.03914]*** 0.143
Job Qualification: Technical 0.336 0.372 -0.036
[0.05132] [0.05480]*** 0.315
Job Qualification: Professional 0.244 0.698 -0.454
[0.04329]*** [0.06873]*** 0.424
Primary Education -  Complete 0.156 0.196 -0.039
[0.02288]*** [0.03632]*** 0.096 *
Secondary Education - Incomplete 0.319 0.345 -0.027
[0.02705]*** [0.04294]*** 0.341
Secondary Education - Complete 0.534 0.604 -0.070
[0.03460]*** [0.04670]*** 0.021 **
Further Education -  Incomplete 0.217 0.976 -0.759
[0.08275]*** [0.13137]*** 0.009 ***
Further Education -  Complete 0.731 0.833 -0.103
[0.05243]*** [0.08285]*** 0.056 *
University Education 0.423 0.847 -0.423
[0.04477]*** [0.05398]*** 0.049 **
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L o g  In com e  
[1]
L og r isk - 
ad ju sted  
in com e [21
D ifferen ce  [ l] -[2 ]  
and  P -va lu e
Characteristics o f the spouse
Inactive -0.244 -0.331 0.087
[0.03302]*** [0.06480]*** 0.040 **
Unemployed -0.355 -0.543 0.187
[0.03647]*** [0.08053]*** 0.000 ***
Employer -0.044 -0.126 0.082
[0.09697] [0.15395] 0.413
Self-employed 0.024 -0.071 0.095
[0.04175] [0.06629] 0.636
Informal Worker -0.097 -0.122 0.025
[0.04289]** [0.06810]* 0.568
Job Qualification: Operative 0.052 0.024 0.028
[0.02465]*** [0.06347] 0.496
Job Qualification: Technical 0.075 0.090 -0.015
[0.03452]*** [0.08147] 0.770
Job Qualification: Professional 0.662 0.244 0.418
[0.06642]*** [0.10545]** 0.996
Public Sector Worker -0.017 -0.027 0.011
[0.04416] [0.07011] 0.816
Primary Education - Complete 0.152 0.207 -0.056
[0.02857]*** [0.04535]*** 0.060 *
Secondary Education - Incomplete 0.229 0.306 -0.076
[0.03370]*** [0.05351]*** 0.028 **
Secondary Education - Complete 0.313 0.425 -0.112
[0.02942]*** [0.05492]*** 0.002 ***
Further Education - Incomplete 0.754 0.177 0.578
[0.07953]*** [0.12627] 0.625
Further Education - Complete 0.371 0.477 -0.106
[0.05219]*** [0.08323]*** 0.051 *
University Education 0.777 0.517 0.260
[0.03400]*** [0.07107]*** 0.042 **
Cohort controls 
95-2 to 97-1 -0.038 -0.083 0.046
[0.03653] [0.05800] 0.226
96-1 to 97-2 -0.013 -0.084 0.071
[0.03672] [0.05829] 0.062 *
96-2 to 98-1 -0.003 -0.042 0.039
[0.03615] [0.05739] 0.297
97-1 to 98-2 0.034 0.008 0.025
[0.03606] [0.05725] 0.494
97-2 to 99-1 0.021 0.026 -0.004
[0.03559] [0.05651] 0.904
98-1 to 99-2 -0.043 -0.070 0.027
[0.03549] [0.05634] 0.459
98-2 to 00-1 -0.028 -0.037 0.010
[0.03579] [0.05682] 0.797
99-1 to 00-2 -0.022 -0.031 0.008
[0.03575] [0.05675] 0.819
99-2 to 01-1 -0.107 -0.108 0.001
[0.03670]*** [0.05826]* 0.975
00-1 to 01-2 -0.115 -0.127 0.012
[0.03635]*** [0.05770]** 0.748
00-2 to 02-1 -0.164 -0.316 0.152




Standard errors in brackets (significant: * at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%) 
P-Value o f  the test below the difference for the fourth column.
Source: Author's estimations based on EPH household survey data (INDEC).
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tive as expected since the excluded category is wage earner. However, part 
of the impact of being self-employed -  for those with no professional quali­
fications -  is reflected by the negative and statistically significant coefficient 
for the informal worker indicator for both the head and the spouse.
A higher job qualification of the head (at the professional level) or the 
spouse (at each of the three levels considered) have a positive impact on the 
average income of the household, as do the education levels of the head and 
the spouse, with higher levels of education implying progressively higher 
household income. Being in the public sector reduces expected income in 
the case of the head, although for the spouse the impact is also negative but 
not statistically significant. Finally, only the three cohorts covering the pe­
riod October 1999-May 2002 are associated with statistically significant and 
negative coefficients, reflecting the progressive deepening of the recession 
and the subsequent crisis.
The data confirms the stylised facts that richer households are smaller, 
better-educated, and have employed heads or spouses in better jobs. The 
parameters obtained in the second column of Table 3.2 correspond to the 
regression with risk adjusted income as the dependent variable, and it is 
easy to notice that most of the results from the first column still apply. The 
most interesting results of Table 3.2, however, are related to the impact (or 
the lack of impact) of the same independent variables on the risk faced by 
the household, and thus the discussion focuses on the tests of differences 
obtained by the estimation of the system by SUR.
The third column of Table 3.2 presents the tests of statistical significance 
for the differences in the coefficients of the two regressions. If the difference 
is not significantly different from zero, it can be interpreted that the asso­
ciated independent variable has the same effect (or lack of effect) in both 
mean and risk adjusted incomes, and thus no discernible correlation with 
risk. However, a significant difference implies that the independent variable 
has a differential effect on the two dependent variables, or, in other words, 
it has an effect on risk. As explained in the previous Section, the SUR test 
can also be interpreted as a regression with the "logarithmic" risk premium 
as the dependent variable (Equation 3.9). In that context, a negative value 
of (5 — (3ra represents a negative effect of a variable on the risk premium, 
which is associated with lower risk, while a positive value implies a higher
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risk premium.
Only a subset of the variables in X* has a significant effect on risk. Re­
garding the structure of the household, only the presence of adults aged 
65 and over significantly affects the household's level of risk in a negative 
way. This can be explained by the fact that the elderly often receive a steady 
stream of income from pensions (Fiszbein et al., 2002), and consequently ex­
perience less income variability -  and face lower income risk -  than other 
age groups.
While there is no statistically significant impact of the age or gender of 
the head on risk, other characteristics do have an effect. If the head has 
migrated to the GBA region (from other provinces in Argentina or from 
other countries) in the last five years, the household suffers more from risk. 
Interestingly, the same indicator was found to have no statistically signifi­
cant impact on average income after controlling for hum an capital and other 
characteristics. This result implies that recent migrants are more exposed to 
income risk than non-migrants.
For both the head and the spouse, being unemployed contributes to risk 
over and above the negative effect of this characteristic on average income. 
The same is true for the informality of the head in the current job, or in the 
previous job if unemployed. Most importantly, a higher level of education 
has a negative impact on the risk faced by the household: the less-educated 
suffer not only from a lower average income, but also from higher levels of 
risk.
Finally, two cohort indicators signal a positive effect on risk. This is the 
case for the last cohort, which is not surprising given the large fall in real 
incomes induced by the crisis of 2001-2002 (see Figure 1.3). The cohort cov­
ering the period 1996-1997 also indicates a higher level of risk, which may be 
due to the variability in incomes induced by the aftermath of the 1994-1995 
crisis and the subsequent recovery.
The regressions in Table 3.2 are based on risk adjusted income with p — 2 
since, as discussed above, this value was found to be reasonable and within 
the range employed in the literature. The analysis of income and poverty 
aggregates, however, was done with different values of the risk aversion 
parameter, and Table 3.3 presents the correspondent robustness check of 
the regression analysis for p E {0.5,1,2,4}. It is not necessary to emulate
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Table 3.3: Difference in Coefficients of Determinants of Log Average Income 
and Log Risk Adjusted Income for Different Values of Risk Aver­
sion
p = 0 .5 p - 1 p = 2 p = 4
Household characteristics 
Number of infants (ages 0-5) 0.0028 0.0072 0.0242 0.0355
Number of infants squared -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0024 -0.0033
Number o f children (ages 6-14) -0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0088 -0.0045
Number o f children squared 0.0007 0.0023 0.0063 0.0076
Number o f youths (ages 15-24) 0.0002 -0.0048 -0.0227 -0.0187
Number of youths squared -0.0013 * -0.0027 -0.0042 -0.0067
Number of adults (ages 25-64) -0.0012 -0.0046 -0.0110 -0.0100
Number o f adults squared -0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0039 -0.0057
Number of elderly (ages 65+) -0.0107 ** -0.0361 ** -0.0995 ** -0.1268 **
Number o f elderly members, squared 0.0014 0.0057 0.0181 0.0224
Characteristics of the head
Age -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0021 -0.0030
Age Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Female head -0.0044 -0.0139 -0.0277 -0.0280
Recent migrant 0.0087 0.0308 * 0.0886 * 0.1091 *
Inactive -0.1070 0.0090 0.0224 0.0228
Unemployed 0.1434 *** 0.2572 *** 0.4264 *** 0.6395 ***
Employer 0.0087 0.0208 -0.0635 0.0725
Self-employed -0.0722 -0.0767 -0.0240 -0.0969
Informal Worker 0.0084 *** 0.0267 *** 0.0771 *** 0.1024***
Public Sector Worker 0.0424 -0.0107 -0.0282 0.0068
Job Qualification: Operative -0.0041 -0.0128 -0.0373 -0.0536 *
Job Qualification: Technical -0.2662 -0.2733 -0.0358 -0.0554
Job Qualification: Professional -0.4224 -0.4310 -0.0358 -0.4657
Primary Education -  Complete -0.0106 ** -0.0212 * -0.0393 ' -0.0566 *
Secondary Education - Incomplete -0.0062 * -0.0137 -0.1160 -0.1289
Secondary Education - Complete -0.0127 *** -0.2535 *** -0.2911 ** -0.3198 **
Further Education -  Incomplete -0.5699 *** -0.0907 -0.2221 *** -0.8319 ***
Further Education -  Complete -0.3736 ** -0.0432 " -0.4624 * -0.4859 *
University Education -0.0151 '** -0.3901 ’** -0.4232 ** -0.4561 **
No Spouse 0.0079 0.0260 0.0444 0.0358
Characteristics o f the spouse
Inactive 0.1203 ** 0.0328 ** 0.0867 ** 0.1053 **
Unemployed -0.0632 *** -0.0181 *** 0.1873 *** 0.1533 ***
Employer 0.0182 0.0415 0.1963 0.1194
Self-employed 0.0781 0.0825 0.0204 0.1078
Informal Worker 0.0037 0.0110 0.0253 0.0279
Job Qualification: Operative 0.0039 0.0110 0.0281 0.0300
Job Qualification: Technical 0.2573 0.2529 -0.0155 -0.0260
Job Qualification: Professional 0.4185 0.4177 0.0004 0.4131
Public Sector Worker -0.0451 0.0035 0.0106 -0.0395
Primary Education - Complete -0.0020 * -0.0141 * -0.0555 * -0.0724 **
Secondary Education - Incomplete -0.0101 “ -0.0267 ** 0.0132 ** -0.0211 **
Secondary Education - Complete -0.0119 *** 0.1853 *** 0.1097 *** 0.0649 ***
Further Education - Incomplete 0.5362 0.0090 0.0401 0.5665
Further Education - Complete 0.3527 -0.0275 0.2539 * 0.2130 **
University Education -0.0088 0.3290 0.2600 ** 0.2231 **
Cohort controls 
95-2 to 97-1 0.0026 0.0117 0.0457 0.0544
96-1 to 97-2 0.0046 0.0191 0.0707 * 0.0913 *
96-2 to 98-1 0.0032 0.0123 0.0389 0.0449
97-1 to 98-2 -0.0001 0.0028 0.0255 0.0306
97-2 to 99-1 -0.0016 -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0056
98-1 to 99-2 0.0017 0.0068 0.0271 0.0322
98-2 to 00-1 -0.0018 -0.0016 0.0095 0.0134
99-1 to 00-2 -0.0034 -0.0047 0.0084 0.0077
99-2 to 01-1 -0.0006 -0.0031 0.0012 0.0089
00-1 to 01-2 -0.0013 -0.0019 0.0121 0.0179
00-2 to 02-1 0.0240 *** 0.0633 *** 0.1521 *** 0.2154 ***
Observations 5446 5446 5446 5446
Superscripts indicate levels o f significance (* 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%).
Source: Author's estimations based on EPH household survey data (INDEC).
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the structure of Table 3.2, since the first column (the regression of the log av­
erage income) need not be repeated: Table 3.3 only presents the equivalent 
of the third column of Table 3.2, namely the difference in the parameters for 
average and risk adjusted incomes, for each value of p.
While higher values of p accentuate the disutility arising from income 
risk and lower values attenuate it, Table 3.3 is reassuring in terms of the ro­
bustness of Table 3.2's results. With the exception of the education variables 
of the spouse, all the variables that were found to be significantly correlated 
with the risk faced by the household, under the assumption that p = 2, are 
also relevant for all other values of p in the Table. While the magnitude of 
the effects is sometimes different, their statistical significance is markedly 
similar.
3.4  C o n c l u s io n
This Chapter presented a simple methodology for incorporating the disutil­
ity arising from income risk in the measurement of poverty. The method­
ology, based on the economics of choice under uncertainty, was applied to 
household panel data from the Greater Buenos Aires region for the period 
1995-2002.
This application demonstrates that averaging income data over time at 
the household level reduces poverty measures by mitigating the impact of 
negative shocks, but this effect is more than offset when the disutility from 
income fluctuations is taken into account with plausible levels of risk aver­
sion.
A regression analysis of the determinants of risk adjusted income re­
veals that risk is not uniform across households. The effect of a number of 
household characteristics on risk adjusted measures differs from their im­
pact on average income. This implies that these characteristics are related 
to the risk faced by the household over and above their correlation with 
average income. Households with better-educated members not only have 
higher incomes, but also experience lower levels of income risk. House­
holds with elderly members, as well as households with informal workers 
and / or unemployed or inactive members tend to suffer more from risk than 
other types of households. Being a recent migrant also increases risk, even
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though it does not affect average income. Finally, at the broader macroe­
conomic level, an economic crisis not only reduces income levels, but also 
increases risk, which magnifies its overall negative impact on poverty and 
well-being.
An alternative to the methodology presented in this Chapter consists of 
studying the mean of poverty evaluations for a household over time, in­
stead of evaluating poverty at average or adjusted levels of income. This 
alternative approach is pursued in the following Chapter.
C h a p t e r  4
C h r o n i c  a n d  T r a n s i e n t  P o v e r t y  i n  
T u r b u l e n t  T i m e s
4.1 In t r o d u c t i o n
The previous Chapters presented different approaches for the study of well­
being based on panel data on incomes. Chapter 1 provided results on po­
verty transitions and short term dynamics by means of a series of two- 
period panels, which suggested that there were sizeable movements both 
within and into and out of poverty in the Argentine data. Chapter 2, in 
turn, proposed and illustrated a general framework for the welfare-based 
evaluation of income fluctuations and well-being over time, while Chapter 
3 presented a related methodology that derives the impact of income risk 
from observed data.
The methodologies of the previous two Chapters concentrated on the 
derivation of measures of income adjusted for fluctuations and risk for the 
whole population, and used those measures to compute poverty and other 
distributional parameters for that population. The approach in this Chapter, 
which was briefly discussed in Section 2.4 in the context of the evaluation 
framework, focuses on poverty over time, providing a methodology for de­
composing it into its chronic and transient components. This methodology 
was developed by Jalan and Ravallion (1998; 2000) to account for fluctua­
tions of household income and poverty status over time, such as those ob­
served during 1995 to 2002 in Argentina (Section 1.3, page 29). Moreover, gi­
ven its prominence in the poverty and development literatures (Baulch and 
Hoddinott, 2000; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003, introduce two special journal 
editions related to the methodology), the results presented below constitute
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an important benchmark for the applications of Chapters 2 and 3, and pro­
vide a complement to their results.
These two components of poverty constitute important inputs for the 
design of poverty alleviation and risk mitigation policies. Since the deter­
minants and consequences of chronic and transient poverty are not neces­
sarily the same, interventions to deal with each of them may differ. For 
instance, the reduction of chronic poverty may involve forms of asset re­
distribution and human capital investments in education and health, while 
the alleviation of transient poverty may be related to employment policies 
and the development of coping mechanisms and insurance devices. Given 
these crucial implications, this Chapter presents a regression analysis of the 
correlates of both components of poverty.
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the method­
ology for decomposing poverty into its chronic and transient components, 
and presents the estimation strategy for the analysis of their determinants. 
Section 4.3 presents the empirical results. A brief conclusion follows.
4 .2  M e t h o d o l o g y
4.2.1 Definitions of transient and chronic poverty
The decomposition of poverty originates in Ravallion's (1988) discussion 
of expected poverty and welfare variability, on which Jalan and Ravallion 
(1998; 2000) elaborate to define the notions of transient and chronic poverty. 
The decomposition can be motivated by the division of the population into 
four mutually exclusive groups according to the evolution of their income 
over time and its average, as depicted in Figure 4.1 (adapted from Hulme 
and Shepherd, 2003). The four groups are the always poor (with income be­
low the poverty line at all periods), the never poor, and types of transiently 
poor. The transiently poor are only poor for some intervals, and they can 
be further divided into those with mean income above the poverty line and 
those with mean income below that threshold.
This partition of the population is extremely informative about the na­
ture of poverty and income processes over time. As found in Section 1.3 for 
Argentina, those who are poor at one point in time may have different past 
experiences and future prospects.
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Figure 4.1: Population Groups by Mean Income and Persistence of Poverty 
Status
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Jalan and Ravallion (1998; 2000) build their decomposition of poverty 
into chronic and transient components on the two parameters that define 
these four categories: average income over time and fluctuations around 
the poverty line. The basis of the decomposition is the vector of observed 
incomes over T periods for a household i, y, =  [yn, ...,yiT], where yn are 
equivalised and normalised by the contemporaneous poverty line as shown 
in Equation 1.3 (page 27). A household's poverty at a point in time is given 
by the evaluation function p(yn), which is required to be additive, strictly 
convex and decreasing up to the poverty line (and taking a value of zero 
thereafter).
Jalan and Ravallion (1998) define the intertemporal poverty of a house­
hold i, Pi, as the average of the poverty evaluations over time:
P, = T 2 (4.1)
t=1
Pi represents the average of i's poverty evaluation. This intertemporal mea­
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sure is the total amount that Jalan and Ravallion (1998) decompose into 
chronic and transient components as Pz- =  Q  +  T/.
As the partition illustrated in Figure 4.1 shows, the decomposition does 
not depend only on fluctuations in income but also on its average over time,
Jalan and Ravallion's (1998) concept of chronic poverty is based on the 
poverty evaluation of this average level:
Q =  p{yi) =  p( t  yu) (4-2)
Cz accounts for the depth of poverty over time.
Finally, transient poverty is obtained as the residual of total poverty and 
its chronic component:
Ti = Pt -  C, =  S  [p(ylt) -  p(y,)} (4.3)
t=l
As illustrated by the term on the right of Equation 4.3, T; can be interpreted 
as the average of the gaps between the poverty evaluation at each point in 
time and the evaluation of average income. Furthermore, the convexity of 
p ensures (by Jensen's inequality) that Ti is always greater than or equal to 
zero.
The intuition behind the definitions of P2, Q  and Tz can be presented 
in terms of the differences between the four categories defined above and 
illustrated in Figure 4.1. The role of average income over time in Equation
4.2 implies that both the never poor and the transiently poor with mean 
income above the poverty line have a zero measure of chronic poverty, while 
this is positive for the other two categories. The difference between the 
never poor and the transiently poor with y > z  is that the latter group has 
a positive value of the transient component, since it is poor for part of the 
period.
The two panels in the bottom of Figure 4.1 depict the difference between 
chronic and transient poverty: while in the Figure the groups in the two 
panels have the same chronic measure (since y  is the same), the always poor 
are below the poverty line in every period. This results in positive values of 
p(yit) at every point in time, whereas the transiently poor have p(yu) =  0 
for the period or periods when they are above the poverty line. The always
CHAPTER 4. CHRONIC A N D  TRANSIENT POVERTY 109
poor, then, have higher values of both intertemporal and transient poverty 
than those in the bottom right panel.
The description of the methodology is completed by the specification of 
the aggregation procedure and the functional form for the poverty evalua­
tion p. The aggregate measures of total, chronic and transient poverty are 
obtained by computing Equations 4.1,4.2 and 4.3 for each household i, and 
averaging over the population.
Regarding the poverty evaluation function p, the strict convexity re­
quirement rules out the use of the p functions implied by the headcount 
and poverty gap measures, defined in Equation 1.5 with oc =  0 and oc = 1 
respectively. The practice in applied work has followed Jalan and Raval­
lion (1998; 2000) and used the squared poverty gap for this decomposition 
(Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; McCulloch and Baulch, 2000). This implies a 
functional form for p given by:
V (y«) =  [max(l -  3fit, 0)]2 (4.4)
which is a simplified version of Equation 1.5 (page 35), since it is based on 
income normalised by the poverty line. The chronic and transient decom­
position is thus based on the FGT measures of Equation 1.6 (page 35).
The squared poverty gap, however, is not the only measure that fulfils 
the requirements set out for p. Kurosaki (2003) presents an in-depth study 
of the sensitivity of the transient-chronic approach to alternative underlying 
poverty evaluation functions, and makes an interesting parallel between the 
squared poverty gap and quadratic utility functions. He proposes using 
the Clark-Watts family of measures (Watts, 1968; Clark et al., 1981) given 
its affinity to the Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function (see the 
discussions in Sections 2.4 and 3.2, pages 64 and 83).
4.2.2 Determinants of poverty
The study of the correlates of intertemporal, chronic and transient poverty 
relies on regression analysis with the corresponding measures defined in the 
Equations above as the dependent variables. This results in the following
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three models:
Ti = X-/3T -h &Ti
Q  =  X-iPc  +  £Ci (4-5)
Pi =  X-/3p +  £pi
As in Equation 3.8 (page 88), the set of household characteristics used as
explanatory variables is given by the vector X; (which includes a constant
term), and eu, &2i and £3/ are regression errors.
The three dependent variables are censored by definition, since they are 
bounded by 0 and 1 -  the three take a value of zero for the non-poor, while 
Pi = C{ = 1 — Tj =  1 when y,- = 0. The Tobit model is the usual choice of 
estimator in these situations. However, it may suffer from severe bias from 
non-normality and heteroskedastic errors, and there is no a priori reason to 
assume that the error £ in Equation 4.5 will be normally distributed. For 
this reason, the Chapter follows Jalan and Ravallion (2000) in estimating the 
three models by Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD), which allows 
for non-normal, non-homoskedastic and non-symmetric errors by imposing 
the relatively less stringent condition of zero median error terms (Chay and 
Powell, 2001). The semiparametric estimation is based on quantile regres­
sion methods, and uses an iterative estimation process based on Buchinsky 
(1994).1
However, the magnitude of the poverty figures for Argentina implies 
that the P„ Q, and 7/ measures are heavily censored. For most of the 1995- 
2002 period, the poverty headcount in the GBA region fluctuated between 
20 and 30 percent (see Section 1.3, page 29, and Appendix C), implying that 
between 70 and 80 percent of the population has a value of p (ya) = 0 in 
Equation 4.4. With such a large fraction of the sample with censored values, 
the regression coefficients in Equation 4.5 must be estimated at very high 
quantiles -  at least above 0.75. To reduce the level of censoring, the poverty 
line is scaled up by 50 percent of its value when conducting the regressions
lrThe estimation was performed using the qcenreg Stata routine developed by Robert 
Vigfusson of Northwestern University. This is an implementation of Buchinsky's (1994) 
recensoring-regression algorithm: starting from an unrestricted quantile regression, the 
observations with a predicted value of the quantile below the censoring point are excluded, 
a procedure which is repeated until the estimate converges.
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in Equation 4.5, since this reduces significantly the number of observations 
with a zero value of intertemporal, transient and chronic poverty, the de­
pendent variables.2 This is the procedure adopted by Jalan and Ravallion 
(2000) for their analysis of chronic and transient poverty in rural China. For 
consistency with the estimates reported in the previous Chapters, however, 
the Tables and Figures in the next Section rely on the normal poverty line.
4 .3  Em pir ic a l  Results
4.3.1 Population groups and poverty decompositions
The applications presented in this Section are based on the Greater Buenos 
Aires (GBA) panel described in Section 1.2. Given the structure of the rotat­
ing panel, the fifteen waves between May 1995 and May 2002 contain data 
for twelve cohorts with four consecutive observations over a period of a 
year and a half, with an average of 453 households and 1812 observations 
per cohort.
Other studies based on the transient-chronic decomposition use panels 
that follow households for a longer period of time, but they typically present 
only one point-estimate of chronic and transient poverty for the whole pe­
riod (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Cruces and Wodon, 2004). The advantage 
of the GBA dataset is that, as a series of twelve panels of four observations, 
it allows the construction of time series of transient and chronic poverty 
measures.
Table 4.1 presents the partition of the population according to the per­
sistence of the poverty status of the household, as discussed in the previous 
Section and illustrated in Figure 4.1. As expected, the trends in these four 
categories follow the evolution of the economy in general. The proportion 
of those always poor is above the average for the period from the May 1999 
to May 2001 cohort, reaching its highest point in the last cohort which cor­
responds to the economic crisis of 2001-2002. The proportion of those who 
are classified as never poor mirrors that of the previous group, reaching its 
lowest point of 42.7 percent for the last cohort, which reflects both the in-
2The change from 1 to 1.5 poverty lines reduces the level of censoring (observations 
with P„ Q, or T, =  0) from 66 and 82 percent of the observations for the transient and 
chronic measures, to 48 and 66 percent respectively.
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Table 4.1: Population Groups by Mean Income and Persistence of Poverty 
Status by Cohort, Greater Buenos Aires, 1995-2002
Cohort PersistentlyPoor
Sometimes poor, Sometimes poor, 
mean income below mean income above 
pov. line pov. line
Never Poor
95-1 to 96-2 9.4% 23.8% 8.0% 58.8%
95-2 to 97-1 16.0% 17.5% 10.5% 56.0%
96-1 to 97-2 8.1% 18.7% 11.6% 61.6%
96-2 to 98-1 12.0% 17.5% 13.1% 57.3%
97-1 to 98-2 10.8% 15.1% 8.6% 65.5%
97-2 to 99-1 9.9% 16.6% 12.1% 61.4%
98-1 to 99-2 13.8% 15.4% 12.8% 58.1%
98-2 to 00-1 13.9% 18.5% 11.6% 56.0%
99-1 to 00-2 17.4% 15.8% 7.5% 59.4%
99-2 to 01-1 14.5% 18.6% 15.0% 51.9%
00-1 to 01-2 18.8% 14.9% 10.5% 55.9%
00-2 to 02-1 23.3% 17.2% 16.8% 42.7%
Average 14.0% 17.5% 11.5% 57.0%
Source: Author's estimations based on EPH household survey data (INDEC).
crease in cross-sectional poverty and the fall in households who stay out 
of poverty for two consecutive waves, as described in Section 1.3. These 
numbers imply that for the last cohort, covering the period October 2000 to 
May 2002, almost a quarter of individuals in the Greater Buenos Aires re­
gion were poor in the four waves of the EPH, while almost 60 percent were 
poor in at least one of the surveys.
Besides the evolution of these two "chronic" categories (the always poor 
and the never poor), Table 4.1 also reflects the considerable movements 
across the poverty line which were identified in Section 1.3 (Figure 1.8, page 
41) and in the empirical applications of Chapters 2 and 3. The downward 
trend in average household income over the period (Figure 1.3, page 30) ex­
plains the fall in the proportion of the sometimes poor with mean income 
above the poverty line and the increase in the proportion of the sometimes 
poor with y  > z. Taken together, the evidence in Figure 1.3 and Table 4.1 
means that those who escaped poverty in at least one of the four waves are 
more likely to have average incomes below the poverty line the generalised 
deterioration of household income over the period.
Figure 4.2 quantifies these effects by presenting the sample averages of
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Table 4.2: Decomposition of Squared Poverty Gap, Greater Buenos Aires,
1995-2002









95-1 to 96-2 4.5% 2.5% 1.9% 56.7% 43.3%
95-2 to 97-1 6.5% 4.2% 2.2% 65.2% 34.8%
96-1 to 97-2 5.1% 3.1% 2.0% 60.6% 39.4%
96-2 to 98-1 5.7% 3.4% 2.4% 58.7% 41.3%
97-1 to 98-2 5.0% 3.0% 1.9% 60.7% 39.3%
97-2 to 99-1 5.4% 3.5% 2.0% 63.7% 36.3%
98-1 to 99-2 6.3% 4.0% 2.3% 63.2% 36.8%
98-2 to 00-1 6.1% 4.0% 2.1% 65.9% 34.1%
99-1 to 00-2 6.0% 4.0% 2.0% 67.1% 32.9%
99-2 to 01-1 6.9% 4.6% 2.3% 67.2% 32.8%
00-1 to 01-2 7.0% 4.9% 2.1% 69.7% 30.3%
00-2 to 02-1 11.6% 8.0% 3.6% 69.2% 30.8%
Average 6.3% 4.1% 2.2% 64.0% 36.0%
Source: Author's estimations based on EPH household survey data (INDEC).
the measures defined in Equations 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. The Figure presents the 
squared poverty gap and its decomposition into its chronic and transient 
components, and it is complemented by Table 4.2, which also computes the 
proportion of total poverty attributable to each of these two components.
As expected from the discussion of the previous Chapters, there is a clear 
upward trend in total poverty, with an increase in the average of Pj from 
0.045 for the first cohort to 0.116 for the last one. The results from the parti­
tion of the population presented in Table 4.1 are also reflected in Table 4.2: 
the increase in the always poor explains the large increase in chronic po­
verty from 0.025 to 0.080, which can also be traced to the fall in household 
income during the period.
The previous Chapters pointed out that the downward trend in income 
was accompanied by a marked increase in its variability. The results in Table
4.2 imply that the "level" effect is the most important in terms of this Chap­
ter's decomposition. Despite a large increase in transient poverty from 0.019 
to 0.036, its share of total poverty is lower and falls over time at the expense 
of the chronic measure (last two columns of Table 4.2). The share of chronic 
poverty increases from 57 percent of the intertemporal measure for the first 
cohort to almost 70 percent for the last two cohorts.
95-1 to 96-2 95-2 to  97-1 96-1 to 97-2 96-2 to
Note: Left scale for squared poverty gap and its compo 
Source: Author's estim ations based on EPH household
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4.3.2 Regression analysis
Table 4.3 presents the result from the estimation of the three regressions 
in Equation 4.5 by CLAD. Following suggestions in Buchinsky (1994) and 
given the level of censoring in the data, the regressions are estimated at the
0.8 quantile.
The independent variables are similar to those used for the SUR system 
of Equation 3.8. They include the initial conditions for (a) household level 
variables, including the number of infants, children, young adults, adults, 
and elderly household members, and the square of their values; whether 
the household head has a spouse; (b) characteristics of the household head, 
including five age intervals; h is/her employment status; h is/her level of 
education; h is/her gender; h is/her migration status (in the last five years); 
whether he/she is an employer, a self-employed worker, or a wage earner; 
the type of h is/her qualifications; h is/her education level; and whether 
he /she  works in the public sector or is an informal worker; and (c) a subset 
of these characteristics for the spouse of the household head, when there is 
one. In addition, the regressions include indicators for each of the cohorts, 
excluding the first one. The summary statistics of these independent vari­
ables are presented in Table 3.1 (page 96).
The results for total poverty (first column of Table 4.3, corresponding 
to the regression of P; from Equation 4.1) are similar to those for chronic 
poverty (second column, with Q  from Equation 4.2 as the dependent vari­
able), and are relatively standard for poverty profiles and regressions of this 
type (World Bank, 2000a; Cruces and Wodon, 2003a, present more detailed 
profiles for Argentina).
For Pi and Q , the number of infants and children is associated with 
higher levels of poverty despite the adjustments made with the equivalence 
scale of Table 1.3 (page 1.4) according to Equation 1.3, although the magni­
tude of this result may be sensitive to the specific choice of scale (Lanjouw 
and Ravallion, 1995). While the gender of the head does not have a statisti­
cally significant effect, heads in the 40-49 age range (the excluded category) 
are associated with lower levels of poverty. With respect to labour market 
indicators, unemployment, inactivity and informality of the head or spouse 
have a very high positive impact on the poverty measures. Self employment
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of the household head and h is/her status (and that of the spouse) as an em­
ployer have a positive effect on observed poverty. While surprising, this 
probably results from the nature of the sample, which consists only of poor 
people. Among them, the self-employed and those with employees tend 
to be part of the informal economy with small and precarious businesses 
(Moreno and Roca, 2002) -  this is discussed below in terms of the effect of 
these indicators on transient poverty. Finally, as expected, higher education 
levels and professional qualifications of the head and the spouse are unam­
biguously associated with lower levels of poverty (the excluded categories 
are no education and no qualifications). These results are broadly consis­
tent with those of Paz (2002) and Gasparini (2003b), discussed in Section 1.4 
(page 42).
The most interesting feature of Table 4.3, however, is the presence of 
disparities in the determinants of chronic and transient poverty, which indi­
cates a differential impact of a household characteristic on the two compo­
nents.
While the results for the composition of the household are relatively ho­
mogeneous among the three columns, households with young heads (19 
years or below) have lower levels of chronic poverty but higher levels of 
transient poverty. The first effect might be due to self-selection: younger in­
dividuals might chose to live with relatives if facing chronic poverty on their 
own. The positive coefficient on transient poverty, on the other hand, im­
plies that younger individuals are subject to more fluctuations in the depth 
of poverty, probably due to lower job tenure and higher vulnerability to 
labour market shocks (Mackenzie, 2004). With respect to older heads of 
household, those aged 65 and more are not associated with higher total po­
verty (the coefficient is not statistically different from zero), although this 
characteristic has a negative effect on chronic and transient poverty, which 
probably reflects the fact that most of these individuals receive steady in­
come streams in the form of pensions.
Another interesting feature of the Table is the public sector indicator, 
which has a positive and highly significant effect on total poverty for both 
the head and h is/her spouse. This is probably due to the relatively low 
salaries of civil servants. However, the stability of this income source -  and 
of public employment -  is reflected in the lack of effect on transient poverty
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Table 4.3: Censored Quantile Regressions for Total, Chronic and Transient
Poverty, Greater Buenos Aires, 1995-2002
Total Poverty Chronic Transient
Household characteristics
Number o f  infants (age 0-5) 0.02513 0.04728 0.01322
[0.00495]*** [0.00656]*** [0.00163]***
Number o f  infants squared 0.01001 0.00589 -0.00214
[0.00140]*** [0.00230]** [0.00048]***
Number o f  children (age 6-14) 0.10942 0.14871 0.02124
[0.00407]*** [0.00332]*** [0.00111]***
Number o f  children squared -0.00882 -0.01415 -0.00321
[0.00088]*** [0.00062]*** [0.00023]***
Number o f  Youths (age 15-24) -0.00633 0.02441 0.01252
[0.00442] [0.00395]*** [0.00135]***
Number o f  Youths squared 0.00465 -0.00683 -0.00333
[0.00119]*** [0.00104]*** [0.00038]***
Number o f  adults (age 25-64) 0.02972 0.00383 0.00837
[0.00744]*** [0.00748] [0.00219]***
Number o f  adults squared -0.01396 -0.00806 -0.00184
[0.00169]*** [0.00150]*** [0.00046]***
Number o f  elderly members (age 65+) -0.10748 -0.15352 -0.01712
[0.01159]*** [0.01153]*** [0.00413]***
Number o f  elderly members, squared 0.02211 0.04187 0.00272
[0.00473]*** [0.00423]*** [0.00218]
No spouse in the household -0.01436 -0.01835 -0.01101
[0.01290] [0.01226] [0.00411]***
Characteristics o f  the head
Age -1 9  and younger 0.1144 -0.17914 0.05603
[0.02546]*** [0.01358]*** [0.00724]***
Age - 20-29 0.06319 0.03264 0.00745
[0.00864]*** [0.00781]*** [0.00267]***
Age - 30-39 0.02578 0.00103 0.00174
[0.00596]*** [0.00526] [0.00183]
Age - 50-59 0.02224 -0.01307 -0.00725
[0.00665]*** [0.00591]** [0.00193]***
Age - 60 and older 0.00291 -0.01523 -0.00956
[0.00909] [0.00835]* [0.00266]***
Female -0.00593 0.00734 -0.00018
[0.00725] [0.00764] [0.00228]
Recent migrant -0.12515 -0.02718 -0.01861
[0.01651]*** [0.01188]** [0.00356]***
Inactive 0.08131 0.12793 0.01399
[0.00907]*** [0.00813]*** [0.00269]***
Unemployed 0.20448 0.22963 0.0617
[0.00825]*** [0.00725]*** [0.00248]***
Employer 0.06007 0.02433 0.02785
[0.02213]*** [0.02175] [0.00489]***
Self-employed 0.029 0.03264 0.00644
[0.00705]*** [0.00610]*** [0.00216]***
Informal sector worker 0.08725 0.11759 0.01316
[0.00674]*** [0.00617]*** [0.00197]***
Public sector worker 0.00324 0.03523 -0.00067
[0.01035] [0.00956]*** [0.00280]
Level o f  qualification: Operative -0.03878 -0.0421 -0.00697
[0.00574]*** [0.00518]*** [0.00169]***
Level o f  qualification: Technical /  Professional -0.06805 -0.08 -0.01679
[0.01307]*** [0.01622]*** [0.00363]***
Primary Education -  Complete -0.02666 -0.05328 0.0026
[0.00549]*** [0.00480]*** [0.00169]
Secondary Education -  Incomplete -0.03212 -0.06173 -0.01483
[0.00677]*** [0.00608]*** [0.00203]***
Secondary Education - Complete -0.16102 -0.18975 -0.02457
[0.01064]*** [0.01116]*** [0.00261]***
Further Education - Incomplete -0.11621 -0.07938 -0.04006
[0.02494]*** [0.02436]*** [0.00705]***
Further Education - Complete -0.14017 -0.16669 -0.04981
[0.02096]*** [0.01772]*** [0.00885]***
University Education -0.17906 -0.14143 -0.05126
[0.01684]*** [0.01279]*** [0.00474]**
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(continued) T ota l P overty C hronic T ran sient
S p ouse characteristics
Inactive 0 .04692 0.0569 0 .01223
[0.01155]*** [0.01017]*** [0.00368]***
U nem ployed 0.13502 0.12663 0.02476
[0.01315]*** [0.01152]*** [0.00416]***
Em ployer 0.22281 0.07813 0.03661
[0.03064]*** [0.02825]*** [0.00991]***
Self-em ployed -0 .01644 -0.01411 0 .00677
[0.01070] [0.00957] [0.00325]**
Informal sector worker 0 .02914 0 .01824 0 .00537
[0.01276]** [0.01122] [0.00406]
Level o f  qualification: Operative -0 .01686 -0 .03378 -0 .01042
[0.01071] [0.01032]*** [0.00337]***
Level o f  qualification: Technical -0 .08941 -0 .12389 -0 .01978
[0.02607]*** [0.01913]*** [0.00626]***
Level o f  qualification: Profesional -0 .0852 -0.031 -0 .01728
[0.02886]*** [0.02357] [0.01172]
Public sector worker -0 .11584 0.05596 -0 .01236
[0.02169]*** [0.01616]*** [0.00537]**
Primary Education -  Complete -0 .06353 -0 .05894 -0 .02344
[0.00621]*** [0.00532]*** [0.00196]***
Secondary Education -  Incomplete -0 .14017 -0 .16398 -0 .03052
[0.00757]*** [0.00714]*** [0.00229]***
Secondary Education - Complete -0 .16016 -0.19071 -0 .03345
[0.01019]*** [0.01065]*** [0.00273]***
Further Education - Incom plete -0.04291 -0 .09544 -0.043
[0.02247]* [0.01927]*** [0.00859]***
Further Education - Com plete -0.0921 -0 .33523 -0 .02125
[0.02013]*** [0.01912]*** [0.00514]***
U niversity Education -0 .33934 -0 .13979 -0 .06746
[0.02516]*** . [0.01405]*** [0.01014]***
C oh ort con tro ls
95-2  to 97-1 0 .07824 0.15982 -0 .01241
[0.01138]*** [0.01103]*** [0.00303]***
96-1 to 97-2 0.05245 0.0811 -0 .00191
[0.01219]*** [0.01251]*** [0.00310]
96-2  to 98-1 0.04365 0.09046 -0 .00526
[0.01135]*** [0.01128]*** [0.00291]*
97-1 to 98-2 0 .05176 0.1155 -0 .00235
[0.01181]*** [0.01159]*** [0.00310]
97-2  to 99-1 0 .05642 0.11633 0.00237
[0.01160]*** [0.01135]*** [0.00298]
98-1 to 99-2 0.10109 0.16046 0 .00464
[0.01121]*** [0.01117]*** [0.00290]
98-2  to 00-1 0 .05722 0.12879 0 .00256
[0.01141]*** [0.01099]*** [0.00288]
99-1 to 00-2 0.07769 0.14167 -0 .00607
[0.01158]*** [0.01101]*** [0.00302]**
99-2  to 01-1 0.09595 0.18423 0.00658
[0.01152]*** [0.01107]*** [0.00292]**
00-1 to 01-2 0 .09066 0.14889 0 .00282
[0.01145]*** [0.01101]*** [0.00302]
00-2  to 02-1 0.17291 0.2458 0 .02856
[0.01117]*** [0.01092]*** [0.00280]***
Constant -0 .05622 -0 .20806 0 .01912
[0.01877]*** [0.01884]*** [0.00572]***
O b servation s 2439 1409 3275
P seu d o  R -Squared 0 .2606 0.2646 0.1089
Standard errors in brackets (significant: * at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%) 
Source: Author's estimations based on EPH household survey data (INDEC).
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for the head of household, and the negative and significant impact on Tz- for 
the spouse. A similar effect is found with respect to changes in income by 
Corbacho et al. (2003), who use EPH data from the 1999-2002 period.
In the P/ regressions, all education and qualification indicators were as­
sociated with lower poverty. This is also true for the lowest level of edu­
cation of the head (completed primary school) and its effect on chronic po­
verty. However, the lack of a significant effect of this variable on transient 
poverty (and its positive sign) indicates that little education may help in 
terms of reducing the level of poverty, but not in moderating its variability.
The positive and significant effect of the head's employer indicator on 
transient poverty, and its lack of effect on chronic poverty, may explain the 
puzzle discussed above: small scale entrepreneurs may not face higher lev­
els of chronic poverty, although the risky nature of their businesses implies 
higher variability and thus higher transient measures. The same explana­
tion probably applies to the self-employed indicator for the spouse, which 
has a (non-significant) negative effect on total and chronic poverty, but a 
positive and significant effect on its transient component.
The positive and significant values of the cohort indicators for the total 
and chronic measures have a clear upward trend, which reflects the fall in 
household income over the 1995-2002 period. Interestingly, these indicators 
only have a statistically significant effect on Tz for a few cohorts, indicat­
ing that while the increase in the depth of poverty was unambiguous, its 
transient dimension varied over the period. The excluded cohort is the first 
one (covering May 1995 to October 1996). The coefficients of the October 
1995-May 1997 and the October 1996-May 1998 cohorts in the transient po­
verty regression are negative and significant, indicating that the period of 
recovery after the Mexican crisis was marked by a fall in the variability of 
well-being over time. The indicator corresponding to the May 1999 to Oc­
tober 2000 is also negative and significant in the Tz regression, due to the 
slight but short-lived recovery in income and unemployment for October 
2000 (Figure 1.3). In contrast, the cohort indicators for these three cohorts 
are positive and strongly significant for the Pz and Q  regressions. The large 
fall in income during the recession of 1999-2001 and the 2001-2002 crisis, 
however, are reflected in the positive and highly significant values of the 
indicators for cohorts 10 and 12 in the three regressions.
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Finally, the results on the determinants of chronic and transient poverty 
can be compared to those of the risk adjusted income regressions of Section
3.3 (page 89). As noted in the Introduction to this Chapter, the methodology 
presented in Chapter 3 concentrates on the effects of income risk at every 
point of the income distribution, while the transient-chronic decomposition 
deals only with the level and variability of well-being among the poor, so 
the two sets of results can be considered complementary.
The results for income and poverty levels are consistent: employment 
status, education and qualifications have the largest impacts on both. The 
comparison between the analysis of risk -  the difference between average 
and risk adjusted income -  and that of differences between transient and 
chronic poverty is certainly the most interesting. The regressions of Sec­
tion 3.3 (Table 3.2, page 98) indicated that households with elderly mem­
bers faced lower levels of risk, which is consistent with the negative effect 
of older household heads on transient poverty in Table 4.3. The informality 
indicators contributed to higher levels of risk and higher levels of poverty, 
although the employer and self-employed variables, which affect transient 
poverty, have no significant effect on average income or risk. Another co­
incidence is that education and qualifications reduce both risk and the tran­
sient component of poverty. Finally, the results in Tables 3.2 and 4.3 capture 
the fall in income and the increase in its variability induced by the 2001-2002 
crisis.
4 .4  C o n c l u s io n
This Chapter presented a decomposition of intertemporal poverty that ac­
counts for the large fluctuations of poverty and household income in Ar­
gentina for the period 1995-2002. This methodology was critically assessed 
in Chapter 2 in the context of the evaluation of income fluctuations over 
time.
The partition of the population into different groups, according to their 
average income over time and their exposure to poverty, complemented the 
decomposition of a poverty measure in its transient and chronic compo­
nents. The analysis of the trend in these two elements revealed that the 
increasing deterioration of living standards over this period was not only
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reflected in its level, but also in its variability. However, given the large fall 
in household income due to the 2001-2002 crisis, the largest share of poverty 
was due to its chronic component.
The decomposition also allows for the study of the correlates of total, 
transient and chronic poverty. This type of regression analysis represents 
a step forward with respect to the simple poverty profiles, since the differ­
ences in the impact of variables on chronic and transient poverty reveals 
their effect not only on the level of well-being, but also on its variability. 
These results are broadly consistent with those of the risk adjusted income 
regressions presented in Chapter 3. They complement that Chapter's ap­
proach and the results from the longitudinal studies for Argentina reviewed 
in Section 1.4.
Part II
Fertility and Women's 
Labour Supply in Argentina: 
Identification of Causal Effects 
Through Sex Preferences
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C h a p t e r  5
E f f e c t s  o f  F e r t il it y  o n  W o m e n ' s  
La b o u r  S u p p l y : M e t h o d o l o g y , E s t i m a t i o n  
S t r a t e g y  a n d  D a t a  f o r  A r g e n t i n a
5 .1  In t r o d u c t io n  t o  Pa r t  I I :
P o v e r t y , Fertility , a n d  W o m e n 's L a b o u r  S u p p l y
In the previous discussion of poverty, risk and income fluctuations in Ar­
gentina, larger households (and especially those with more children) were 
found to be poorer and more prone to suffering from income fluctuations. 
At the same time, the employment status of the head of household and the 
spouse was established as a strong correlate of chronic and transient po­
verty.
Studies of this type provide a valuable input for the analysis of poverty 
and its alleviation, and constitute a step towards understanding the mech­
anisms underlying deprivation and vulnerability. However, the recovered 
correlations do not imply causality, at least not without further assumptions: 
causal relations are blurred by the endogeneity and simultaneity of the dif­
ferent factors at stake. For instance, household size and fertility might be 
"causing" poverty by the simple mechanical effect of dividing income am­
ong a larger number of people,1 but also by hampering the opportunities 
of income-generating activities of some household members. At the same 
time, poverty itself may induce a rise in fertility, because of a lower opportu­
nity cost of a parent's time, or because of reduced access to family planning
1In the case of poverty measurement in Argentina, this is manifested in the number of 
household members fc,- in the denominator of Equation 1.2.
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possibilities.2 Similar concerns about the direction of causality also arise in 
the relationship between poverty and labour market outcomes.
The next step after the regression results of Chapters 3 and 4 consists in 
establishing the nature of the causal links underlying the identified correla­
tions.
The results of Part I on the positive correlations between poverty and 
fertility, on the one hand, and poverty and joblessness, on the other, moti­
vate the research presented in this Part, which establishes the determinants 
of the income-generating process of women as primary and secondary earn­
ers in the household. Specifically, the following Chapters study the effects 
of fertility on female labour supply, prompted not only by their correlation 
with poverty measures, but also by their evolution in Argentina: Figure 5.1 
shows that female labour force participation increased by almost 60 percent 
in the 1980-2000 period, while fertility fell significantly by almost 25 per­
cent during the same years and is expected to reach replacement levels by 
2010-2015 (Pantelides, 2002; Binstock, 2004; CELADE, 2004).3 The following 
pages will attempt to establish whether the change in fertility can explain 
the large increase in female labour force participation.
Fertility transitions of this type, and an even higher incorporation of wo­
men into the labour force in developed countries during the twentieth cen­
tury, prompted a continuous interest in the relationship between childbear­
ing and women's labour supply in the labour economics and demography 
literatures.4
However, endogeneity issues are pervasive in applied empirical rese­
arch. Concerns about the endogeneity of fertility and work decisions imply 
that much of this literature has been devoted to disentangle the causal mech­
anisms linking childbearing and women's labour supply. In a review of the 
literature, Willis (1987) wrote that " ... it has proven difficult to find enough 
well-measured exogenous variables to permit cause and effect relationships 
to be extracted from correlations among factors such as [...] the decline 
of childbearing [...] and increased female labour participation." Since the
2See Anand and Morduch (1998) and Lipton (1998) for a discussion of these points.
Replacement level fertility implies a total fertility rate usually between 2.1 and 2.2 chil­
dren per woman, depending on a country's level of mortality.
4See, among others, Gronau (1973), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), Killingsworth and 
Heckman (1986), Willis (1987), and Browning (1992).
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Figure 5.1: Female Labour Force Participation (Women Aged 14 and Older) 
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Source: CELADE (2004).
publication of that review, however, substantial progress has been made 
in labour economics by means of "natural experiments," which exploit the 
exogenous dimension of naturally occurring events as sources of variation 
(Angrist and Krueger, 1999,2001).
The aim of Chapters 5 to 8 is to provide a baseline measure of the impact 
of fertility on wom en's labour supply in Argentina. The following Chap-
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"cause and effect relationships."
It is argued, however, that whether the identification strategy can be ap­
plied to developing countries or not must first be established. The empirical 
results for Argentina constitute the first contribution of the following pages. 
The application to Argentina establishes whether the causal effect of child­
bearing on female labour supply holds in developing countries, where fer­
tility is typically higher, and female education and labour force participation 
levels are lower than in developed countries (United Nations, 2002).
The second contribution, presented in this Chapter and the following, 
consists in the discussion of the "same sex" strategy in the context of de­
veloping countries, and in the proposed interpretation of a set of auxiliary 
evidence for the evaluation of the identifying assumptions. Chapter 6 main­
tains that since the exclusion restrictions of instrumental variables are in­
herently non-testable, their plausibility must be evaluated on a case by case 
basis by means of indirect evidence. In particular, it is argued that the type 
and degree of sex preferences have to be assessed to establish the validity of 
the exclusion restrictions. Finally, the third contribution, presented in Chap­
ter 8, is the derivation of a new test to support the generality of instrumental 
variable results.
The present Chapter provides an econometric framework for the appli­
cation of the "same sex" estimation strategy to Argentina. Section 5.2 illus­
trates the theoretical relationship between fertility and female labour sup­
ply. It then describes the potential outcomes framework and the conditions 
for identification of causal effects. Section 5.3 studies in detail the "same 
sex" strategy within this framework. Section 5.4 describes the data emplo­
yed for the analysis and presents a set of summary statistics of the main 
variables. Some brief conclusions follow.
5 .2  Th eo r y  a n d  M e t h o d o l o g y
5.2.1 Theoretical framework: fertility and labour supply
The analysis of women's labour supply is intrinsically connected to the eco­
nomic models of fertility, time allocation and household decision making
household survey data from Korea, and Cruces and Galiani (2003) present additional data 
and estimates from Mexico.
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(Becker, 1991, summarises the developments in this field).
The essence of the economic analysis of fertility and labour supply is 
that the two are usually considered joint decisions: while children provide 
utility to their parents, they also enter the household's budget constraint 
since they involve considerable costs, both in terms of goods (e.g., food and 
school materials) and time devoted to childcare.
These relations are captured in this Section by means of a stylised static 
model of a nuclear household adapted from Browning (1992). This model 
concentrates on the woman's side of the problem, taking other variables, 
such as the spouse's income, hours of work at home and in the market as 
fixed.
The woman's utility function is defined as U = U (xm/xC/l,h}lfc), and 
is assumed to be increasing in all its arguments: xm and xc denote the con­
sumption of the mother and the children, I is the time devoted to leisure, 
hH is the time spent at home, and c is the number of children. The woman 
divides her total time T between work at home h leisure I and work in the 
market hmr for which she is compensated with a wage w. Finally, the budget 
constraint is completed by a fixed quantity 1, representing the household's 
other sources of income, the price px of consumption goods and a cost per 
child given by pc. The woman chooses the optimal quantities of her choice 
variables to solve the following maximisation problem:
max U = U (xm/xc, I, hh,c) subject to (5.1)
X m , X Cll th h ,C
I +  whm = px(xm +  %c) +  PcC (budget constraint)
T = hh + hm + l (time constraint)
The two constraints can be summarised as I +  w T — (wl +  px{xm +  xc)) +  
(pcc +  whfr), which describes the allocation of the household's full income 
between the woman and the child, if work at home is considered mainly as 
childcare and household chores.
This stylised model highlights the main theoretical relationships needed 
for the discussion of this Part. The shape of the utility function U and the 
first and second order conditions of the optimisation problem in Equation
5.1 define the demand for children, the labour force participation and the 
labour supply of the woman. Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), Mont­
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gomery and Trussell (1986) and Browning (1992) present more elaborate 
models covering single-parent households, labour supply dynamics, pri­
vate childcare, household production (Becker, 1965; Gronau, 1977), joint 
allocation of hours of man and woman (Gronau, 1973), and the quantity- 
quality of children interaction (Becker and Lewis, 1973). Cigno (1991) and 
Ermisch (2003) provide full treatments of all these aspects of the economics 
of the family
The simple setting of Equation 5.1 illustrates some important considera­
tions. Firstly, the labour supply, childcare and fertility decisions are simul­
taneous, although this is partially due to the static nature of the model: dy­
namic models capture the irreversibility of fertility decisions and their sub­
sequent effects on time allocation. Secondly, while the model of Equation
5.1 is too general for the derivation of demands for the different goods (and 
their interactions) without functional form assumptions, it still captures the 
essence of the causal relation between fertility and female labour supply: 
the utility function and the budget and time constraints imply a trade-off 
between "pure" utility from children, wage-income and the time and goods 
needs of children. Dynamic models often result in a negative causal effect 
of fertility on short-run labour supply through the time needs of children 
in the time constraint. Finally, the model can be used to illustrate the endo­
geneity that arises in the empirical estimation of labour supply models.
The objective of this Part is to obtain estimates of the direct effect of chil­
dren c in the labour supply of women, represented by =  T — I* — h^. 
Following Browning (1992), the model from Equation 5.1 results in a condi­
tional labour supply -  either in terms of hours, or as a binary participation 
indicator -  defined as Y =  /(K , D), where K is a vector that contains the 
variables in the model of Equation 5.1 and some exogenous characteristics, 
and D is a measure of fertility -  such as the number of children, or an indi­
cator of more than c children in a sample of women with c or more children.
The parameter of interest is the labour supply response to changes in 
the fertility variable, /e>. This parameter, however, is difficult to recover by 
simple statistical methods as illustrated by the derivative of Y  with respect 
to D. Ignoring the effects of fertility on all the other variables in Equation
5.1 (present in K), which requires a series of highly implausible assumptions 
(Browning, 1992), but considering the potential effects of fertility on wages,
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for example, this derivative is equal to:
dY dw
d D ~ d D f w + f °  ( }
Childbearing might have an effect on wages, for instance because of the 
foregone appreciation in the woman's "stock of experience" during mater­
nity leave (Cigno, 1991, Chapter 7). This would imply that dw /dD  ^  0. 
Moreover, the wage w is determined by ability and motivation factors that 
are unobservable and that may be correlated with fertility decisions through 
the childbearing and leisure preferences in the utility function U. Taking 
into account all the variables of the model in Equation 5.1 would add par­
tial derivatives (in Equation 5.2) of the components of K with respect to D.
This discussion implies that a fertility indicator D would be endogenous 
in a labour supply model -  a regression of Y  on D is flawed because "vari­
ables that are explicitly or implicitly assumed to be fixed are [...] within the 
control of mothers" (Browning, 1992). An additional factor is that unob­
served factors might be driving both decisions.
An alternative is to evaluate the structural parameters implied by the 
utility function and the constraints, but models of this type rely on a large 
number of assumptions, since preferences are not observable. As pointed 
out by Willis (1987), a solution to these endogeneity problems resides in 
finding a variable Z that induces variation in fertility but does not affect the 
labour supply decision directly, which allows the derivation of a reduced 
form relationship between fertility and labour supply.
Continuing the example presented in Equation 5.2, which only considers 
the endogenous effect of fertility on the wage rate, if Z is not related to the 
factors that account for dw /dD  then:
dY d w r d D r , dY ,dD
dz  =  d z f w+ d z f D ’ r e s u l t m g m / D  =  d z ! d z  ( 5 3 )
since the exogeneity of Z with respect to w implies that dw /dZ  =  0. The pa­
rameter of interest, the response of the labour supply to changes in fertility, 
is thus identified. This intuitive idea is the basis of the statistical framework 
and identification strategy presented in the following pages.
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5.2.2 The potential outcomes framework
Instrumental variables techniques, based on variables like Z in the previous 
Section, have been used since the 1920s to identify causal effects by exploit­
ing exogenous variations in the variables of interest (Wright, 1928; Angrist 
and Krueger, 2001). This section presents the potential outcomes frame­
work, a general setting for causal inference within which instrumental vari­
ables estimators can be given a causal interpretation without functional 
form assumptions.6
The objective is to evaluate the causal effect of some treatment over an 
outcome of interest: in this Part, the "treatment" denotes a measure of fer­
tility D, and the outcome Y is related to the employment status of a woman. 
This Section focuses on the case of binary treatments and outcomes:7 Yz is 
equal to 1 if the woman i is employed, and 0 if she is not, while Dz is an in­
dicator of whether i has more than two children in a sample of women with 
at least two offspring, which corresponds to the Angrist and Evans (1998) 
setting discussed in the following Section.
As observed in the discussion of Equation 5.2, the direct effect of D on Y 
in empirical models of women's labour supply is difficult to obtain because 
of simultaneity and endogeneity concerns. The potential outcomes frame­
work attempts to solve endogeneity problems of this type. Its starting point 
is the definition of a causal effect, which relies on the notion of potential -  as 
opposed to observed -  outcomes Y^  (Abadie, 2003a): Yqz is the potential out­
come without treatment for individual i, and represents the level of Y that i 
would attain if not exposed to the treatment. Yu  is defined analogously: it 
represents the outcome that the same individual i would attain if exposed 
to the treatment. The key feature is that potential outcomes refer to unob­
served counterfactuals. An individual i has either been exposed (Dz =  1) or 
not exposed to the treatment (Dz =  0), and Yz represents i's actual observed 
outcome. However, both Yqz and Yu  are defined for i: they represent the 
outcome that would have been observed in the two alternative situations, 
one of which is necessarily a counterfactual. In the case of fertility and wo­
6This Section draws mainly on Abadie's (2003a) presentation of results by Imbens and 
Angrist (1994), Angrist et al. (1996), Angrist (2001) and Abadie (2002,2003b), among others.
7Most of the results hold in models with variable treatment intensity (Angrist and Im­
bens, 1995), as discussed below. The empirical results in Chapters 7 and 8 deal with both 
cases.
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men's labour supply, the employment status of a woman i who has more 
than two children (Dz =  1) is Y u ,  which is equal to the observed Yj,  and 
Yqi represents the same woman's counterfactual employment status which 
would have been observed if she had only two children (Dz =  0).8
The causal effect of the treatment D for individual i is defined in terms 
of counterfactuals as the difference between the two potential outcomes, 
Yu — Yqi (Abadie, 2003a). In the previous example, the causal effect of 
childbearing is the divergence in employment status between having two 
or more than two children -  this difference is due only to childbearing, and 
thus it is not contaminated by other endogenous factors as in Equation 5.2.
Since causal effects are defined in terms of inherently unobserved coun­
terfactuals (i.e., what labour supply would have been in another situation), 
the problem of identification is to find a way of expressing the parameter of 
interest in terms of observable quantities. Moreover, since Yq/ and Yiz cannot 
both be observed at the same time for i, causal effects cannot be computed 
at the individual level: the identified parameter refers necessarily to the av­
erage causal effect E [Y \  — Y q ].
A first naive approach, corresponding to that of Equation 5.2, consists in 
comparing the average outcomes by treatment status. However, the simple 
comparison between the treated (E[Y|D =  1]) and the non treated (E[Y|D =  
0]), as given by an ordinary least squares regression of Y on D, is unlikely to 
identify any meaningful causal effect. This can be shown by re-writing the 
difference of these expectations in terms of potential outcomes:
E[Y|D = 1]-E[Y|D = 0] =
= E[Yi|D =  1] -  E[Y0\D =  0] +  E[Yj -  Y0) -  E[Yj -  Y0] (5.4)
= E[Yi -  Y0] +  {E[Y0] -  E[Y0|D =  0]} -  {E[Ya] -  E[Yi|D = 1]}
bias
where E[Yi — Yo] is the average treatment effect, and the last term  repre­
sents the bias. The elements in the first line of Equation 5.4 are observable, 
but since the bias term is composed of non-observable counterfactuals the 
average treatment effect cannot be distinguished from the simple difference
8Formally, the observed outcome Yz is a function of potential outcomes and the treat­
ment indicator Dz: Yz =  Yo;(l — Dz) +  YizDz.
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in average outcomes.9
The identification of the causal effect E [Y\ — Yo] in Equation 5.4 can still 
be attained in situations where the bias is equal to zero, although this is 
unlikely to be the case in most applications due to problems of selection 
and endogeneity like those described in the previous Section. For instance, 
individuals might choose whether to enter the treatment by estimating their 
own potential outcomes, resulting in a non-zero bias term in Equation 5.4 
-  Section 5.3.1 discusses this in detail in the context of fertility and female 
labour supply.
A well-known exception in which the left hand side of Equation 5.4 suc­
cessfully estimates the average causal effect is the case of random assign­
ment, which plays a central role in identification. When the population is 
randomly divided into treatment (Dz =  1) and control (Dz =  0) groups, the 
expectations of Y\ and Yo are independent of D. Intuitively, the assignment 
ensures that individuals do not self-select into treatment, and thus the bias 
in Equation 5.4 is forced to be 0 by the experimental design.
While randomised experiments are difficult to carry out in economics, 
and infeasible in the study of fertility and women's labour supply, the prob­
lems of selection and endogeneity can be overcome by finding a setting akin 
to random assignment. The next Section discusses the case of instrumental 
variables, in which identification is attained with a variable, correlated with 
the treatment, which is "as good as randomly assigned" (Angrist, 2004).
5.2.3 Identification by instrumental variables: LATE and the Wald estimator
A  solution to the endogeneity problem in the theoretical model described 
above was given in Equation 5.3 by means of exogenous variation in the 
causing variable. Imbens and Angrist (1994) translate the intuition of that
9Altematively, the bias can be expressed in terms of the average treatment effect on the 
treated, as done by Abadie (2003b) and Angrist (2004):
E[Y\D =  1] -  E[Y\D =  0] =  E[Yi\D  =  1] -  E[Y0|D =  0]
= E[Y1 - Y 0\D = 1}
+ {E[Y0|D =  1]-E[Y0|D =  0]}
where E[Yi — Yo\D = 1] is defined as the average causal effect on the treated, and the term 
E[Yo|D =  1] — E[Yq|D =  0] is the bias. Equation 5.4 seems better for presentational pur­
poses since instrumental variables identify the average treatment effect and not necessarily 
the effect on the treated.
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Equation into the potential outcomes framework, showing that the identi­
fication of causal effects when the treatment is non-random can be attained 
with an instrumental variable (IV) Z which induces exogenous variation in 
the treatment. The condition, as in Equation 5.3, is that Z must be correlated 
with the treatment but only affect the outcome Y  through its effect on D: in 
the Angrist and Evans (1998) example, the instrument Z is an indicator for 
women whose first two children are of the same sex, which, as discussed in 
the next Section, is correlated with having more than two children, but does 
not have a direct impact on the m other's labour supply.
Some additional notation and definitions are needed to derive the in­
strumental variables identification result. Given a binary instrument Z, Dz 
represents the potential treatment status given Z = z: Dz = Dq if Z =  0 
and Dz =  Di if Z =  1. Just as Y\ and Yo represent the potential outcomes in 
terms of the treatment D, Dz represents the treatment status that would be 
observed for different values of the instrument. With this notation, the po­
tential outcomes can be re-defined in terms of the treatment status and the 
instrument as Yz&. As in the case of potential outcomes, just one treatment 
status is observable for each individual, either Dq or D \, but both counter­
factuals are defined.10
Following Angrist et al. (1996), this setting allows the partition of the 
population into four mutually exclusive categories according to the values 
of Dz\
1. Compliers: D q = OandDi =  1. These individuals receive the treatment 
when the instrument is 1, but do not receive it when it is 0.
2. Always takers: D q =  1 and Di =  1. These individuals are always 
exposed to the treatment, regardless of the value of the instrument.
3. Never takers: D q =  0 and D\ = 0 These individuals are never exposed 
to the treatment, regardless of the value of the instrument.
4. Defiers: D q — 1 and Di =  0. These individuals receive the treatment 
when the instrument is 0, but do not receive it when it is 1.
^Formally, the observed treatment D, is a function of potential treatment and the instru­
ment Z,: Dj =  D0z(l — Z,-) +  DuZj.
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Compliers are those whose treatment status is changed by the instru­
ment. In terms of the childbearing example, compliers are women who 
would have had an additional child if their first two children were of the 
same sex, but would not have had it if the first two were of different sex. 
Always takers always have more than two children irrespective of the sex 
of the first two, whereas never takers stop at two in any circumstance. Fi­
nally, defiers are simply those who behave in the opposite way of compliers: 
two children of the same sex induce them to stop having children, while two 
children of different sex encourage them to have more than two. Since these 
definitions are based on unobservable potential treatments, it is impossible 
to assign a single individual to any of these four groups from observable 
characteristics.
The following assumptions represent a set of nonparametric conditions11 
in terms of Y2^ , Dz and Z under which the instrumental variables estimators 
identify causal effects for the subpopulation of compliers (Abadie, 2003b):
Assumption 5.1 Independence: the vector (Yoo, Yio, Yoi, Yu, Do, Di) is inde­
pendent of the instrument Z.
Assumption 5.2 Exclusion: Y =  Yo^/or d =  0 and d =  1.
Assumption 5.3 First stage: 0<Pr(Z =  l ) < l  and also 
Pr(Di = 1) > Pr(D0 = 1).
Assumption 5.4 Monotonicity: D\ ^  D q .
The independence Assumption 5.1 refers to the treatment assignment 
mechanism with respect to Z, requiring that the instrument is randomly 
assigned.
Assumption 5.2 means that Yoo =  Yio =  Yo and Yoi =  Y \\ =  Y\, imply­
ing that for a given treatment status d, the potential outcome Yz& is always 
the same, irrespective of the value of the instrument. Potential outcomes 
can then be defined in terms of the treatment D alone, Y ,^ as in Section 5.2.2. 
This exclusion restriction means that any influence of the instrument on the
11 Implicit in this notation is the "Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption," which postu­
lates that an individual i is not affected by the treatment received and instrument assigned 
to other individuals in the population (Angrist et al., 1996).
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potential outcomes comes only through its effect on the treatment D: the 
instrument Z does not affect Y  directly.
The first part of Assumption 5.3 rules out the possibility that either all 
or none of the individuals in the population have a positive value for the 
instrument indicator -  any of the two extremes would render Z trivial. The 
second part of the Assumption states that the instrument affects the proba­
bility of treatment, which is required to be more likely to equal 1 for those 
with Zj = 1 than for those with Zz =  0.12
Finally, Assumption 5.4 requires that changing Z from 0 to 1 should not 
shift an individual from receiving the treatment to not receiving it. This 
effectively rules out the presence of defiers, which is not controversial in 
most applications.13
Given an instrument Z that satisfies Assumptions 5.1-5.4, Imbens and 
Angrist (1994) show that the causal effect of the treatment is identified for 
those whose treatment status is changed by the instrument (Do =  0 and 
Di =  1), the group of compliers:
Proposition 5.1 Local Average Treatment Effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994): I f  
Assumptions 5.1, 5.2,5.3 and 5.4 hold, then:
E[Y|Z = 1] — E[Y|Z = 0]
[ 0 , 0  0 , 1  1 E[D\Z = 1] — E[D|Z = 0] ( J
This estimator is the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). It is an 
identification result in the sense that a difference in unobservable poten­
tial outcomes can be expressed as a function of observable quantities. In the 
presence of an instrumental variable that fulfils the conditions set above, 
the causal effect of the treatment D for the group of compliers is the quo­
tient in Equation 5.5.14 This result is obtained without any functional form
12The "greater than" signs in Assumptions 5.3 and 5.4 can be reversed without loss of 
generality.
13This assumption is not specific to the potential outcomes framework: as noted by An­
grist et al. (1996), it is implicit in standard instrumental variable models. The same authors 
provide a detailed discussion of these four assumptions and the consequences of their vio­
lations.
14While the discussion focuses on binary treatments, Angrist and Imbens (1995) show an 
equivalent identifying result in models with variable treatment intensity When D is not 
binary the parameter # in Equation 5.5 captures the weighted average of causal responses 
to a unit change in treatment. In the fertility example, if the variable D is the number of
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assumption.
Proposition 5.1 identifies the causal effect for the subpopulation of com­
pliers, since for this group the treatment status D is determined by a random 
event Z. This rules out the issue of self-selection, making compliers akin to 
a group subject to an experiment with random assignment to treatment.
A limitation of the LATE parameter from Proposition 5.1 is that it can 
only be extrapolated as a causal effect for the whole population by assum­
ing no heterogeneity in potential outcomes between compliers and other 
groups. Under that assumption, LATE is equal to the population average 
causal effect E \Y\ — Y q]. Chapter 8 addresses the plausibility of assump­
tions of this type in the context of fertility and women's labour supply.
The LATE parameter and its standard error can be recovered by means of 
an instrumental variable model with a dummy endogenous regressor. This 
coefficient is known as the "Wald" estimate, and is obtained by estimating 
the Equation:
Yf =  y  T  T  £/ (5*6)
where Yz and Di are defined as before, y  is a constant term, £z is an error 
term, and the treatment variable Dz is instrumented with Zz .
In some cases, Assumptions 5.1,5.2,5.3 and 5.4 may only hold condition­
ally on some observable exogenous variables Xz. Alternatively, a researcher 
might be interested in controlling for these characteristics in the estimation 
of causal effects to extrapolate results to another group of the population 
with different values of Xz. In these cases, the simplest option is to estimate 
the causal effect is by means of a linear, constant-effects model of the form:
E[Y0I |Xj] =  Xj-jS and 
* 1« =  Yoi +  $
where Xz is a vector of control variables that influence the outcome Y inde­
pendently of the treatment status, as described in the first Equation (Angrist, 
2001). The second Equation implies that the causal effect of the treatment 
represents a shift in the outcome, as in the LATE setting above. These as­
own children, Yj represents the potential labour supply for an individual at each value j  of 
D, and the LATE parameter represents the average effect of an increase in the number of 
children by one.
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sumptions lead to the following linear causal model:
Yi =  X-/3 +  (pDi +  Si (57)
This model can be estimated by two-stage least squares, with Z2 as an in­
strument for Di, to obtain the causal effect parameter (p. The instrumental 
variable Z\ must satisfy an extended version of Assumptions 5.1-5.4 that 
makes them conditional on the controls X; (Abadie, 2003b).15
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) model in Equation 5.7 is equivalent 
to the canonical version of the instrumental variable model with one en­
dogenous regressor. Moreover, it has been shown that this setting can be 
considered as a special case of the latent index model.16 The advantages of 
the framework described in this Section are threefold. Firstly, it provides 
an alternative interpretation of these models in terms of causal inference. 
It also individualises the underlying assumptions, making conditions for 
identification explicit. Finally, these conditions do not depend on functional 
form assumptions. The following Section discusses the application of the 
framework to the case of fertility and women's labour supply, highlight­
ing the endogeneity problems that arise in this context and the potential for 
identification by means of instrumental variables.
15Abadie (2003b) points out that the introduction of covariates X,- implies that the para­
meter (p in Equation 5.7 is not exactly a LATE as defined in Proposition 5.1, and he proposes 
a weighted "Casual IV estimator" for (p that has a LATE interpretation. However, his own 
results, as well as estimations from Angrist (2001) and Cruces and Galiani (2003), find the 
"Casual IV" estimates of (p in Equation 5.7 almost indistinguishable from those obtained 
by two-stage least squares. This is due to the fact that the covariates used in the estimation 
are discrete with finite support (Abadie, 2003b).
16The model in Equation 5.7 can have an alternative interpretation as a latent index 
model where Y* =  X- j3 +  (pDj +  with Y,- =  1 if Y* > 0, Y, =  0 if Y* < 0, and £, =  86i +  u,. 
Y* is a latent outcome variable, and the error term is composed by a random component w, 
and an unobservable parameter 0,- affecting the treatment and the outcome (Iacovou, 2001). 
Heckman et al. (2003) discuss the equivalence of the potential outcomes and latent index 
models, using a latent-variable framework "to unite the recent treatment-effect literature 
with the classical selection-bias literature." This issue is also explored at length by Angrist 
(2001,2003).
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5.3 Fertility , W o m e n 's La b o u r  S u p p l y  a n d  t h e  "Sa m e  S e x "
E s t im a t io n  St r a t e g y
5.3.1 Fertility and women's labour supply: endogeneity and selection issues
A  variety of studies from different disciplines as well as casual observa­
tion indicate the presence of a negative correlation between childbearing 
and women's labour supply (see references in Section 5.2.1). However, this 
correlation cannot be interpreted as a causal effect w ithout further (and de­
batable) assumptions on the nature, size and sign of the selection bias term.
The bias term in Equation 5.4 provides a simple illustration of selection 
as an obstacle to identification. The bias arises because expected potential 
outcomes may affect self-selection into treatment: this term would be 0 in 
Equation 5.4 (and thus identification achieved) only if the decision to have a 
child is independent of a women's potential labour market outcomes when 
not having any children. In that case, the treatment D becomes irrelevant 
for the expectation of potential outcomes, and the bias disappears:
Bias = {E[Y0]-E [Y 0|D =  0 ]} -{E [Y 1]-E [Y i|D  =  l]} (5.8)
=  {E[Y0]-E [Y 0]} -{ E [Y i]-E [Y i]}  =  0
However, the theoretical results discussed in Section 5.2.1 and empirical 
evidence suggest that fertility and women's labour supply are jointly de­
termined and that there is a causal link between the two, making this in­
dependence assumption implausible. Childbearing decisions take into ac­
count expected potential outcomes, career plans, comparative advantages, 
preferences and the division of labour within the household, implying that 
women with higher fertility are probably different in terms of potential out­
comes from women with lower fertility.
For instance, women lacking opportunities for childcare arrangements, 
with stronger preferences for children, or who forecast relatively poor la­
bour market outcomes (such as a low quality job, or low wages)17 might 
decide to work at home and have children. These women self-select into 
treatment because they expect a relatively low Y\, implying that their poten­
17This might be related to individual ability, but can also be affected by opportunities 
and by the extent of discrimination in labour markets, among other factors.
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tial outcomes are lower than average: this results in E[Yi\D = 1] < E[Y!]. 
On the other hand, women who expect good labour market outcomes prob­
ably self-select into lower fertility (non treatment): the potential outcome of 
this group is above average, implying that E[Yo|D =  0] > E[Yo]-
A situation like this results in a negative bias term in Equation 5.4,18 
but this is due to the nature of the example: in other cases, the bias might be 
positive. For instance, this is the case if E[Yi] is very low within women who 
self-select into D =  0, and relatively high among those who chose D =  1. 
In a situation like this, women who chose lower fertility do so because of 
low expected outcomes when having children (Yi), and not because of good 
outcomes without children as in the previous example.
While the framework outlined in the previous Section proposed a so­
lution to the endogeneity problems of this type through instrumental vari­
ables, the problem remains in finding a suitable variable Z, which is dis­
cussed in the following pages.
5.3.2 Identification through natural experiments
As shown by Proposition 5.1, the identification of the causal effect in Equa­
tion 5.4 can be attained through an instrument Z that meets the require­
ments of Assumptions 5.1-5.4. However, finding a valid instrument in so­
cioeconomic data is not evident: most of the observed individual charac­
teristics are plausibly correlated with unobservable factors driving the out­
come, making them endogenous to the relationship of interest in violation 
of Assumption 5.2. For instance, there is strong evidence of a link between 
the level of education and women's fertility decisions, but it is unlikely that 
education could make a good instrument for childbearing since it certainly 
affects labour supply through channels other than the number of children. 
Moreover, while most meaningful socioeconomic characteristics might be 
considered to be jointly determined, other plausibly exogenous individual 
attributes might not have an impact in the variable of interest, as required 
by Assumption 5.3.
18Using the alternative definition of the bias in terms of the average treatment on the 
treated given in footnote 9 (page 132), the bias is E[Yq|D =  1] — E[Yq|D =  0]. Women 
who expect high outcomes without the treatment self-select into D =  0, which results in a 
negative bias since E[Yq\D =  0] > E[Yq|D =  1].
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These problems with socioeconomic characteristics and the difficulties 
of carrying out randomised experiments in the social sciences imply that re­
searchers often rely on "natural experiments," situations equivalent to ran­
dom treatments that arise by chance. Some examples of naturally occurring 
events exploited in labour economics are birth date, gender composition of 
offspring and twin births -  Angrist and Krueger (1999) review these appli­
cations, and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) provide a critical assessment of 
the literature.
The main advantage of the natural outcomes of the previous paragraph 
is that, in the words of Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), they are "plausibly 
random with respect to at least two of the major sources of heterogeneity 
in hum an population, tastes and abilities." The consequence is that these 
natural outcomes are exogenous, as required by Assumption 5.2. If they 
influence the variable whose effect is of interest, they comply with Assump­
tion 5.3 and they can be exploited as instruments if Assumptions 5.1 and 5.4 
are also met.
5.3.3 The "same sex" strategy: sex mix as a natural experiment
This is the approach proposed by Angrist and Evans (1998) for the study of 
fertility and female labour supply. The "same sex" estimation strategy relies 
on the sex of a women's first two children as an instrument for fertility in a 
model of female labour supply. Its suitability as an instrument is given by 
two hypotheses. On the one hand, the gender of children is random. On the 
other hand, the gender mix has an impact on fertility as a consequence of 
parental sex preferences, but does not affect directly the parent's labour sup­
ply. These premises are discussed in detail for Argentina in the following 
Chapter.
In general terms, sex preferences can be defined as the utility that parents 
derive from the gender of their children. This issue, and its relationship 
to fertility behaviour, has been dealt with from different angles, from in- 
depth ethnographic studies to demographic statistical analysis (Williamson, 
1983; Basu and Das Gupta, 2001) and models of rational utility maximising 
agents (Ben Porath and Welch, 1976; Leung, 1991; Ahn, 1995). While most 
studies concentrate on son or daughter preference, the "same sex" strategy 
exploits the parental predilection for a mixed sex composition of children,
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which is revealed as the desire to have at least one son and one daughter 
-  a well-known stylised fact in the demography literature for developed 
countries (Williamson, 1983). When such preferences are present, parents of 
two children of the same sex exhibit a higher probability of having another 
child to attain their desired composition.
The "same sex" strategy relies on these preferences, and can be justified 
as follows. The sex composition of children, a naturally occurring random 
event,19 affects fertility through parental sex preferences, as required by As­
sumptions 5.3 and 5.4. Since the sex mix is random, making the identify­
ing assumption that it affects labour supply only through its effect on the 
number of children satisfies the requirements of Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2. 
In these circumstances, the sex mix constitutes an instrumental variable for 
fertility which can be used to identify causal effects on women's labour sup­
ply through models like Equations 5.6 and 5.7. Because of its reliance in the 
sex mix of children, the "same sex" strategy studies women with at least 
two children.
Angrist and Evans (1998) analyze the case of the United States in detail, 
and discuss the plausibility of the exogeneity of sex preferences (and their 
effects) in labour supply decisions in their study. They estimate their model 
for the United States' 1980 and 1990 Censuses. For both years, they report 
strong first-stage results of the effects of sex mix on fertility, and compelling 
evidence of a negative causal effect of fertility on women's labour supply in 
the second stage.
Besides this original application, the "same sex" estimation strategy has 
been used in other contexts. Carrasco (2001) uses the Panel Survey of In­
come Dynamics from the United States, adapting the instrumental variables 
estimators for the longitudinal structure of the data. Her results are con­
sistent with previous estimates from Census data. In an application to the 
United Kingdom, Iacovou (2001) employs the "same sex" strategy with data 
from the British Household Panel Survey and the National Child Develop­
ment Study. While she still finds negative effects of fertility on women's
19Sex screening techniques might affect the randomness of the gender composition be­
cause of selective abortion. While these techniques have made substantial progress in the 
last decade, they were not widely available in the United States in 1980 and 1990, the years 
Angrist and Evans (1998) use in their estimation. Section 7.2.2 discusses the case of Ar­
gentina.
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labour supply, the instrumental variables coefficients are not very precisely 
estimated, which might be attributed to the relatively small sample size of 
her datasets.
In developing countries, Chun and Oh (2002) applied the "same sex" 
strategy to household survey data from Korea (the National Survey of Fam­
ily Income and Expenditure), finding significant first- and second-stage ef­
fects roughly consistent with the Angrist and Evans (1998) results for the 
United States. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) find similar results with a 
dataset of rural households in India. Finally, Cruces and Galiani (2003) 
present additional data and estimates for Mexico, which show that the sig­
nificant casual effect of fertility on female labour supply accounts for most 
of the increase in female labour force participation in the 1970-2000 period 
in that country.
While the fertility effects of the sex mix of children can be established 
from the data, identifying assumptions are not universally valid and must 
be evaluated on a case by case basis. After the description of the data in 
the following Section, Chapter 6 studies the plausibility of the strategy's 
premises for Argentina.
5 .4  D ata  a n d  Su m m a r y  Statistics
5.4.1 Description of the main dataset
The data used in this Chapter is from Argentina's 1991 Census of Population 
and Housing ("Censo Nacional de Poblacion y Viviendas") conducted by 
the Instituto Nacional de Estadlsticas y Censos (INDEC).
This Census is divided into two sections. A basic questionnaire was ad­
ministered to the whole population (32,245,467 individuals and 8,927,289 
households), while an extended questionnaire covered a large random sam­
ple representative of the whole country. The analysis in this Chapter is ba­
sed on the dataset gathered by the latter questionnaire, since it contains 
detailed demographic and labour force participation data. The sample is 
composed of a total of 16,023,180 individuals and 4,287,580 households.
The study of fertility and labour supply needed some adjustments to the 
data. Women with two children were selected from the total sample, and 
their characteristics were linked to those of their children and spouses (if
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present). As in Angrist and Evans (1998), the sample was limited to women 
between 21 and 35 years old whose oldest child was at most 18 years old at 
the time of the Census.20
Since the relationship variable in the Census dataset indicates kinship 
with respect to the head of the household, it was only possible to match 
children with women who were heads of households or spouses of the head. 
The observations for women spouses of the head were checked so that the 
number of own surviving children (as asked for in a specific question) was 
the same as the number of matched children in the household 21 This en­
sured that children of a male head of household were not wrongly matched 
to a spouse who was not their mother. As shown in Appendix D, the em­
pirical results of this Part are robust to all these adjustments.
Finally, in order to establish the generality of the results, the analysis 
was carried out on a series of variations of the total sample described in the 
previous paragraphs. The full sample consists of all women aged 21-35 with 
at least two children and whose oldest child was 18 or less (Complete Sample), 
whereas the Married sample corresponds to the subgroup of legally married 
women living with their spouses. Since Angrist and Evans (1998) exclude 
women whose second child was less than a year old from their estimations, 
this further adjustment was made to the two previous samples to obtain 
comparable datasets, resulting in the AE and AE Married categories. All 
variables, parameters and estimates of interest are reported separately for 
these four subgroups. The corresponding sample sizes are reported in the 
last row of Table 5.1.22
20There were a total of 766,572 women between 21 and 35 with at least two children 
whose oldest child was 18 or less. The observations for which the age at first birth was 
less than 14 were discarded, taking this as an indicator of data entry errors or misallocated 
children, since most of the ages were far too low (8,745 women were discarded in total, of 
which 2,952 had imputed ages at first birth of 11 or less). A small fraction (5,718 observa­
tions) of married women for which the husband's age at first birth was less than 14 was 
also discarded.
21 This is by far the most important adjustment of the sample. A total of 106,001 women 
were discarded (13.83 percent of the original 766,572), corresponding to those whose de­
clared number of surviving children did not correspond to the number of children matched 
in the household.
22These large sample sizes imply that the standard errors of the regression coefficients 
presented in Chapter 7 are virtually not affected by the use of Huber-White robust standard 
errors.
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5.4.2 Variables and descriptive statistics
The outcome of interest for the estimations is the labour supply of women. 
In the Argentine Census data, individuals working for pay include employ­
ees (wage earners), the self-employed, owner-managers and civil and do­
mestic servants, and exclude family workers without remuneration. The 
Worked for pay indicator is equal to 1 for this group, and 0 otherwise. Since 
income and hours of work were not collected in the Argentine Census, the 
analysis covers this employment status indicator only.
The fertility characteristics refer to the number and gender composition 
of children. The variable Number of children represents own children in the 
household, according to the allocation rules described above. The More than 
two children indicator is derived from this variable, and is defined as 1 for 
women with three or more children, and 0 otherwise. The Same sex, Two 
boys and Two girls variables refer to the sex of the first two children, and are 
equal to 1 if the first two were of the same sex, two males or two females 
respectively, and 0 otherwise in all cases.
Regarding individual characteristics, the Age and Age at first birth vari­
ables, measured in years, are self explanatory. The education indicators 
were constructed by dividing the sample into three homogeneous groups, 
composed of those with up to some primary schooling, those with some 
high school, and those with some higher education. Finally, all variables are 
defined analogously when referring to the spouses of married women.
As stated in the Introduction to this Chapter, demographic indicators 
in Argentina in 1991 were at a level consistent with an advanced fertility 
transition: the average number of children ever bom  for women in the 19- 
49 age group was 2.04 (and 2.83 for women with at least one child), with a 
mode of 2: these figures are in the 2-3 range, where the "same sex" strategy 
applies. Finally, for this age group, the labour force participation rose almost 
continuously during the twentieth century, reaching 35.4 percent in 1991 -  
Figure 5.1 presents these trends for women aged 14 and older.
These patterns are reflected in Table 5.1, which presents a set of sum­
mary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis for the four samples 
defined in Section 5.4.1 (Complete Sample, Married, AE Sample, AE Married), 
corresponding to women aged 21-35 with at least two children.
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Worked for pay 0.314 0.305 0.315 0.305
(=1 if  worked for pay, 0 otherwise) (0.464) (0.460) (0.465) (0.460)
More than 2 children 0.548 0.528 0.596 0.574
(=1 if  more than two children, 0 otherwise) (0.498) (0.499) (0.491) (0.495)
Number of children 2.976 2.905 3.062 2.985
(1.223) (1.165) (1.240) (1.183)
Basic demographics:
Age 29.410 29.679 29.660 29.928
(3.868) (3.755) (3.770) (3.652)
Age at first birth 20.830 21.127 20.641 20.932
(3.434) (3.436) (3.337) (3.340)
Fertility and sex mix:
Same Sex 0.507 0.506 0.506 0.505
(=1 if  first two children o f same sex, 0 otherwise) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Two Boys 0.260 0.261 0.260 0.261
(=1 if  first two children were boys, 0 otherwise) (0.438) (0.439) (0.438) (0.439)
Two Girls 0.246 0.245 0.246 0.244
(=1 if  first two children were girls, 0 otherwise) (0.431) (0.430) (0.431) (0.430)
Boy 1st 0.508 0.510 0.508 0.510
(=1 if  first child was a boy, 0 otherwise) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Boy 2nd 0.506 0.507 0.506 0.507
(=1 if  second child was a boy, 0 otherwise) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Indicators o f  maximum education level:
Some primary education 0.581 0.531 0.593 0.544
(0.493) (0.499) (0.491) (0.493)
Some secondary education 0.298 0.325 0.293 0.321
(0.457) (0.468) (0.455) (0.457)
Some tertiary eduaction 0.121 0.144 0.114 0.135
(0.326) (0.351) (0.318) (0.326)
Observations 653,213 497,194 599,941 456,437
Note: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses). The samples correspond to women aged 
21-35 with two or more children aged 18 or younger from the extended questionnaire sample of  
the 1991 Census, as described in the text.
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The labour force participation, as captured by the Worked for pay indi­
cator, is in the 30.5-31.5 percent range, depending on the sample, with the 
lower rates corresponding to married women. The average fertility is sub­
stantially higher than for the 19-49 age group discussed above, because Ta­
ble 5.1 refers to women with at least two children. The average number 
of children varies between 2.91 and 3.06, and it is slightly lower for mar­
ried women. More than half of the women have more than two children, 
but unlike the case of the employment and number of children variables, 
there is a substantial variation between the four samples. This is due to the 
adjustment made to obtain the AE  samples, which results in an average of 
57.4-59.6 percent (AE Sample and AE Married, respectively) compared to a 
lower 52.8-54.8 percent for the Complete and Married samples.
The average age of the women in these samples is between 29 and 30 
years old, and slightly higher for married women, while the age at first 
birth is around 21 years old for all samples. Regarding the sex composition 
of children, the proportion of males in first births is around 51 percent, and 
just above 50 percent of the women have two siblings of the same sex, w ith a 
slightly higher proportion of these cases corresponding to two boys (around 
26 percent) than two girls (around 24 percent). These figures correspond to 
the stylised facts of the demography literature (Williamson, 1983).
Finally, the education level is relatively high in the four samples with 
respect to other Latin American countries, with more than 40 percent of 
the women with at least some secondary education. A noticeable difference 
between the samples is that married women have higher levels of secondary 
and further education than the corresponding overall samples.
5.5  C o n c l u s io n
This Chapter has discussed the theoretical and empirical problems for es­
tablishing a causal relationship between fertility and female labour supply. 
The discussion was carried out in terms of the potential outcomes frame­
work, and it proposed instrumental variable techniques a possible solution 
to the endogeneity problems that invalidate simple estimation approaches.
The "same sex" strategy exploits the fertility effects of parental sex pref­
erences as a natural experiment. While its necessary conditions were met in
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the original application to the United States (Angrist and Evans, 1998), the 
challenge for its application to another context is to show that the identifica­
tion strategy is still valid. The data in Section 5.4 implies that Argentina in 
1991 was substantially different from the United States in the two key vari­
ables: the average number of children ever bom  for women in the 19-49 age 
group was 2.04 (and 2.83 for women with at least one child), compared to 
1.44 (and 2.23, respectively) for the equivalent United States sample of 1990, 
while the labour force participation for the same group was 52.8 percent in 
Argentina compared to 80.9 percent in the United States.23
The next Chapter discusses the conditions for application of the "same 
sex" strategy and the problems of this identification strategy in the context 
of a developing country, where son preferences, among other institutional 
factors, might affect the plausibility of the identifying assumptions. Their 
validity is critically assessed in the Argentine case, using the data described 
in this Chapter and other complementary sources.
23These figures were computed from Argentina's 1991 Census (as described in Section 
5.4) and from the one percent Public Use Micro Sample from the United States 1990 Census, 
provided by Sobek et al. (2003).
C h a p t e r  6
S ex  P r e f e r e n c e s  a n d  F e r t i l i t y  i n  A r g e n t i n a
6.1 In t r o d u c t io n
The previous Chapter motivated the establishment of a link between fertil­
ity and female labour supply by noting that in Part I both variables were 
consistently associated with a household's poverty status in Argentina. 
While causal links are difficult to establish in applied empirical research, 
Chapter 5 discussed an instrumental variable estimation strategy for models 
of fertility and female labour supply based on the fertility effects of parental 
sex preferences.
This identification strategy was originally devised for the United States 
in the late twentieth century, and its justification is a priori valid only for that 
case. The analysis in this Chapter deals with the threats to the validity of the 
approach in its application to the Argentine census data of 1991, presenting 
evidence on the fertility effects of sex preferences and on their exogeneity 
with respect to labour market outcomes.
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the threats to 
the validity of the strategy for developing countries. Section 6.3 presents 
evidence against these potential challenges, studying the nature and extent 
of sex preferences in Argentina, their fertility effects, and their institutional 
background. A brief conclusion follows.
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6.2 Va l id it y  o f  t h e  Id e n t if ic a t io n  St r a t e g y  
in  D e v e l o p in g  C o u n t r ie s
6.2.1 First stages: nature of sex preferences and the same-sex effect
The "same sex" strategy is based on context-dependent evidence and as­
sumptions that need to be considered on a case by case basis. This is espe­
cially relevant when attempting to apply the strategy to developing coun­
tries like Argentina, where the socioeconomic and cultural context differs 
substantially from the United States, where the original study was carried 
out.
The precondition for the application of the "same sex" strategy is the 
existence of a first-stage relationship between the sex mix of children and 
further childbearing in the context under study. A correlation between the 
treatment D and the instrument Z, as required by Assumption 5.3 (page 
134), is easy to establish: it only requires to check if the sex mix of children 
has a significant effect on further childbearing. Angrist and Evans (1998) 
study the impact of a "same sex" indicator on further childbearing for wo­
men with at least two children, and Section 6.3.1 presents a detailed analysis 
of sex mix and fertility in Argentina by studying the probability of further 
childbearing conditional on the sex of previous children.
The basis of the "same sex" strategy is the fact that parents tend to have a 
preference for a balanced sibling sex composition, which implies that those 
with two children of the same sex are more likely to have another child than 
parents of a boy and a girl. These type of sex preferences, observed by An­
grist and Evans (1998) in their United States data, are not uncommon. Based 
on multiple sources of attitudinal evidence on fertility, Basu and Das Gupta 
(2001) state that "in most regions of the world, parents express a prefer­
ence for a gender-balanced family," usually mixed with "mild preferences 
for children of a particular gender." While stated preferences might not af­
fect fertility behaviour in a significant manner, Williamson (1983) and Basu 
and Das Gupta (2001) report that there is compelling evidence that sex pref­
erences result in differential fertility effects, either as a consequence of a 
gender-balanced preference or as a result of a preference for sons.
The evidence for developed countries is consistent with gender-balanced 
preferences: results from attitudinal surveys are confirmed by higher fertil­
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ity for parents of children of the same sex. This is complemented with a 
minor son bias in some circumstances, which is characterised as a higher 
probability of further childbearing for parents of girls than for parents of 
boys. The United States provide a typical example for industrialised soci­
eties: Angrist and Evans (1998) report that for the 1980 and 1990 Census, 
parents of two children of the same sex had a significantly higher probabil­
ity of having a third child than parents of a boy and a girl, and that mothers 
of two girls were slightly more likely to have a third child than were m oth­
ers of two boys. This is consistent with previous evidence from the United 
States (Ben Porath and Welch, 1976; Williamson, 1983). Iacovou (2001) re­
ports similar results from two British datasets: in samples from the British 
Household Panel Survey, almost half of the mothers with two sons or two 
daughters had another child (with a difference between the two of only half 
a percentage point), compared to only 41.2 percent of mothers of a boy and 
a girl. These fertility patterns correspond to the effects of the conventional 
sex preferences observed by Basu and Das Gupta (2001).
In developing countries, sex preferences and their fertility effects are 
more heterogeneous, and can differ from the patterns of the previous para­
graph. In general, the preference for a gender-balanced family coexists with 
stronger son preferences. For instance, Das (1987) finds for India that "at 
each parity a higher proportion of couples with no sons went on to have the 
next child than did those who already had one or more sons," but he also ob­
serves a positive effect on fertility when all living children are sons, "indicat­
ing that preference for sons is not to the exclusion of daughters." In a review 
of attitudinal evidence, family and population structures in Bangladesh, In­
dia and Pakistan, Nag (1991) concludes that the prevalent form is a "general 
preference of sons over daughters as well as a desire for at least one daugh­
ter."
In other developing countries, however, parental preferences indicate 
only a strong preference for sons. This implies that couples are more likely 
to stop having children when having at least one boy, and that parents 
of a certain number of girls are much more likely to have an additional 
child than parents of the same number of boys. Moreover, as reported by 
Das Gupta (2003) for China and Korea, extreme forms of son preference also 
result in abnormally high ratios of boys to girls in the population as a con­
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sequence of selective abortion, higher infant mortality for daughters, and 
even infanticide. In these cases, the sex composition of children cannot be 
considered to be purely random, and thus the independence Assumption
5.1 is not likely to hold.
In general, the fertility effects of sex preferences can be divided into three 
categories: gender-balanced, gender-balanced with moderate son prefer­
ence, or strongly biased towards sons. It should be noted, however, that 
the presence of sex preferences other than the first case is not necessarily an 
impediment for the application of the "same sex" strategy in other contexts. 
If the gender composition of children can be considered as a random event 
and the sex preferences have some form of effect on childbearing, then the 
sex mix of children can still be exploited as a source of variation in fertility 
(i.e., as an instrument Z in Equations 5.6 or 5.7, pages 136 and 137).1 How­
ever, this is only true if the exclusion and monotonicity Assumptions hold: 
a first-stage relationship is a necessary condition, but the crucial point is 
whether the variation in fertility induced by sex preferences can be consid­
ered to be exogenous. This is discussed in the following pages for develop­
ing countries.
6.2.2 Sex preferences and the identifying assumption
Establishing the case for the randomness of the instrument (Assumption 
5.1, page 134) is relatively straightforward. The gender of a child is a natu­
rally occurring random event, and the sex mix is thus "as good as randomly 
assigned" (Angrist, 2001). As discussed in the previous Chapter, a prob­
lem arises with extreme forms of son preference that lead to the neglect of 
daughters in basic healthcare, or when sex screening techniques are widely 
available and result in selective abortions. In those cases, the sex mix is m a­
nipulated and might be correlated with potential outcomes. The inspection 
of sex ratios by age, household consumption and school enrolment data pro­
vides evidence on extreme forms of son preferences that could cast doubts 
on the credibility of the independence assumption. This is accomplished in
1Note, however, that different instruments imply different types of compliers and thus 
identify causal effects for different subgroups of the population. Section 8.2 (page 191) dis­
cusses whether differences in the "complier" subpopulations are relevant for the estimation 
results.
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Section 6.3 for Argentina.
The independence of the sex mix with respect to potential outcomes can­
not be established directly, but while the assignment mechanism itself is 
not testable, its implications are. A simple test is to compare characteris­
tics of parents of same-sex and mixed sex siblings -  if truly random, there 
should not be systematic differences in exogenous attributes between the 
two groups.
Identification is not attained solely through first stages and indepen­
dence: the basis of instrumental variable estimation is that the instrument 
Z, while correlated with the treatment D, does not have a direct effect on 
the outcome Y  and is thus correctly excluded from the second stage. How­
ever, as an exclusion restriction, Assumption 5.2 (page 134) is inherently 
non-testable and its plausibility has to be evaluated on a case by case basis. 
In the context of the "same sex" strategy in the United States, Angrist and 
Evans (1998) show that there is almost no association between the sex of 
children and labour supply. Moreover, they review the evidence on norms 
and behaviour and the institutional setting, concluding that the sex mix only 
affects labour supply through its influence on fertility. Finally, they argue 
that the inclusion of the sex of the first two children among the covariates 
X in the estimation of Equation 5.7 controls for any secular effects of these 
variables.
While this may or may not be the case in other developed countries, the 
presence of moderate and extreme son preferences raises additional con­
cerns in developing countries. If the bias towards sons is a pure preference 
with no other behavioural consequence than its impact on fertility, it con­
stitutes an idiosyncratic characteristic of the population under study and 
the plausibility of the exclusion restriction is not affected.2 The "same sex" 
strategy can still be applied, accommodating for the preference for sons in 
the first stage by including in X the sex of the first two children.
However, the identification strategy may be compromised if the pref­
erence for sons has socioeconomic roots and consequences that are con­
ceivably related to the potential outcomes, in violation of Assumption 5.2,
2In terms of the theoretical model of Secion 5.2.1 (page 126), this holds under the con­
dition of separability of leisure and the utility derived from children and their gender 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000).
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which is more likely to happen in developing countries. Basu and Das 
Gupta (2001) argue that beyond cultural and religious factors, some soci­
eties exhibit a strong son preference because of the gap between sons' and 
daughters' "ability to contribute to the physical, emotional and financial 
well-being of their parental household." This gap is determined by kinship 
systems: if women's links with their parents are cut off after marriage, it 
becomes more attractive to rear sons that will be able to provide for their 
parents in old age.
This observation has important implications for the "same sex" strategy. 
For instance, it is possible to imagine a situation where having two daugh­
ters is a random event (Assumption 5.1) that induces a higher probability 
of further childbearing through a combination of son and gender-balanced 
preferences (Assumption 5.3). If in this hypothetical setting there is no so­
cial insurance and women have low employment rates, parents might rely 
on their male children for old age support, and this might be at the origin 
of the preference for sons. Thus parents of two girls are relatively worse off, 
and will have to work more in order to compensate for the foregone income. 
In terms of the theoretical model of Section 5.2.1 (page 126), taking I as the 
permanent income of the household, using sons for old age support implies 
that the instrument Z (the sex mix of children) cannot identify the direct ef­
fect of fertility on labour supply, fo ,  because of the effect of the sex mix of 
children on I. The derivative of Y (labour supply) with respect to Z is given 
by:
dZ dZ?1
and the use of sons for old age support implies that
m * °
which in turn implies that Z has a direct effect on labour supply, over and 
above its effect on fertility. In terms of potential outcomes, irrespective of 
the treatment D, the sex mix of children implies that Y\& > Yq ,^ that is, those 
who had two girls will work more than others. This is a direct effect of Z 
on potential outcomes over and above its influence on further childbearing 
D, and as such, it invalidates Assumption 5.2. In terms of the canonical
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instrumental variables model, the preference for sons might induce a direct 
correlation of the sex mix with the labour supply or the unobservable factors 
that affect it, and in this case it is incorrectly excluded from the second stage.
There are other plausible problems for identification in contexts with 
non-extreme son preferences.3 In some societies, parents are expected to 
pay substantial dowries for their daughters, which affects their permanent 
income and, potentially, their labour supply. These effects on potential out­
comes are not verifiable: it is not possible to determine if the sex mix of 
children or related factors, like dowries, have a direct effect on labour sup­
ply. However, an examination of the social and institutional setting of each 
application might reveal or rule out the presence of problems of this type. 
Section 6.3 conducts this analysis for Argentina.
6.2.3 Direct effects of same sex
The identification problems discussed above arise from the presence of son 
preferences. However, direct effects of the sex mix of children, unrelated to 
parental sex preferences, might also invalidate the application of the "same 
sex" strategy. As discussed above, Angrist and Evans (1998) rule out the 
possibility that the secular effects of the sex of children contaminate their 
instrumental variables estimates for the United States. Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (2000) attempt to question this aspect of the estimation strategy us­
ing data from rural India. They show that having two children of the same 
sex, which is likely to be random in their data, implies a higher probability 
of further childbearing, establishing the presence of a "same sex" first-stage 
relationship.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin's (2000) caveats are based on the expenditure 
data for the same households. By studying outlays on child-related goods, 
they find that same-sex siblings are associated with lower levels of expendi­
ture. They attribute this effect to "hand-me-down" savings, which are more 
likely to arise for items such as clothing and footwear when there are chil­
dren of the same sex in the household. Based on this effect of sex mix on 
expenditure, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) presume that "the sex compo­
3As discussed above, extreme forms of son preferences that result in selective abortions 
or neglect of girls invalidate the randomness of the instrument, in addition to their effects 
on the exclusion restriction.
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sition of children plausibly alters labour supply through mechanisms other 
than through fertility change alone." According to this interpretation, par­
ents of same-sex children in their Indian data may need to work less because 
of these savings, implying in terms of potential outcomes that Yqd > d- 
While the authors provide evidence of a link of sex mix and expenditure, 
they do not establish a direct effect of the instrument Z on labour sup­
ply. Moreover, the critique only applies to their Indian dataset: they state 
that "it is not possible to infer from this evidence whether hand-me-down 
economies associated with the sex-mix of births are an important phenom­
enon" in other situations. However, these valid concerns can be addressed 
by testing the presence of savings of this type with expenditure data, and 
this is done for Argentina in Section 6.3.
Despite the context-dependent nature of the identifying assumptions, 
most of the applications of the "same sex" strategy mentioned in Section
5.3.3 (page 140) are justified on the basis of a first-stage relationship, with­
out studying the potential impediments to the exclusion restriction and the 
other identifying assumptions. The exceptions are Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(2000), although they only deal with the concern raised in the previous para­
graph, and Chun and Oh (2002), who briefly discuss the strong son prefer­
ence observed in their Korean data. The originality of this Chapter lies in 
the detailed analysis of different data sources to assess the plausibility of the 
"same sex" identifying assumptions in the Argentine case.
6.3 S ex  P r e f e r e n c e s  a n d  Id e n t if ic a t io n  
A s s u m p t io n s  in  A r g e n t in a
6.3.1 Independence of the instrument and fertility effects of sex preferences
The purpose of this Section is to assess the plausibility of the identifying 
assumptions of the "same sex" strategy for Argentina, addressing the issues 
raised in the previous Section.
Assumption 5.1 requires the independence of the instrument with re­
spect to the potential outcomes and treatments. While potential outcomes 
and treatments, by definition, cannot be observed, the randomness of the 
instrument can still be established by some of the implications of the inde­
pendence assumption. One simple check is to compare the characteristics of
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Age -0.0285 -0.0234 -0.0213 -0.0195
(0.0096)*** (0.0107)** (0.0097)** (0.0096)*"
Age at first birth 0.0090 0.0134 0.0057 0.0081
(0.0085) (0.0097) (0.0086) (0.0085)
Residence in rural area -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0014
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Indicators o f  maximum  
education level:
Some primary education -0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0014
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Some secondary education 0.0003 0.0012 0.0001 0.0009
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Some tertiary eduaction -0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Observations 653,213 497,194 599,941 456,437
Note: Differences in means (mean o f "same sex" mothers minus mean o f  mixed sex
mothers) and their standard deviations (in parentheses). * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The samples correspond to women aged 21-35 
with two or more children aged 18 or younger from the extended questionnaire sample o f  
the 1991 Census, as described in the text.
women with same-sex and mixed-sex sibling compositions, i.e., according 
to the value of the instrument Z.
Table 6.1 presents the differences in selected variables between these two 
groups for the four samples of women with at least two children defined 
in Section 5.4 (page 142). With the exception of the Age variable, none of 
the differences is significant, not even at the 10 percent level, despite the 
extremely large sample sizes. Women whose first two children were of the 
same sex and mothers of mixed-sex children exhibit no differences in their 
ages at first birth, area of residence and education levels.
The only variable for which there is a significant difference is Age: the 
Table indicates that "same sex" mothers are about 0.02-0.03 years younger 
than mothers of mixed-sex siblings. While statistically significant, this effect 
is small, and it can be attributed to the high precision of the estimates for 
large sample sizes, since there does not seem to be a difference in the closely
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related Age at firth birth variable. Moreover, women in the groups defined 
by the Same sex indicator cannot be distinguished in terms of their education 
level, which is an important determinant of earnings and labour supply. In 
any case, two-stage least squares models like Equation 5.7 can accommodate 
covariates like the Age variable to control for any effects that this might have 
on the outcome of interest.
While the evidence from Table 6.1 supports the hypothesis of random 
assignment of the Same sex instrument Z, another prerequisite of the esti­
mation strategy is the existence of a first-stage relationship, embodied in 
Assumption 5.3. The analysis below serves two purposes: it first establishes 
the existence of a first-stage relationship between sex preferences and fertil­
ity in Argentina, and it also provides a detailed study of the nature of these 
preferences in the data.
A first-stage relationship requires a significant correlation between the 
instrument Z and the indicator D, but as discussed in the previous Sec­
tion, the correlation between childbearing and an indicator of having two 
children of the same sex may be due to different types of preferences. The 
mixed-sex sibling preference consists in a desire of having at least one child 
of each sex, which induces a higher probability of having more children 
(D =  1) in couples whose children are all boys or all girls (Z =  1). The pref­
erence for sons, in turn, implies that parents of a certain number of girls are 
more likely to have an additional child than parents of the same number of 
boys. To discriminate between these two types of preferences, it is necessary 
to disaggregate the effect of the Same sex variable.
In the demography literature, sex preferences and their effect on fertility 
are discussed in terms of "parity progression ratios." The parity is defined 
as the number of children, while the progression ratio refers to the prob­
ability of having n 4-1 children, given n children. Much of this literature 
is devoted to the presence of son preference and their effects, implicitly as­
suming that a positive correlation between the number of daughters and 
subsequent childbearing (or a negative correlation with the number of sons) 
is an unambiguous sign of son preference. Leung (1991), however, develops 
a dynamic model of sex preferences and fertility decisions to show that such 
tests of sex preferences are only valid under certain conditions. He derives 
the optimal fertility behaviour for a couple as a value function defined over
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the effective number of children given by:
UfBt +  btGt
where Bt represents the number of sons, G* the number of daughters, and 
at and bt the relative weight attached to children of each sex. Values of 
at or bt greater (smaller) than zero indicate a positive (negative) valuation 
of children of the respective sex. Son preference, no sex preference, and 
daughter preference are defined as cases where at > bt, at = bt and at < bt 
respectively.
Leung (1991) questions the commonly held view according to which a 
negative effect of the number of sons on subsequent fertility is an unam ­
biguous sign of boy preference. The main conclusion from the model is 
that a negative relationship between the probability of further births and 
the number of boys, holding parity constant, can be explained by either son 
or daughter preference: the only definite conclusion is that sex preferences 
of some sort are present since the gender of children affects the probability 
of birth. For this negative correlation to be consistent with daughter prefer­
ence, however, Leung (1991) shows that parents must value boys negatively 
at every single parity.4 In what follows, it is shown that this is unlikely to be 
the case in the Argentine data, so that this mild restriction allows the discus­
sion of son and daughter preference in a way consistent with the previous 
literature.
Table 6.2 presents the progression ratios by parity and sex composition 
of children for the sample of married women -  for completeness, the Table 
also includes those who had only one child. These results are similar for the 
other three samples previously defined.
The first row of the Table presents the results for parities one to two. 
More than 77 percent of the women went on to have another child, but those 
who had a girl in their first birth have a small but significantly higher prob­
ability of having a second child, while those who had a boy are less likely to 
have another child. It should be noted that, while significant, these effects 
are extremely small: the difference in the probability of further childbearing
4He shows that a negative effect of the number of sons on subsequent fertility can be 
observationally equivalent to cases of daughter preference, for instance if at < 0 and at < 
bt < 0, but he notes that this requires at < 0 (a dislike of sons) at each parity.
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Table 6.2: Parity Progression Ratios by Parity and Sex Mix of Children, Mar­
ried Women




Same sex M ixed sex
0
PPR by num ber o f boys: 
1 2  3 4
1 to 2 644,084 0.7719 - - 0.7737 0.7703**
2 to 3 497,194 0.5280 0.5460*** 0.5096*** 0.5568 0.5096*** 0.5359***
3 to 4 262,525 0.4241 0.4422*** 0.4176*** 0.4499 0.4229 0.4124*** 0.4348***
4 to 5 111,341 0.3941 0.4050*** 0.3922 0.4031 0.3961 0.3909 0.3903 0.4070**
Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the number in the cell is different to the "Overall" category at the 10, 5 
and 1% levels o f  significance respectively. The samples correspond to married women aged 21-35 with two 
or more children aged 18 or younger from the extended questionnaire sample o f  the 1991 Census, as 
described in the text (Complete sample, married).
between the two groups is only 0.34 percentage points. Although this is a 
sign of son preference, the size of the differences for higher parities (dis­
cussed below) indicates that this difference is not substantial and that its 
significance may be due to the precision granted by the large sample size.
The second row of Table 6.2 presents the transition probability between 
parities two and three, which is at the heart of the "same sex" strategy since 
it represents the first-stage relationship between the instrument Z (Same sex) 
and the treatment D (More than two children and Number of children). In the 
sample of married women with two children, 52.8 percent went on to have 
a third child, but as pointed by the two following columns, this group repre­
sented a larger fraction among women with two boys or two girls (54.6 per­
cent) than among those with a son and a daughter (50.1 percent). This size­
able and significant difference of 4.5 percentage points indicates the pres­
ence of some form of sex preferences, which can be analysed with the help 
of the following columns. Mothers of two boys and of two girls both exhibit 
a significantly higher probability of further childbearing, but this probabil­
ity is almost 2.1 percentage points higher for mothers of girls. The fact that 
mothers of two boys have a higher probability of having another child than 
mothers of a boy and a girl (53.6 percent compared to 50.1) suggests the 
presence of a strong gender-balanced preference with a moderate bias to­
wards boys.
This conclusion is supported by the analysis of further parity progres-
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sion ratios. The difference between same-sex and mixed-sex parents is only 
about 2.5 percentage points in the transition probabilities between three to 
four children, compared to the 4.5 for two to three, but the pattern is simi­
lar when observing the effect of boys and girls. This same-sex effect is still 
higher for parents of two girls than for parents of two boys.
In the transition from four to five children, the same-sex effect is still 
present, although the difference in the probability of further childbearing 
between parents of same-sex and mixed-sex children is reduced to 1.3 per­
centage points. An interesting point, however, is that at this parity the ef­
fect is driven by a preference for daughters, since the probability of further 
childbearing for those who have had no sons is not significantly different 
from the overall probability.5
Finally, it should be noted that the number of boys never has a nega­
tive effect on the probability of further childbearing, which is not consistent 
with a negative net value of sons at every parity. This addresses Leung's 
(1991) concern of observational equivalence between son and daughter pref­
erences.
The results in Table 6.2 refer to the Married sample, but the magnitude 
and significance of the parity progression ratios are similar for the remain­
ing three samples. However, it is possible that different groups in the pop­
ulation defined by some characteristics exhibit different types of sex prefer­
ences, which could bias the results with the pooled datasets if these char­
acteristics are systematically related to labour market outcomes. While not 
presenting the full parity progression ratio analysis, Section 7.5 (page 187) 
discusses the first-stage relationship between the instruments Same sex, Two 
boys and Two girls and the treatments More than two children and Number of 
children for the groups defined by the women's education levels of Table
5.1 (page 145). This analysis indicates that the sex preferences identified in 
this Section are homogeneous across these three groups and among rural 
and urban populations, with only minor differences in the probabilities of
5A corollary of this analysis brings support to Assumption 5.4 (page 134). While 
monotonicity is not directly verifiable, because it is defined in terms of potential outcomes, 
Angrist and Imbens (1995) note that the assumption has a testable implication in the case of 
multivaried treatments such as the number of children: if the assumption holds, the cumu­
lative density functions of D with Z =  0 and Z =  1 should not cross. Inspection of Table
6.2 indicates that this is the case for the Argentine data.
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further childbearing.
This evidence implies that the first-stage Assumption 5.3 is valid, in the 
sense that the sex mix of children has an effect on fertility in Argentina. 
Moreover, sex preferences and their effect on fertility correspond to Sec­
tion's 6.2.1 gender-balanced with moderate son preference category, and 
they are consistent with Basu and Das Gupta's (2001) widespread "pref­
erence for a gender-balanced family" with "mild preferences for children of 
a particular gender."
Given the presence of son preferences and the concerns raised in the 
previous Section about this phenomenon for the validity of the "same sex" 
strategy in developing countries, the following pages study the possibility 
of contamination of instrumental variable estimations by describing the in­
stitutional setting and presenting evidence on the exogeneity of the sex-mix 
for female labour supply decisions in Argentina.
6.3.2 Institutional setting and effects of son preferences
The analysis of the first-stage relationship revealed that the preference for a 
gender-balanced family is more intense for parents of girls, which was inter­
preted as a moderate bias for sons in Argentina. As discussed in Section 6.2, 
this might raise some concerns about the exclusion restriction in Assump­
tion 5.2 in the context of a developing country: if son preferences are due to 
-  or result in -  economic factors that are correlated with the labour supply 
of the parents, the instrument Z has a direct effect on the outcome Y. In that 
case, instrumental variable results are biased and do not identify the causal 
effect in Proposition 5.1 (page 135). Since potential outcomes are not observ­
able, exclusion restrictions are inherently non-testable, and their plausibility 
must be evaluated on a case by case basis by means of indirect evidence -  
the following Chapter presents direct evidence by means of Hausman-type 
overidentification tests.
As described in Section 6.2.2, Basu and Das Gupta (2001) attribute the 
extreme preference for sons in China and other developing countries to the 
gap between sons' and daughters' ability to contribute to the well-being of 
their parental household, which is determined by kinship systems. How­
ever, when reviewing the evidence for Latin America, they observe that 
"childbearing outside formal marriage or stable unions is common," a pat­
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tern that they find inconsistent with economic dependence of women on 
men. They conclude that despite a tradition of "male machismo [..] there 
are few rigid rules constraining women from participating actively in social 
and economic life, or from helping their parents" in the region.
This is consistent with the evidence from Argentina (INDEC, 2001). With 
respect to kinship systems, women stay in contact with their parents, and 
the lack of constraints pointed out by Basu and Das Gupta (2001) implies 
a relatively high labour force participation of women, as previously dis­
cussed. Moreover, dowries are unheard of, which implies that daughters 
are not necessarily more expensive to rear than sons, at least as far as mar­
riage is concerned. Finally, the argument of children (and notably boys) as 
insurance for old age is weakened by the fact that since the middle of the 
twentieth century Argentina has had a fairly large social security system 
that supports retired workers but also destitute people in old age, regard­
less of their previous contributions,6 which was reflected in the results in 
Part I on the relative income stability in households with pensioners.
The institutional setting suggests that the roots of the moderate predilec­
tion for boys in Argentina is eminently cultural. As discussed in Section 
6.2.2, however, even if due to purely cultural factors in their origin, son pref­
erence may have consequences that might call into question the validity of 
the "same sex" strategy in developing countries.
One of the most prominent manifestations of extreme son preferences is 
the phenomenon of "missing girls," attributed to discrimination in the form 
of gender-based stopping rules, selective abortion, neglect of daughters and 
even infanticide. The effect of stopping rules was considered in the discus­
sion of Table 6.2, and selective abortion can be ruled out in 1991 Argentina 
since sex screening techniques were practically not available at the time of 
the Census.7
Figure 6.1 presents the infant sex ratios -  representing the ratio of boys 
to girls aged zero to four years old -  for selected countries around 1990. 
The Figure indicates that this ratio is slightly lower in Argentina than in
6See Arza (2004) for a thorough review of social security in Argentina.
7While screening techniques have made substantial progress in the last decade, access 
to them was limited (at best) in Argentina in 1991. Moreover, abortion was (and still is) 
illegal, further reducing the possibilities of selection of the sex of offspring. Das Gupta 
(2003) discusses selective abortion and their effects on gender mix in Korea.
Figure 6.1: Sex Ratios -  Number of Boys /  Number of Girls, 0 to 4 Years Old, Selected Countries, 1990
1.12
0.98
Argentina (1991) United States China Republic o f Korea India
Source: A rgentina and United States: author's calculations based on the respective censuses. China, Korea and India: Basu and Das G upta (2003).
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Table 6.3: School Enrolment, Children Aged 6 to 12









6 319,150 96.17% 311,510 96.51% 630,660 96.34% -0.346
7 323,530 97.30% 314,370 96.95% 637,900 97.13% 0.348
8 332,694 98.01% 326,251 98.18% 658,945 98.10% -0.173
9 337,167 98.08% 330,052 98.20% 667,219 98.14% -0.127
10 336,681 97.80% 327,912 98.12% 664,593 97.96% -0.319
11 345,115 97.54% 336,835 97.76% 681,950 97.65% -0.221
12 340,912 96.11% 331,430 96.42% 672,342 96.26% -0.307
Total 2,335,249 97.29% 2,278,360 97.46% 4,613,609 97.38% -0.167
Note: Data from the 1991 Census. The difference in attendance is the rate for boys minus 
the rate for girls.
the United States, which is considered a case of very mild son preference 
(Williamson, 1983), and substantially lower than in extreme cases like China 
and Korea, identified as cases of extreme son preferences (Basu and Das 
Gupta, 2001).
The infant sex ratio in Argentina is consistent with the small but rel­
atively higher proportion of boys in births, which is an almost universal 
feature of demographic data. Figure 6.1 can thus be taken as evidence of 
no discrimination against girls in the form of neglect or reduced healthcare 
that results in higher mortality among girls, and it shows the lack of an ag­
gregate effect of the preference for sons in the Argentine data.
Another manifestation of extreme forms of son preference is the neglect 
of daughters in other aspects than nutrition and healthcare. In most coun­
tries where girls are systematically discriminated against, the school enrol­
ment rates of younger females are significantly lower than that of their male 
counterparts. In Argentina, however, Pantelides (2002) reports that in 1991 
women exhibited higher rates of course completion than men, which is con­
sistent with the evidence in Table 6.3. This Table presents the school enrol­
ment rates for children aged six to twelve years old from the 1991 Census. 
These rates are very close for boys and girls, but slightly higher for girls on 
average and for almost every age group. This pattern is not consistent with
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discrimination against girls in education.
As discussed in the previous Chapter, further evidence on the effect of 
sex preferences can be deducted from household's consumption patterns 
and the budget spent on goods for children of different sex.8 Table 6.4 
presents evidence from the 1987 National Survey of Household Expendi­
ture ("Encuesta Nacional de Gasto de los Hogares"-ENGH), carried out by 
INDEC.9 The sample is representative of the 1991 Census data (with the ex­
ception of isolated rural areas), and it was constructed following the criteria 
set out in Section 5.4 (page 142). It consists of 6,808 married women aged 18 
to 45, with two or more children aged 18 or younger.
Table 6.4 presents data on differences in budget shares for a series of 
goods by sex composition of children. If girls were neglected or discrim­
inated against, parents of boys would spend a higher proportion of their 
budget on food, health, clothing or education, among other goods. The 
first panel in the Table points out that parents of two children of the same 
sex, and parents of two boys and two girls have the same budget shares 
in seven categories ranging from marginal expenditures, like "Entertain­
ment," to more substantial items like "Food and beverages," including also 
categories of children related goods. None of the differences for parents of 
two boys or two girls are different from zero at the normal levels of signif­
icance. Moreover, the last column presents the coefficient of a regression of 
the respective share on the ratio of boys to total children in the household, 
and none is significant either. Finally, the bottom panel of the Table presents 
the total and per capita measures of income and expenditure and their dif­
ferences by the same variables: the results indicates that these aggregates 
are not affected by the sex mix of children in the household.
The consistent lack of effect of the sex composition of children on the 
budget shares of child-related goods can be taken as further evidence of no 
discrimination against girls and of the lack of direct effects of sex mix on 
relevant economic variables.
The evidence presented so far states that demographic and fertility pat­
terns in Argentina are consistent w ith preferences for a gender-balanced
8Deaton (1997, Chapter 4) and Case and Deaton (2003) review these issues.
Expenditure surveys are only carried out every ten years by INDEC. The 1987 survey 
is the closest to the 1991 Census year employed in the empirical analysis of fertility and 
labour supply.
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Table 6.4: Difference in Budget Shares, Income and Expenditure by Sex 
Composition of Children
First two children Boys/
Total Same sex Two boys Two girls Total
Budget shares of:
Food and beverages 42.0% 0.0105 0.0117 0.0019 -0.0006
(0.0140) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0229)
Clothing and footwear 8.4% 0.0037 0.0030 0.0019 0.0030
(0.0022)* (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0037)
Clothing for children under 10 3.4% 0.0009 0.0003 0.0009 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0013)
Health and related expenditures 4.6% -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0016
(0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0035)
Education, total 1.7% -0.0031 -0.0017 -0.0025 0.0004
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0036)
School related materials 0.6% -0.0002 -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0009
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Entertainment 6.1% 0.0002 0.0018 -0.0017 0.0043
(0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0031)
Income and expenditure measures:
Total net income of the household 1085 9.0 27.3 -16.6 56.5
(27.9) (31.7) (32.6) (45.6)
Net income per capita 227 -1.8 4.1 -6.7 13.9
(6.1) (7.0) (7.2) (10.0)
Total expenditure 941 11.4 -2.7 18.4 -10.3
(20.1) (22.9) (23.5) (33.0)
Per capita expenditure 196 -0.7 -0.9 0.1 1.4
(4.5) (5.1) (5.3) (7.4)
Note: Differences in means (mean of the relevant group minus mean of the rest o f the population) and their 
standard deviations (in parentheses), except for the last column which reports the regression coefficient of 
the ratio of boys (with the variable in column 1 as the dependent variable). * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The sample consists of 6,808 married women aged 18-45, with two 
or more children aged 18 or younger from the Encuesta Nacional de Gasto de los Hogares, INDEC, 1987. 
Income and expenditure in current Australes.
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family with a moderate bias towards sons, and that these patterns are ho­
mogeneous across different groups of the population. Moreover, the in­
stitutional setting and the evidence presented in this Section supports the 
conclusion that these preferences are eminently cultural in their origins and 
limited in their effects. Data from sex ratios, school enrolment and house­
hold expenditure fail to reveal any significant form of discrimination against 
girls, supporting the hypothesis that the bias towards sons, observed in the 
parity progression ratios, is an idiosyncratic feature of the society under 
study which appears to be innocuous for the application of the "same sex" 
strategy in Argentina.
6.3.3 Identification concerns beyond sex preferences: direct effects o f "same sex"
The indirect evidence presented above supports the hypothesis that son 
preferences do not invalidate the exclusion restriction in Assumption 5.2, 
since it seems unlikely that they induce a direct effect on the labour supply 
of women over and above their effect on fertility. It must still be established, 
however, that beyond the issue of son preference the sex mix of children (the 
instrument Z) does not have a direct effect on potential outcomes.
A possible threat to the validity of the "same sex" identification strategy 
is posed by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), as discussed in Section 6.2.3. 
Studying outlays per children in rural India, they find that same sex sib­
lings are related to substantially lower levels of expenditure on some child- 
related goods. They attribute this effect to hand-me-down savings, which 
are more likely to arise for items such as clothing and footwear when there 
are children of the same sex in the household. Since these items represent 
a sizeable fraction of the household's expenditures, they note that the sex 
composition of children plausibly alters labour supply through mechanisms 
other than through fertility change alone.
Whether or not the effect identified by Rosenzweig and Wolpin's (2000) 
is present in other settings is a verifiable matter, and Table 6.4 presents ev­
idence on the effects of sex mix on household consumption patterns in Ar­
gentina. Using expenditure data from the ENGH survey (described above), 
the Table reports the budget share of seven categories of goods (top panel) 
and the sample means of income and expenditure (bottom panel). It also 
presents the difference in those variables between the whole sample and
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households with same sex children, two boys and two girls (columns 3, 4 
and 5 respectively). In the last column, it reports the regression coefficient 
of the ratio of boys when the budget shares, income and expenditure vari­
ables are used as dependent variables.
The budget shares of clothing, footwear, and school-related goods, am­
ong other categories, are not significantly affected by the sex composition of 
children in the household. Only one of the figures in the Table is significant 
at the 10 percent level: households with two children of the same sex have a 
0.3 percentage points higher budget share of clothing and footwear. More­
over, the sign of this difference contradicts the presence of hand-me-down 
savings, since those with same-sex children spend a significantly higher 
share of their budget in clothing and footwear. The evidence in Table 6.4 
reflects the lack of hand-me-down savings or other effects of sex mix on the 
expenditure patterns of households in Argentina.
Finally, aggregate data from the ENGH suggests that hand-me-down ef­
fects not reflected in Table 6.4 are unlikely to have a noticeable effect on 
total expenditure. Argentine households in the full 1987 ENGH sample 
devoted 6.7 percent of their budget to the clothing and footwear (for all 
members), and only 2.8 percent on those items for children aged 10 or less 
(INDEC, 2000).
Meanwhile, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) find in their Indian data that 
clothing expenditures on children under 18 represents 11 percent of house­
hold income, and their estimated hand-me-down savings for these goods 
amounts to 1.3 percent of average earnings. Even assuming that savings of 
this type exist in Argentina (and that they imply a direct effect on labour 
supply), their size would be too small to account for a meaningful reduced 
form relationship between a same sex indicator and parental labour supply. 
The results for India are specific to the nature of the setting, which consists 
of extremely poor households in rural areas that devote a large share of their 
resources to child-related goods.
The indirect evidence presented in this Section is thus consistent with the 
validity of the exclusion restriction of Assumption 5.2. The following Chap­
ter presents further evidence on the exogeneity of the same sex variable in 
the labour supply decision based on Hausman-type overidentification tests 
of the instrumental variables regressions.
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6 . 4  C o n c l u s i o n
The discussion and the evidence presented in this Chapter indicates that 
the sex mix of children, as captured by the "same sex" instrument Z, has an 
effect on fertility D and probably no direct effect on the labour market out­
come Y, and it is thus correctly excluded from the second-stage estimation 
in Argentina. While the preference for a gender-balanced family is comple­
mented by a moderate bias for sons, this secular effect is not endogenous 
to the labour supply decision of the parents and can be controlled for by 
adding covariates in two-stage least squares estimations.
In the following Chapter, the significant and plausibly exogenous effect 
of the sex mix of children on further childbearing in Argentina is exploited 
to produce instrumental variables estimates of the causal effect of fertility 
on labour supply.
C h a p t e r  7
F e r t i l i t y  a n d  W o m e n ' s  L a b o u r  S u p p l y  i n
A r g e n t i n a
7 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
As discussed in the Introduction to Part II (page 123), labour market vari­
ables are strong correlates of poverty measures, but little is known about 
their determinants in Argentina. While the negative correlation between 
childbearing and labour force participation is an almost universal phenom­
enon, its interpretation in terms of causality is often marred by self-selection, 
endogeneity and simultaneity issues, as discussed with the help of a stylised 
model of female labour supply in Section 5.2.1 (page 126).
This Chapter establishes the causal nature of the link between fertility 
and female labour supply in Argentina by means of the "same sex" identi­
fication strategy. This strategy is based on the observation that parents of 
two children of the same sex exhibit a higher propensity to have another 
child to obtain a gender-balanced sibling composition. Under certain con­
ditions, analysed in Chapters 5, the sex mix of children can thus be used 
as an instrument for further childbearing, and as shown in Chapter 6, the 
exogeneity requirements for the instrument are met in the Argentine case.
The data employed in this Chapter was described in Section 5.4 (page 
142) and consists of a large sample of women from the 1991 Census, aged 21 
to 35 and with two or more children. As discussed in Introduction to Part II, 
the period 1980-2000 was characterised by a large increase in female labour 
force participation and by a fall in fertility rates towards replacement levels. 
Moreover, as discussed in Section 1.1 (page 18), the year 1991 marked the be­
ginning of a period of market oriented reforms that changed the structure
170
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of Argentine labour markets and the economy as a whole. The post-Second 
World War period was characterised by relatively high levels of unionisa­
tion (about half of the labour force in 1990), job security and high employ­
ment protection (Galiani and Gerchunoff, 2003). The structural reforms of 
the 1990s affected the labour market directly, by modifying employment 
regulations and reducing the power of unions through labour laws, and in­
directly, through the impact of trade liberalisation on unemployment and 
participation. The main effects were a deterioration of job stability and the 
growth of the informal sector1 from 28.9 percent of workers in May 1991 
EPH to almost 45 percent in May 2003,2 which resulted in a dual market 
with relatively well paid workers in secure jobs, on the one hand, and self- 
employed and small-firm employees with no benefits and high de facto job 
flexibility on the other (Moreno and Roca, 2002).
The unemployment rate had an upward trend before and after the pe­
riod under study. It raised from less than 3 percent in 1980 up to 6.9 percent 
in May 1991, with a relatively higher level for women than for men (7.3 and 
6.9 percent, respectively). However, these figures are low when compared 
to the evolution of the 1990s, depicted in Figure 1.3 (page 30) -  the unem­
ployment rate eventually peaked at 21.5 percent in May 2002. This trend 
was simultaneous to a substantial increase in female labour force participa­
tion, from 35.4 in 1990 to 38.4 percent in 2000, compared to 66.5 to 67.7 for 
men (CELADE, 2004, based on Census data). The high levels of unemploy­
ment, however, imply that employment rates did not grow as much during 
this period for women, and decreased substantially for men and the overall 
population during the crisis of 2001-2002 (Cortes, 2003).
With respect to the distribution of hours, part-time work was relatively 
uncommon in Argentina. In May 1991, only 5.7 percent of employed men 
worked less than 30 hours. This modality was more common for women, 
with 10.8 percent worked less than 20 hours, and 26.1 percent less than 30 
hours, but still relatively low when compared to the United Kingdom, for 
instance, where 40.5 percent of women worked part time in 2000 (ILO, 2003). 
The low participation of women and the low levels of part time work were
1See the definition of informality in Section 3.3 (footnote 5, page 95).
2Unless stated otherwise, the figures in this Introduction correspond to EPH indicators 
presented by Cortes (2003). The May 1991 data is almost contemporaneous to the Census, 
but the EPH covers only major urban centres.
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attributed, among other factors, to the limited supply of childcare facilities 
for children under school age and to the lack of free provision for poor hou­
seholds (Cortes, 2003). This issue is discussed later in this Chapter in the 
light of the results from the model of fertility and female labour supply es­
timated below.
This Chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 presents the benchmark 
results from the Wald and two-stage least squares instrumental variable es­
timations of fertility and female labour supply in Argentina. Section 7.3 
extends these results to parents of at least three children, and provides an 
analysis of the effects of fertility for different groups defined by their edu­
cation level. Conclusions follow.
7.2 W a l d  a n d  T w o - S t a g e  L e a s t  S q u a r e s  E s t i m a t e s
7.2.2 Wald estimates
This Section studies the causal effect of fertility on female labour supply. 
The estimations are based on the utility maximisation problem presented 
in Equation 5.1 (page 127). This model results in a labour supply function 
Y  = / ( K, D), where K is a vector of characteristics and choice variables, 
and D is a measure of fertility. The parameter of interest is the labour sup­
ply response to changes in the fertility variable, fa ,  which may be difficult 
to recover due to the potential effects of D on the components of K. As dis­
cussed in Section 5.2.1 (page 126), a solution to these endogeneity problems 
resides in finding an instrumental variable Z that induces variation in fertil­
ity (D) but does not affect the labour supply decision directly. Defining K  as 
a generic component of K, the derivative of Y  (labour supply) with respect 
to Z is given by:
ay _  ax ,  b d ,
dz ~ d z 'K d z ‘D
Since the exogeneity of Z ensures that dK/dZ  =  0, the effect of fertility on 
labour supply is identified:
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Previous work on fertility and labour supply found that parental sex prefer­
ences provide valid instruments for models of this type in the United States 
(Angrist and Evans, 1998). The evidence presented in Chapter 6 for Ar­
gentina indicated that the sex mix of children, as captured by the "same 
sex" instrument Z, has an effect on further childbearing in women with at 
least two children (D), and no direct effect on the labour market outcome Y.
The simplest way to estimate the parameter in Equation 7.1 is by instru­
mental variables, in a model with a constant and one endogenous regressor 
like Equation 5.6:
Y/ = y +  (pDi + £i
This regression is estimated with Z as an instrument for D with a first-stage 
regression of the form:
Dj  =  Y f  +  9 Zj  +  €{ (7.2)
The parameter cp estimated in this way corresponds to the Local Average 
Treatment Effect of Proposition 5.1 (page 135), since by definition (p obtained 
by IV represents the difference in means of the outcome variable for the two 
values of the instrument Z divided by 9, which is equal to the difference in 
the expectation of the treatment D at the two values of Z ?
The Assumptions 5.1-5.4, required by Proposition 5.1, were the object of 
the previous Chapter, which presented evidence on their plausibility in the 
Argentine case. It can then be assumed that the parameter (p identifies a 
Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) for the group of compilers.
Table 7.1 reports the results of the unconditional IV model of Equation 
5.6, the LATE-Wald coefficient (p, for the four samples defined in Section 
5.4 (page 142). For comparison purposes, the Table also presents the corre­
sponding OLS results for (p, obtained by estimating the model in Equation
5.6 without instrumenting D.4
3While the discussion is in terms of a binary treatment D (More than two children), this 
Chapter also presents results obtained with D set to the Number o f children variable. These 
two regressors correspond to the binary and variable treatments, respectively, as discussed 
in Section 5.2.3 (page 132). The case of variable treatment intensity requires only minor 
adjustments to the interpretation of the LATE parameter, as described in the same Section 
(footnote 14, page 135).
4While useful for comparison purposes, it should be noted that the OLS and instru­
mental variables coefficients are not necessarily comparable without further homogeneity 
assumptions. As discussed in Section 5.2.3 (page 132), instrumental variables estimates 
identify the causal effect only for the subpopulation of compliers, while OLS coefficients,
Table 7.1: Wald Estimates of the Effect of Fertility on Women's Labour Supply
Complete Sample Married
Proportion of Worked for Number of More than 
sample pay children two children
Proportion of Worked for Number of More than 
sample pay children two children
Overall mean 0.3138 2.9763 0.5480 0.3050 2.9050 0.5280
Same sex (1) 













































AE Sample AE Sample, married










Overall mean 0.3155 3.0619 0.5955 0.3046 2.9848 0.5741
Same sex (1) 













































Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The Wald estimates represent the difference (l)-(2) of the Worked 
fo r  pay  indicator divided by the difference (l)-(2) of the Number o f children and More than two children variables. The OLS estimates 
represent the coefficients of these two variables in the respective regressions with Worked fo r  pay  as the dependent variable. The samples 
correspond to women aged 21-35 with two or more children aged 18 or younger from the extended questionnaire sample of the 1991 
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The Wald estimates of the effect of the total number of children and hav­
ing more than two children on the probability of working for pay is obtained 
with the following variables: the instrument Z is the binary indicator Same 
sex, the dependent variable Y is Worked for pay, and the endogenous regres­
sor D is either the Number of children variable or the More than two children 
indicator.
Given the interpretation of OLS regressions with one binary indepen­
dent variable as simple differences in the mean of the dependent variable, 
Table 7.1 presents the overall means of Y  and D, and their values conditional 
on Z — 1 (same sex) and Z — 0 (mixed sex). The Table also reports the dif­
ference of the conditional means, which in the case of the variables Number 
of children and More than two children can be interpreted as the coefficient 0 
in the first-stage regression of Equation 7.2.
The Table has four panels, one for each of the samples on which the 
analysis is carried out. The first row within each panel contains the means 
of the variables of interest, as already presented in Table 5.1 (page 145). The 
first column indicates that among parents of at least two children there is a 
marginally higher probability of having the first two children of the same 
sex (about 50.5-50.6 percent) than one son and one daughter.
The reduced form effect of the Same sex instrument on the outcome vari­
able Worked for Pay, denoted by the difference in the conditional means, is 
very small, as expected from the discussion of the previous Chapter. This 
difference, which represents the numerator of the LATE coefficient of Equa­
tion 5.5 (page 135), is of the expected sign: mothers of Same sex children 
have a lower probability of working for pay of about 0.3 to 0.4 percentage 
points, which can be attributed to the impact of the instrument on the en­
dogenous fertility variables. The third and fourth columns of each panel re­
port the means of Number of children and More than two children conditional 
on Same sex, and their differences. Women whose first two children were 
of the same sex had on average between 0.057 and 0.0584 more children, 
and a 0.032-0.0403 higher probability of having a third child, depending on 
the sample. These numbers represent the estimate of the parameter 6  in 
the first-stage Equation 7.2, and correspond to the parental preference for
as given by Equation 5.4 (page on 132), provide a (potentially biased) estimate of the aver­
age effect for the whole population.
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a gender-balanced family in the transition from two to three children, pre­
sented in Table 6.2 and discussed in Section 6.3.1 (page 155).
The bottom part of each panel in Table 7.1 reports the OLS and Wald 
(IV) estimates of the effects of fertility on women's labour supply, repre­
sented by cp in Equation 5.6. The Wald coefficients indicate that an addi­
tional child reduces women's labour supply by about 5 percentage points, 
while having more than two children has a negative impact of about 9-10 
percentage points. The results are very similar for the Complete and AE Sam­
ples, although the coefficients are slightly higher (in absolute value) for mar­
ried women. Moreover, all estimates are strongly significant, with six of the 
eight Wald coefficients different from zero at the 1 percent level. Finally, for 
both instrumented variables, More than two children and Number o f children, 
the Wald point estimates are higher than the OLS coefficients in absolute 
value, implying that OLS estimates might be underestimating the negative 
effect of additional children on women's labour supply if the compliers are 
similar in their characteristics to the rest of the population. The following 
Section presents a formal test of these differences.
The Wald estimates and their statistical significance represent strong ev­
idence of a causal effect of fertility on labour supply in the Argentina data. 
However, as discussed in general in Section 6.2 and specifically for Ar­
gentina in Section 6.3 (page 155), the concerns raised by a mild son pref­
erence in the sample indicate the need for controlling for the secular effect 
of the sex of the first two children in the estimations. Moreover, other plau­
sible exogenous demographic characteristics can be included as regressors 
in the second stage. The following Section addresses these issues, present­
ing the results of the two-stage least squares estimation of the fertility and 
labour supply model that accommodates a set of covariates.
7.2.2 First stages and two-stage least squares: benchmark results
The first-stage effect of the instrument was evident in the tabulations of Ta­
ble 6.2, and it was confirmed in Table 7.1. However, the results from Table
6.2 point out the presence of a mixed-sex sibling preference complemented 
with a moderate bias for boys, so that the model could be improved by 
adding covariates to control for any secular independent of the sex of the 
first two children, and by distinguishing between the Two boys and Two girls
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components of the Same sex instrument. While the Wald setup of Equation
5.6 provides a compact model for causal effects, its drawbacks are the lack 
of controls for other exogenous characteristics and its reliance on a single 
instrument. This Section deals with the constant effect model of Equation 
5.7:
Yj = X'j3 +  4>Di -+- £/
This model is estimated by two-stage least squares, with Z as an instrument 
for D, which implies a first-stage regression of the form:
Di = XlPf  + OZi + ei (7.3)
The set of covariates X includes plausibly exogenous characteristics like the 
age of the woman and her age at first birth. Given the possibility of effects 
of the gender of children on omitted variables, the vector X also includes 
indicators for the sex of the first two children. As discussed in the robust­
ness checks presented in Appendix D (page 232), the main results of this 
Section are not affected by the inclusion of other covariates in X, but the ev­
idence suggests that some of them, like the indicators of the education level, 
might be endogenous. For this reason, this Section only reports results with 
a minimum of demographic variables in X.5
Finally, with respect to the mild son preference found in the data, the 
estimation is also carried out by decomposing the Same sex indicator into 
the indicators Two boys and Two girls, since a further advantage of two-stage 
least squares is that it allows for more than one instrument to be included 
in the estimation: these two variables can be used as an instrument for D 
in Equation 5.7. The estimation with two separate instruments implies a 
first-stage model of the form:
D/ =  X'iPjt +  9l Z li +  #2^2 i +  e i (7*4)
where Z \ and Z2 represent the Two boys and Two girls indicators, and D and
5It should be noted that the regressions implicitly control for the age of the first child, 
equal to the difference of Age and Age at first birth. The ages of other children were not 
included because of the potential endogeneity of birth intervals, which are left for further 
research.
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X are defined as before.6
Table 7.2 reports the coefficients 6 from Equation 7.3 and Q\ and 62 from 
Equation 7.4. These OLS first-stage regressions are estimated for the two 
instrumented variables D, Number of children and More than two children, 
and the Table reports only the coefficients and standard errors of the in­
struments.
Columns one to four contain the results for an OLS regression with Num­
ber of children as the dependent variable, and columns five to eight present 
the same information with More than two children as the dependent vari­
able. The first row indicates that women in the complete sample with two 
children of the same sex have on average 0.0633 more children after con­
ditioning on the characteristics X, and have a 0.0341 higher probability of 
having more than two children, with slightly higher numbers for the AE  
samples and for married women. It should be noted that all the coefficients 
presented in the Table are significant at the 1 percent level.
The results for the Same sex instrument in Table 7.2 are a weighted aver­
age of the effect of having two girls and two boys. These are presented in the 
second and third rows. For the whole sample, women with two girls have 
on average 0.0894 more children, and a 0.0439 higher probability of having 
more than two children. As observed previously in Table 6.2 (page 155), 
these figures are lower for women who had two boys (0.0372 and 0.0243 re­
spectively). Finally, the panel at the bottom of the Table presents the results 
of the same first-stage regressions, but using the covariates corresponding 
to the women's spouse. The coefficients are similar to those for married 
women, which are higher than those for the overall sample.
Table 7.2 represents a multivariate version of the parity progression ra­
tios of Table 6.2 for the transition from parity two to three, and the conclu­
sions from that Table still hold conditional on the covariates X: the sex mix 
of the first two children has a strongly significant effect on fertility variables, 
and this first-stage relationship reveals a preference for a gender-balanced 
family with a moderate bias for sons.
Based on the effects of the instrument Z (and its components Z \ and Z2)
6When using these two instruments instead of Same sex, it is not possible to control for 
the sex of the first two children in the regression because of perfect multicollinearity. As 
in Angrist and Evans (1998), the results presented here control for the sex of the first child 
when using Two boys and Two girls as instruments.
Table 7.2: First Stages: Effect of Sex Composition on Further Childbearing
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Observations 653,213 497,194 599,941 456,437 653,213 497,194 599,941 456,437
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include the age and the age at first 
birth o f the woman or her spouse, in addition to the sex o f the first and second children (where indicated). The samples correspond to women aged 21-35 
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on the endogenous regressors D, and given the plausibility of the identify­
ing assumptions in the Argentine case as discussed in the previous Chapter, 
Table 7.3 presents the results of the estimation of Equation 5.7 by ordinary 
and two-stage least squares. The Table reports the coefficient <p by OLS and 
using Same sex or Two boys and Two girls as instruments for Number of chil­
dren (columns 1-4) and More than two children (columns 5-8), with Worked for 
pay as the dependent variable.
The first panel of the Table presents the OLS results. Since the use of Two 
boys and Two girls as instruments implies that it is not possible to control for 
the sex of the first two children, due to multicollinearity, the panel presents 
the OLS estimations when controlling alternatively for the sex of the first 
child and the sex of the first two. These OLS results are unaffected by the 
exclusion of the second child, and are all strongly significant at the 1 percent 
level, indicating that an additional child reduces the m other's probability 
of working by 0.0415-0.0469, while the More than two children indicator has 
an impact of 0.0792-0.0984 on labour supply, depending on the samples. 
The impact is lower (in absolute terms) for married women, and for the AE  
samples.
The second panel of Table 7.3 presents the instrumental variables esti­
mates of Equation 5.7. The first set of coefficients corresponds to the use 
of the Same sex variable as the sole instrument. Instrumental variables esti­
mates for married women are higher (in absolute value) than the correspon­
dent OLS coefficients for both Number of children and More than two children 
(around -0.04/-0.05 and -0.07/-0.09, respectively), but they are lower for 
the overall samples (Complete and AE). It should be noted that all these co­
efficients are significant at least at the 5 percent level, indicating that the 
instrument provides enough variation in the endogenous variables.
The next set of results in the second panel of Table 7.3 presents the es­
timation when the Same sex instrument is decomposed into its Two boys 
and Two girls components. The pattern of differences with OLS estimates 
is now much simpler: using the two instruments, IV coefficients are con­
sistently smaller (in absolute value) than OLS, in contrast w ith the pattern 
of differences with the Wald estimates of Table 7.1. The differences are rela­
tively large: More than two children OLS coefficients are in the -0.0793/-0.0985 
range, but are restricted to -0.061/-0.0801 for the instrumental variables es-
Table 7.3: OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of Fertility and Women's Labour Supply
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Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include the age and the age 
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timates; the pattern is similar for Number of children. For both variables, the 
coefficients for the whole samples are smaller than those for married wo­
men, and their level of significance is somewhat smaller than when using 
Same sex as an instrument, but still significant overall (three at the 10 percent 
level, four at 5 percent and one at 1 percent).
As noted by Angrist and Evans (1998), an advantage of decomposing the 
Same sex instrument is that the model becomes overidentified, with two in­
struments for one endogenous regressor, and thus a standard Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions can be applied. These results provide further 
evidence in favour of the exogeneity of the instrument, discussed in Section 
6.3: the validity of the instruments is not rejected by the tests' results, as 
indicated by their p-values in Table 7.3. This implies that the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the esti­
mated equation. For only one case (Number of children - AE Sample), the test's 
null is rejected at the 5 percent level. Moreover, Angrist and Imbens (1995) 
show that this test also measures the difference in the coefficient (f) when the 
estimation is carried out with the two instruments separately. The causal ef­
fect of childbearing for Two boys compliers is thus not significantly different 
from the effect for the Two girls compliers, providing further evidence that 
the moderate bias towards sons in the gender-balanced preferences is not a 
cause of concern, as discussed at length in Section 6.3.2 (page 155).
The last panel in Table 7.3 presents the results for Spouse worked for pay 
as the dependent variable, with the corresponding controls for the sex of 
the first two children, the spouse's age and age at first birth. While there 
seems to be a small but strongly significant effect in the OLS regressions 
(-0.0066/-0.0076 for Number of children, -0.0116/-0.009 for More than two chil­
dren), none of the instrumental variables coefficients are significantly dif­
ferent from zero at the standard levels of confidence. This can be taken 
as evidence of no effect of the number of children on the spouses' labour 
supply, which might be explained by the small variation in the dependent 
variable: more than 95 percent of the male spouses work for pay. It should 
be noted, however, that the IV estimates are statistically indistinguishable 
from the OLS estimates, so that the instrument might not contain enough 
information to isolate the impact of children on this outcome.
Regarding the differences between IV and OLS, it is worth remember­
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ing that the "same sex" strategy identifies the average effect of having more 
than two children on those whose fertility decisions are changed by the in­
strument, the group of compliers, while OLS is suspected to fail at identi­
fying the same effect averaged over the whole population. While the two 
methods do not estimate results for the same groups without further as­
sumptions (see the discussion of compliers in Chapter 8), they can still be 
compared and their differences can be tested for statistical significance: un­
der homogeneity assumptions, this difference is the selection bias from OLS 
in Equation 5.4 (page 131). Table 7.3 reports the results from a Durbin-Wu- 
Hausman test for the two-stage least squares models. Most of the OLS co­
efficients in Table 7.3 are higher (in absolute value) than their IV counter­
parts, but the opposite is true for the Wald estimates of Table 7.1, pointing 
to upward and downward biases as discussed in Section 5.3.1 (page 155). 
However, while the instrumental variable coefficients are significant at the 
5 percent level, their confidence intervals are still broad, and this is reflected 
in the failure to reject the Durbin-Wu-Hausman null hypothesis of signifi­
cant differences between IV and OLS coefficients for all the models in the 
Table and in Table 7.1 (tests not reported).
7.3 A d d it io n a l  Results
7.3.1 More than three children
This Section provides additional findings, and some robustness checks of 
the benchmark results of this Chapter. A first extension to the "same sex" 
strategy is based on the evidence from the parity progression ratios in Ta­
ble 6.2 (page 159), which indicates that the preference for a gender-balanced 
family in Argentina is not limited to the two to three children range: parents 
of three boys or three girls have a significantly higher probability of having 
a fourth child than parents of mixed sex siblings. The higher fertility implies 
that the decision to go from three to four children is more relevant in the Ar­
gentine case than in the other applications reviewed in Section 5.3.3 (page 
140). In 1991,33.8 percent of women aged 19-49 had three or more children, 
compared to only 20.5 percent in the United States in 1990. This allows the 
estimation of a 2SLS model like Equation 5.7 for the impact of childbear­
ing at higher parities on women's labour supply by limiting the samples
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to women with three children or more, which none of previous studies has 
attempted.
The first-stage, OLS and IV results from this model are presented in Ta­
ble 7.4. The instrument Same sex indicates that the first three children were 
of the same sex, and it is decomposed into its Three boys and Three girls in­
dicators. The endogenous regressors are Number of children and More than 
three children, and the covariates X include controls for age, age at first birth 
and the sex of the first two or three children.
In accordance with the evidence in Table 6.2, the first stages are strongly 
significant. The Same sex indicator has an effect of about 0.041-0.046 more 
children and 0.025-0.029 higher probability of having a fourth child. While 
significant, these coefficients are substantially lower than the Same sex effect 
on the two to three children decision, again as expected from Table 6.2.
The OLS results in Table 7.4 suggest that the impact of childbearing on 
labour supply is relatively homogeneous, not varying widely with the num ­
ber of children: the coefficients of Number of children are in the 0.036-0.038 
range, lower but close to those in Table 7.3. The same is true for the coeffi­
cients of More than three children: at around 0.07-0.073, they are not far below 
than those for More than two children.
Although the sample size is smaller and the effect of the instruments 
is weaker, the instrumental variables coefficients of Number of children and 
More than three children in Table 7.4 are still significant at the 10 percent level 
for married women. Compared to the results of Table 7.3, these IV coeffi­
cients indicate that the negative causal effect of fertility on labour supply is 
higher for a fourth child than for a third child. When instrumenting Num ­
ber of children, the estimate is around 0.07 for married women, above the 
0.029-0.052 range for the two to three children effect, while the results for 
More than three children, at around 0.11, are higher than those of More than 
two children in Table 7.3 (0.061-0.093).
Finally, the Sargan null fails to be rejected in all the estimations, support­
ing the exogeneity of the Three boys and Three girls indicators, but as in Table 
7.3, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests indicate that the differences between IV 
and OLS estimates are not significant.
Table 7.4: OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares Estimations for Three or More Children
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Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include controls for the age 
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7.3.2 Heterogeneous effects: results by education level
The results in the previous Sections of this Chapter captured the average 
causal effect of fertility on women's labour supply for the population as 
a whole. However, subgroups of the population can be expected to have 
different propensities to participate in the labour market, and the effect of 
childbearing might differ substantially for them.
In Table 7.5, the two-stage least squares model given by Equation 5.7 was 
estimated separately for three mutually exclusive subgroups of the popula­
tion defined by the level of education of women: those with up to some 
primary education, those with some high school education, and those with 
some tertiary or university education. The first stages (not reported) for 
these three groups are remarkably close, and consistent with the gender- 
balanced preferences with a moderate bias for sons in all three cases: the 
fact that the same fertility effects are observed for very different groups of 
the population reinforces the conclusions of Section 6.3.1 (page 155) on the 
nature of the group of compliers.7
The results in Table 7.5 correspond to OLS and IV regressions of Worked 
for pay on the standard set of controls, with Number of children and More than 
two children instrumented by the Same sex indicator.
For the less educated group, the results are similar to those in Table 7.3 
for the overall population, although the IV estimates are significant at the 
standard levels for the married samples only. For the group of women with 
some high school education, the effects of fertility in the IV regressions are 
significantly different from zero (for six of the coefficients at the 10 percent 
level, and at 5 percent for the other two), and they are higher than those in 
Table 7.3: for Number of children, the coefficients (in absolute value) stand 
around 0.07 (compared to 0.04-0.05), while the More than two children coef-
7The unconditional effects of Two boys and Two girls in a regression with More than two 
children as the dependent variable are 0.0223 and 0.0423, and the effect of the Same sex in­
dicator is 0.0320 (as in Table 7.1) for the Complete sample. The same coefficients estimated 
for the primary education group are 0.0201, 0.0407 and 0.0301; for the high school sample 
0.0254, 0.0440 and 0.0344; and for the further education group, 0.0284, 0.0422 and 0.0350. 
All these coefficients are similar, and only the Two boys coefficient for the further education 
sample is outside the 95 percent confidence intervals of the full sample coefficients, indicat­
ing that for this group the preference for boys is smaller than for the other two. However, 
this group still exhibits preferences for a gender-balanced family with a (more) moderate 
bias for sons. The same type of decomposition reveals that the first-stage effects are statis­
tically equal between rural and urban households.
Table 7.5: Heterogeneous Effects: Results by Education Level




0 , Married Sample
AE
AE Sample Sample, 
married
Complete , ,  . , ^  .
„ Married AE Sample Sample,
married
Education Level: Completed primary or less
IV: Same Sex -0.0299 -0.0508 -0.0293 -0.0497 -0.0629 -0.1028 -0.0613 -0.1004
[0.0197] [0.0197]** [0.0194] [0.0194]** [0.0416] [0.0399]** [0.0407] [0.0393]**
DWH p-value 0.7804 0.3624 0.7187 0.4101 0.7403 0.4094 0.5967 0.5150
OLS with same controls -0.0354 -0.0329 -0.0362 -0.0338 -0.0767 -0.0699 -0.0828 -0.0749
[0.0006]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0018]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0018]***
Observations 379,290 264,142 355,560 248,477 379,290 264,142 355,560 248,477
Education Level: high school, complete or incomplete
IV: Same Sex -0.0655 -0.0683 -0.0680 -0.0755 -0.1063 -0.1107 -0.1100 -0.1219
[0.0353]* [0.0363]* [0.0341]** [0.0351]** [0.0573]* [0.0588]* [0.0551]** [0.0567]**
DWH p-value 0.6976 0.5515 0.6442 0.4198 0.8062 0.5847 0.7803 0.4620
OLS with same controls -0.0518 -0.0468 -0.0523 -0.0472 -0.0923 -0.0786 -0.0946 -0.0803
[0.0013]*** [0.0014]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0014]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0025]***
Observations 194,683 161,631 176,000 146,492 194,683 161,631 176,000 146,492
Education Level: some university or tertiary
IV: Same Sex 0.0196 0.0505 -0.0271 -0.0072 0.0280 0.0700 -0.0386 -0.0100
[0.0663] [0.0671] [0.0613] [0.0616] [0.0945] [0.0928] [0.0875] [0.0852]
DWH p-value 0.2515 0.1268 0.6386 0.4809 0.2985 0.1485 0.7141 0.5302
OLS with same controls -0.0559 -0.0508 -0.0558 -0.0505 -0.0698 -0.0629 -0.0707 -0.0633
[0.0025]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0039]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0040]***
Observations 79,240 71,421 68,381 61,468 79,240 71,421 68,381 61,468
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include 
the age and the age at first birth of the women or her spouse, in addition to the sex of the first and second children (where 
indicated). The samples correspond to women aged 21-35 with two or more children aged 18 or younger from the extended 
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ficients, at around 0.10-0.12, are higher than the previous 0.08-0.09. Given 
the wide IV confidence intervals, however, the equality of coefficients in the 
two Tables cannot be rejected.
As expected, the OLS coefficients are significantly different from zero for 
all samples and education groups. Despite this fact, none of the IV estimates 
for the higher education group are even marginally significant. This might 
be due to a lack of precision, since the smaller sample size may not provide 
enough variation to isolate a causal effect of children on labour supply (see 
the discussion of significance and sample sizes in Appendix D, page 236). 
Alternatively, there might be no effect at all for this group. A possible reason 
for this is that richer households (as proxied by the education level) may be 
able to afford market-provided childcare, which attenuates the fertility ef­
fect on labour supply. This hypothesis is supported by the data. The 1991 
Census covered members of the household and their domestic employees 
living in the same dwelling, which can be taken as a lower bound for child­
care services consumption. Overall, 1.03 percent of the women in the final 
sample had a domestic employee living in the house. The proportion for 
the lowest education group was only 0.19 percent, in contrast with 1.02 per­
cent for those with some high school and a relatively high 4.51 percent for 
women with some higher education. While not conclusive, this result is con­
sistent with the idea that access to childcare attenuates the negative effect of 
childbearing on women's labour supply. Moreover, it is also consistent with 
previous findings: as discussed in the Introduction to this Chapter, Cortes 
(2003) states that the lack of free childcare for children under school age was 
a major impediment for the labour force participation of women in poorer 
households in Argentina.
The heterogeneity in the impact of fertility on women's labour supply in 
Argentina is further analysed in terms of potential outcomes in the follow­
ing Chapter.
7.4  C o n c l u s io n
Building on the results from Chapter 6, which revealed a significant and 
plausibly exogenous effect of the sex mix of children on further childbear­
ing in Argentina, this Chapter exploited this source of variation to produce
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instrumental variables estimates of fertility on female labour supply.
The results of this Chapter indicate the presence of a strongly significant 
negative causal effect of fertility on the labour supply of women with at least 
two children. This result is robust to different specifications of the model, 
the variables and the underlying datasets, and it was shown to hold for wo­
men with three or more children. The strongest negative impact of fertility 
was on the labour supply of women with low education levels, while the 
effect on women with higher education was not significantly different from 
zero.
The findings of this Chapter indicate that childbearing leads to a reduc­
tion in female labour supply in Argentina -  but how much of the increase in 
labour force participation in the last three decades can be explained by the 
large changes in fertility observed in Figure 5.1 (page 125)? According to 
CELADE (2004), fertility fell by 24 percent in Argentina between 1980 and 
2000, while female labour force participation increased by 14.3 percentage 
points (just under 60 percent). Using the Wald estimates for the complete 
sample in Table 7.1, one fewer child implies a fall in female labour force 
participation of about 5.11 percentage points. The fall of 0.82 children in 
Argentina between 1980 and 2000 accounts for an increase of 4.2 percent­
age points in participation, which is 29.4 percent of the increase in female 
employment during the same period.
It should be noted, however, that the identified causal effect holds only 
for the group of compliers (defined in Chapter 5) without further assump­
tions: the calculation of the previous paragraph is only valid if the estimated 
elasticity can be generalised from compliers to the whole population of wo­
men with at least two children (and from this group to all women). The fol­
lowing Chapter discusses the generality of these Local Average Treatment 
Effects, and establishes whether the identified causal link can be extrapo­
lated from compliers to the population. It also expands the results by educa­
tion levels by applying additional identification results within the potential 
outcomes framework.
The robust causal link between fertility and female labour supply, the 
substantial magnitude of its effects and its stronger impact on the poorest 
group of the population have important policy implications, which are dis­
cussed in the Conclusion to Part II (page 212).
C h a p t e r  8
P o t e n t i a l  O u t c o m e s  a n d  E x t r a p o l a t i o n  o f  
R e s u l t s  f o r  C o m p l i e r s
8.1 In t r o d u c t io n
The previous three Chapters presented the "same sex" identification strat- 
egy, which consists of using the sex composition of children as instruments 
for childbearing in a model of fertility and female labour supply. The 
strategy exploits parental preferences for a mixed-sex sibling composition, 
which induce higher fertility in couples with two children of the same sex. 
The validity of the strategy was discussed in Chapter 6 by means of a de­
tailed analysis of the identifying assumptions and their plausibility in the 
Argentine case, studying the institutional context and the testable implica­
tions of the assumptions set out in Chapter 5. The evidence supported the 
validity of the strategy for Argentina, and this allowed the estimation of the 
causal effect of fertility on women's labour supply in Chapter 7.
The aim of this Chapter is to extend and generalise these findings by 
specifying additional identification results in the context of instrumental 
variable estimation, and using the Argentine data on fertility and female 
labour supply to illustrate how these results can be applied. The motiva­
tion is twofold. On the one hand, without further assumptions, IV results 
like those obtained in the previous Chapter are only valid for the group of 
compliers (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In the model of fertility and female 
labour supply, this group is composed of women who had an additional 
child because the first two were of the same sex. The issue is whether the 
results obtained for compliers are representative and can be extrapolated 
to the whole population, since the parameter of interest is how women in
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general (and not only compliers) adapt their labour supply to changes in fer­
tility. On the other hand, the estimation of the labour supply model by ed­
ucation group, presented in Section 7.3 (page 183), revealed the presence of 
heterogeneous effects of fertility: childbearing only affected the labour sup­
ply of women with lower levels of education. The following pages present 
additional identification results within the potential outcomes framework 
to study the nature of heterogeneous effects beyond the simple estimation 
of causal effects for different subgroups of the population. While IV coeffi­
cients estimate the difference between outcomes (for instance, labour sup­
ply) in two counterfactual situations (for instance, low and high fertility), 
the analysis developed in this Chapter focuses on the outcome levels in 
these two situations, and not only in the difference between the two.
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 discusses the nature 
of the group of compliers, presenting additional identification results and 
proposing an auxiliary test to verify to what extent the LATE estimates can 
be generalised to the whole population. Section 8.3 presents the main results 
on fertility and female labour supply broken down by education group, and 
carries out the discussion beyond causal effects by concentrating on poten­
tial outcomes. The issue of extrapolation of results for compliers is then 
discussed w ith respect to the three education subgroups, and the auxiliary 
test proposed in Section 8.2 is illustrated with the Argentine labour sup­
ply data and with a job training programme dataset from the United States. 
Conclusion follows.
8.2 "Sa m e  s e x " C o m p l ie r s  a n d  t h e  G e n e r a l it y  o f  LATE Re su l t s
82.1 "Same sex" compliers and extrapolation
The potential outcomes framework, presented in Section 5.2.2 (page 130), 
addresses problems of endogeneity in the estimation of causal effects. The 
definition of causal effects relies on the notion of potential -  as opposed to 
observed -  outcomes Y# with respect to a binary treatment D: Yq/ and Yu  
represent the outcome that would have been observed for individual i in the 
two alternative situations D,- =  0 and D,- =  1, one of which is necessarily a 
counterfactual. In the case of fertility and women's labour supply, the em­
ployment status of a woman i who has more than two children (D; =  1) is
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Yu, which is equal to the observed Yz, and Yqz represents the same woman's
had only two children (Dz =  0). The causal effect of the treatment D for indi­
vidual i is defined in terms of counterfactuals as the difference between the 
two potential outcomes, Yu  — Y0z (Abadie, 2003a). Since Yqz and Ylz cannot 
both be observed at the same time for the same individual i, causal effects 
cannot be computed at the individual level: the identified parameter refers 
necessarily to the average causal effect E[Yi — Yq].
As discussed in Section 5.2.3, the LATE identification result of Proposi­
tion 5.1 (page 135) establishes that when an instrument Z is available, and 
satisfies Assumptions 5.1-5.4 (page 134), this average causal effect is identi­
fied (i.e., can be expressed in terms of observable quantities) for the group of 
compliers. The proposition results in Equation 5.5, which defines the Local 
Average Treatment Effect (LATE):
This result, however, holds only for compliers, those whose treatment status 
is changed by the instrument. In the case of the "same sex" instrument, 
compliers consist of two groups: namely, women who had another child 
because their first two children were of the same sex, but who would have 
stopped at two if the children were of different sex, and the reciprocal group, 
women who did not have additional children because they had one boy and 
one girl, but would have had more children if the first two were of the same 
sex.
These two subgroups are akin to a randomised treatment-control setup, 
which is why compliers play such an important role in identification: their 
treatment status is solely determined by a random factor, the sex of the first 
two children. But even if the instrument Z plausibly complies with As­
sumptions 5.1-5.4, resulting in a valid instrumental variable estimation, the 
relevance and generality of the results depends on the nature of the group 
of compliers. The plausibility of homogeneity assumptions, the limits of 
extrapolation of results from compliers, and their relevance as a subgroup 
of the population are all matters that need to be considered with respect to 
specific applications.
counterfactual employment status which would have been observed if she
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The first point to raise is whether compliers are per se an interesting 
subset of the population. This is certainly true in some applications: for in­
stance, in the JTPA job training programme in the United States, individuals 
were offered labour market oriented courses through a random mechanism. 
While not all of those assigned attended training sessions, the assignment 
itself provides a good instrument in randomised experiments with imper­
fect compliance (Abadie et al., 2002; Abadie, 2003b). Compliers in the JTPA 
case were those who attended training sessions because they were offered 
the opportunity of doing so, but would not have attended in the absence of 
an offer.
The identified causal effect for this group consists in the change in out­
comes induced by the offer of training, which is an interesting result for 
policy and for the evaluation of programmes of this type.
In the "same sex" case, however, compliers only represent individuals 
with a type of sex preference that modifies their fertility behaviour in a spe­
cific way. "Same sex" compliers do not represent an especially interesting 
group in terms of economic theory or policy as far as their complier status 
is concerned, because their "experimental treatment" is driven by genetics 
and not an economic programme. For this reason, "same sex" compliers 
have an advantage for the extrapolation of results to the whole population. 
In the job training example, the identified effect is interesting per se, but it 
does not represent the average effect of the programme for the overall pop­
ulation because compliers represent a particular subset, i.e. those who re­
acted positively to the offer of training. On the other hand, generalising the 
effects for compliers in the "same sex" case seems less controversial: while 
exhibiting stronger effects of sex preferences in their fertility decisions, there 
is no a priori reason to argue that they are substantially different from the 
rest of the population in terms of labour supply behaviour.
This Section presents and derives additional identification results which 
can be used to test assertions of this type: while the extrapolation of causal 
effects for compliers remains intrinsically untestable, as in the case of the 
exclusion restriction (see Section 6.3, 155), its plausibility can be assessed 
with auxiliary evidence.
CHAPTER 8. POTENTIAL OUTCOMES A N D  EXTRAPOLATION 194
8.2.2 Proportion of compliers in different samples
The extrapolation of results from compliers to the whole population cannot 
be directly verified: since they are defined in terms of their counterfactual 
treatment status, it is not possible to assign any individual to this group, 
and thus their characteristics cannot be observed. For this reason, it is not 
possible to say whether compliers are representative of the whole popula­
tion, and thus parameters like the LATE coefficient defined in Proposition
5.1 cannot be extrapolated without further assumptions.
However, if it is plausible to assume that compliers are not intrinsically 
different from the rest of the population except in their behaviour with re­
spect to the instrument, this homogeneity warranties that estimates like 
LATE represent the average causal effect for the overall population (and 
not only for compliers). In the "same sex" case, compliers are women who 
had more children because the first two where of the same sex: if they are 
deemed similar to other women in other dimensions, then their labour sup­
ply parameters can be extrapolated to the rest of the population.
While homogeneity cannot be tested directly, some of its implications 
can be verified, as in the discussion of the exclusion restriction in Chapter 
6. For instance, if homogeneity holds, then compliers should represent con­
stant fractions of the population among subgroups distinguished by some 
exogenous characteristic X. This can be verified by means of an additional 
identification result due to Imbens and Rubin (1997) for the case of binary 
treatments:
Proposition 8.1 Proportion of compliers (Imbens and Rubin, 1997): i f  Assump­
tions 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 hold, then the proportion of compliers in the population 
is identified and given by:
Pr(D0 = 0,Di = l) = Pr(Df = l|Z/ =  l ) -P r(D /  =  l|Zf =  0)
=  E[D|Z =  1] -  E[D|Z =  0] (8.1)
This result follows from the definition of the different groups by poten­
tial treatment in Section 5.2.2 (page 130): the fraction of individuals with 
D/ =  1 and Z\ =  1 estimates the combined population of always-takers 
(those who would always be treated, independently of the instrument) and
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compliers. Moreover, the group with Dz =  1 and Zz =  0 is composed only 
of always takers: the monotonicity Assumption 5.4, which rules out the 
presence of defiers, implies that the proportion of compliers given in Propo­
sition 8.1 can be obtained as a residual between these two proportions of the 
sample when D is binary.
The difference in Equation 8.1 is the denominator of the LATE-Wald es­
timator (right hand side of Equation 5.5, page 135), and it is equivalent to 
the coefficient of Z in a first-stage regression of D on a constant and Z.1
The unbiased estimator of the proportion of compliers given in Equa­
tion 8.1 can be calculated for different subsets of the population defined 
by exogenous characteristics: the rationale for this is that if the proportions 
vary significantly among groups, the status of compiler would be associated 
with the discriminating characteristic, weakening the case for extrapolation 
of results to the whole population. Section 8.3.2 carries out this analysis 
with samples defined by education level in Argentina.
8.2.3 Identification of outcomes for compliers
The analysis of proportions of compliers in different subpopulations is use­
ful as a check of homogeneity assumptions, but it does not provide a formal 
test to support claims about extrapolation. An auxiliary test can be derived 
from additional identification results for compliers.
As described in detail in Section 5.2 (page 126), causality and the LATE 
estimate are defined in terms of differences in potential outcomes of the 
form E[Yi — Yq]. However, the nature of compliers2 allows for more gen­
eral identification results: Abadie (2002, Lemma 2.1) shows that the whole 
marginal distribution of potential outcomes is identified for this group. In 
particular, the average potential outcomes are given by Equations 8.2 and
8.3 in the following Proposition:
1 Abadie (2003b, Lemma 2.1) provides an additional formal proof and extends this result 
to the case of covariates X.
2To ease the reading of the Equations in this Chapter, the superscritp "c" is used to 
indicate a variable for the groups of compliers only, and the conditioning of an expectation 
to this group: for instance, the outcome for compliers is written as:
Y c = Y\ Do =  0, Di =  1, and its expectation is given by:
EC[Y] =  E[YC} = E[Y\D0 =  0 ,D 1 =  1].
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Proposition 8.2 Potential outcomes for compliers (Abadie, 2002): If Assumptions 
5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 hold, then:
pryci =  E[Y(1-P)1Z = 1] —E[Y(1-P)1Z =  0]
1 oJ E[(l -  P ) |Z  =  1] -  E[(l -  P ) |Z  =  0] V ' ’
pryci =  E[YP|Z =  1] — E[YP|Z =  0]
1 lJ E[P|Z =  1] — E[P|Z =  0] ( ' ’
Proposition 8.2 allows the decomposition of the causal effect for compil­
ers, the LATE Ec[Yi — Yo], into its two components. By providing the base­
line upon which the causal effect operates, this result facilitates the study 
of heterogeneous effects in the population. An analysis of this type for Ar­
gentina is presented in Section 7.32?
Finally, the results from Propositions 8.1 and 8.2 allow the derivation of 
a new identification result, central to the discussion of the extrapolation of 
results for compliers.
The following proposition is the main result of the Chapter. It builds 
on Abadie's (2003b) proof that the expectation of functions of Y, D and Z 
are identified for compliers. Using this result and Equations 8.2 and 8.3, 
the Proposition shows that beyond the counterfactuals, the actual expected 
outcome is identified for compliers:
Proposition 8.3 Identification of average outcomes for compliers: if Assumptions
5.1,5.2,5.3 and 5.4 hold, then:
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The proof of Proposition 8.3 is based on the fact that the average outcome 
for compliers is a weighted sum of the potential outcomes for this group:
Proof. The expected outcome can be expressed as a weighted sum according to 
the values of the instrument Z: E[Y] =  E[Y|Z =  0] Pr(Z =  0) +  E[Y|Z =  
1] Pr(Z =  1). This is also true for compliers:
E[YC] = E[YC\Z =  0] Pr(Z =  0) +  E[YC|Z =  1] Pr(Z =  1) (8.5)
3The details for the computation of the parameters in Equations 8.2 and 8.3 and their 
standard errors are provided in Appendix E.
CHAPTER 8. POTENTIAL OUTCOMES A N D  EXTRAPOLATION 197
Since for compliers D =  Z, the independence of Z implies that:
(8.6)
A similar argument shows that:
E[YC\Z =  1] =  E[Yf|Z =  1] =  E[YJ] (8.7)
Replacing 8.6 and 8.7 into 8.5 gives:
E[YC] = E[Yf] Pr(Z =  1) +  E[Y§] Pr(Z =  0)
Using the identification results for Yq and Y\  for compliers (Equations 8.2 and 8.3, 
Proposition 8.2) in the previous Equation results in:
Since Z is a binary variable, Pr(Z =  0) =  E[ 1 — Z] =  1 — E[Z] and Pr(Z =  
1) =  E[Z]. Using this and the fact that E[Y(1 — D)] =  E[Y] — E[YD] and E[1 — 
D] =  1 — E[D], some manipulation of the previous Equation results in:
which is the result of the proposition. ■
An alternative and conceptually equivalent proof can be constructed us­
ing Theorem 3.1 in Abadie (2003b). This Theorem states that under the 
LATE identifying assumptions the expectation of any function g(Y,  D, X) 
is identified for compliers. Proposition 8.3 can be thought of as the case 
in which g(Y, D,  X) =  Y. The alternative proof uses this Theorem and the 
results from Proposition 8.2.
Intuitively, the proof states that the expected outcome is a weighted sum 
of the potential outcomes for compliers with different values of the instru­
ment, since this group is akin to a randomised experiment and thus there is 
no self-selection bias.
This Proposition can be used to assess the plausibility of the homogene­
ity of compliers with respect to the population. It is possible to verify if the 
average outcome for compliers differs from that of the overall population,
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with a test given by:
A = E [ Y ] - E [ Y C] (8.8)
The idea is that the extrapolation of LATE results from compliers to the 
overall population is less credible if A =  0 is rejected.4 In that case, com­
pliers would differ significantly from the overall sample in a crucial aspect, 
namely the expectation of the outcome variable.
Equation 8.8 is an auxiliary test for extrapolation, and it can be con­
ducted for different subgroups defined by observable characteristics. The 
following Section provides examples of this test for the model of labour sup­
ply in Argentina, and for the JTPA training programme mentioned above, 
since the two were identified as opposed cases with respect to the extrapo­
lation of results for compliers in the discussion of this Section.
8.3 P o t e n t ia l  O u t c o m e s  a n d  H e t e r o g e n e o u s  E ffec ts
8.3.1 Decomposition of LATE estimates by potential outcomes
The definition of a causal effect in Chapter 5 referred to the difference be­
tween observed and counterfactual outcomes. For instance, in the labour 
supply example, the causal effect of fertility is obtained by comparing the 
labour supply of women with three or more children with the labour sup­
ply of the same women if they had only two children. While IV coefficients 
like LATE concentrate on this difference, represented by parameters like #  
in Equation 5.7, the identification results in Proposition 8.2 show that, sub­
ject to Assumptions 5.1-5.4, it is possible to study the counterfactual lev­
els themselves. The study of causal effects can be complemented by the 
analysis of the full set of potential outcomes for compliers: the LATE and 
IV coefficients, which present the difference 4> = Ec[Yi — Yq], may be mask­
ing important differences in the levels of E[Y[] and E [ Y q] .  The results below 
concentrate on the levels of E[Yf\ and E[Yq], and constitute a complement of 
the IV estimates of the previous Chapter because they measure the baseline 
upon which the causal effect operates.
Table 8.1 presents the decomposition of the LATE coefficients in potential
4The details for the computation of the test in Equation 8.4 with regression software are 
provided in Appendix E.
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Table 8.1: Effect of "More than two children" on "Worked for pay": Ex­














O verall outcom es:
(l) Expected outcome 0.305 0.214 0.301 0.681
(2) Expected outcome with D=0 0.355 0.237 0.330 0.703
(3) Expected outcome with D=1 0.267 0.201 0.272 0.653
(4) OLS Estimate (3)-(2) -0.088 -0.035 -0.058 -0.050
P oten tia l outcom es fo r  com pilers:
(5) Y0: Potential outcome with D=0 0.350 0.245 0.340 0.780
Standard error (0.023) (0.025) (0.043) (0.064)
(6) Yj: Potential outcome with D=1 0.248 0.125 0.212 0.753
Standard error (0.025) (0.033) (0.041) (0.059)
(7) Wald-LATE estimate (6)-(5) -0.102 -0.120 -0.128 -0.026
Standard error (0.034)*** (0.042)*** (0.059)** (0.086)
O utcom es fo r  com pilers:
(8) Proportion in the sample 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.044
(9) Expected outcome 0.298 0.184 0.275 0.766
Standard error (0.017) (0.021) (0.030) (0.044)
(10) P-value of the test (1)=(9) 0.699 0.158 0.380 0.060
Observations 456,437 248,477 146,492 61,468
Note: All potential outcomes and OLS coefficients are different from zero at the 1% level. For the
Wald estimate, superscripts denote significance as in previous tables. The samples correspond to 
married women aged 21-35 with two or more children aged 18 or younger from the extended
questionnaire sample of the 1991 Census, as described in the text (AE sample, married').
outcomes for the same education groups as in Table 7.5 (page 187) for the 
AE sample, married (the results for other samples are quantitatively similar 
and qualitatively the same).
The first panel of the Table presents the unconditional expectation of the 
outcome variable, E[Y] (row 1), and its value conditional on the instrument 
Z, E[Y|D =  0] (row 2) and E[Y|D =  1] (row 3). The average in the Worked 
for pay indicator, 0.305, conceals important differences in the population. In 
the lowest educated group only a fraction 0.214 of the women work for pay, 
while in the middle education group this proportion is 0.301, just below the 
population average. For the relatively small group with some higher edu­
cation, however, the average of the Worked for pay indicator is much higher 
at 0.681.
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The Table also presents the expected outcomes conditional on D =  0 and 
D = 1 and the difference between the two, which is the simple OLS coef­
ficient of D when this variable is regressed on Y, as presented in Table 7.1 
(page 174) for all samples. As in that Table, the coefficients are all negative 
and strongly significant.
The second panel of the Table breaks down the LATE-Wald estimate 
Ec[Yi — Yo] (row 7) into its components E[Yq] (row 5) and E[Y£] (row 6), 
which are identified for compliers (Proposition 8.2). These potential out­
comes represent the counterfactual probabilities of employment under the 
two values of the treatment. The LATE coefficients, which represent the dif­
ference between E[Yq] and E[Yf], are relatively close in the 0.10-0.13 range 
(in absolute value) for the overall sample and the low and middle education 
groups.
The compliers in the middle education group exhibit a counterfactual 
probability of working of 0.34 if not having a third child, while their aver­
age labour supply would be only 0.212 if they did have a third child. While 
resulting in a similar difference in absolute terms, the potential outcomes 
for the low education compliers are 0.245 and 0.125, respectively, substan­
tially lower than those in the middle group. The 0.12-0.128 difference in 
potential outcomes given by the LATE estimates gives the impression of a 
relatively homogeneous impact of childbearing on labour supply in these 
two education groups: while this is true in absolute terms, the impact is 
much larger for the low education group when relative to the baseline po­
tential outcomes.
Finally, as with the expected outcome, the potential outcomes for the 
higher education group are much higher than for the population as a whole, 
but the Wald estimate is not significantly different from zero, which might 
indicate a lack of precision given the smaller sample size.
Since regression coefficients of binary indicators represent differences in 
the expectation of variables, evidence like that of Table 7.5 might overlook 
important disparities in their levels. The breakdown presented in Table 8.1 
is an important complement of the analysis of heterogeneity in the impact 
of childbearing on women's labour supply, and provides a clear picture of 
the differences between the three subgroups.
CHAPTER 8. POTENTIAL OUTCOMES A N D  EXTRAPOLATION 201
8.3.2 Are compliers different? Extrapolation and homogeneity assumptions
The division of the sample by education group can also be exploited to ad­
dress the issue of extrapolation of results for compliers by means of the ad­
ditional identification results discussed in Sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.3.
The bottom panel of Table 8.1 presents estimates of the proportion of 
compliers (row 8) for the different subpopulations (Proposition 8.1), which 
are given by the first-stage coefficients of Z when this variable is regressed 
on D. Compliers represent about 4 percent of the AE married sample, with 
about the same proportion in the low and middle education groups, and 4.4 
percent of the higher education group.
The Table shows that the proportion of compliers is uniform across sub­
populations with large differences in the outcome variable and other ob­
servable characteristics. Moreover, this also indicates that the first-stage ef­
fect of Same sex on More than two children is roughly constant in the popula­
tion (as discussed in Section 7.3.2, page 186), which supports the hypothesis 
that compliers are not substantially different from the rest of the popula­
tion in the "same sex" application to Argentina and suggests that the LATE 
results can be extrapolated.
Further evidence in this regard is provided by row 9 in the bottom panel 
of Table 8.1, which presents the computation of the expected outcome for 
compliers E[YC], and its standard error, as defined in Proposition 8.3. For 
the three groups, these expectations seem to be close to the average out­
comes for the respective complete populations. This is formally confirmed 
by the results in row 10, which presents the p-value of the test derived from 
Proposition 8.3 and given by Equation 8.8. The hypothesis of equality of 
mean outcomes between compliers and the overall population cannot be 
rejected at the standard levels of significance for the complete sample nor 
for any of the three groups.
The intuition of Section 8.2.1 is right: compliers are important in the 
"same sex" application because they are not substantially different from the 
rest, and thus the causal effects identified for this group may be considered 
as representative of the whole population.
For comparison purposes, the test in Equation 8.8 is also computed with 
participants in the JTPA programme, since the discussion in Section 8.2.1 hy-
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Table 8.2: Effect of Training on Earnings: Expected and Potential Outcomes, 
JTPA Participants
O utcom e variable: 





(l) Expected outcome 19,147 13,029
(2) Expected outcome with D=0 17,485 12,078
(3) Expected outcome with D=1 21,456 14,211
(4) OLS Estimate (3)-(2) 3,970 2,133
Potential outcomes for compliers:
(5) Y0: Potential outcome with D=0 19,830 12,311
Standard error 710 419
(6) Yj: Potential outcome with D=1 21,655 14,253
Standard error 624 385
(7) Wald-LATE estimate (6)-(5) 1,825 1,942
Standard error (945)* (569)***
Outcomes fo r compliers:
(8) Proportion in the sample 0.612 0.640
(9) Expected outcome 21,046 13,612
Standard error (479) (293)
(10) P-value of the test (1)=(9) 0.000 0.046
Observations 5,102 6,102
Note: All potential outcomes and OLS coefficients are different from zero at the 1%
level. For the Wald estimate, superscripts denote significance as in previous tables. The
treatment D is attending training sessions. The samples correspond to participants in the
JTPA training programme, as described in Abadie et al. (2002).
pothesised that compliers in that application were fundamentally different 
from other groups.
Table 8.2 presents the same set of statistics as in Table 8.1 for men and wo­
men participating in the JTPA experiment, using the data from Abadie et al. 
(2002). Based on a random selection procedure, two thirds of the partici­
pants in the programme were assigned to training courses, while a further 
third was not allowed to attend them. The treatment in this case is the train­
ing received, and a random, exogenous instrument is provided by the offer 
of training.5 Abadie et al. (2002) find that the programme had a positive and
5The instrumentation is needed because even in randomised experiments the identifi­
cation by simple differences in means only holds if all individuals assigned to treatment 
are indeed treated, and those in the control group are completely excluded -  that is, if
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significant causal effect on women's earnings, but only a marginally signif­
icant effect for men. These results correspond to the Wald-LATE estimates 
in Table 8.2 (row 7).
The decomposition of the LATE estimate Ec[Yi — Yo] in row 7 into its 
components E[Yq] and E[Y[], presented in the second panel of the Table 
(rows 5 and 6), shows that the similar causal effects for men and for women 
($1,825 and $1,942 respectively) operate on very different baselines, with 
potential outcomes substantially lower for women than for men.
Finally, as discussed in Section 8.2.1, compliers in this randomised ex­
periment can be expected to differ substantially from the overall popula­
tion. The evidence in Table 8.2 supports this hypothesis: for both men and 
women, compliers exhibit a significantly higher level of expected earnings 
than the overall population, as revealed by test of equality of E[Y] (row 1) 
and EC[Y] (row 9) given by Equation 8.8. The results in row 10 state that this 
hypothesis can be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for women 
and at the 1 percent level for men in the JTPA experiment.
The discussion of the results in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 illustrates the use of 
the additional identification results derived in Section 8.2. Besides the use­
ful information provided by the decomposition of causal effects into coun­
terfactual potential outcomes, the computation of the test in Equation 8.8 
for two different samples provides further support to the conjecture that 
"same sex" compliers are not significantly different from the overall popu­
lation. This is because the result of the test in Table 8.2 captures the intuition 
that compliers in JTPA programme are fundamentally different from other 
groups.
8.4  C o n c l u s io n
This Chapter studied the issue of heterogeneity in the effects of fertility on 
female labour supply, and presented additional identification results to test 
the generality of the benchmark results of Chapter 7.
The analysis of LATE estimates broken down by education groups re­
vealed the presence of some heterogeneity in the effect of childbearing on 
labour supply by education level. By studying the potential outcomes for
compliance with the experimental protocol is perfect.
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each subgroup, the negative causal effect of fertility on female labour sup­
ply was found to be stronger among the lowest educated group. Since these 
women had the lowest levels of labour force participation, the reduction 
in labour supply induced by an increase in fertility was found to be larger, 
in proportional terms, than for women in the middle education category. 
These results also confirmed the finding (presented in Chapter 7) that wo­
men in the higher education group were not significantly affected by fer­
tility in their labour supply decisions. The analysis in terms of potential 
outcomes, however, provided an explanation of this result: the labour force 
participation of women with some tertiary education was found to be very 
high regardless of the number of children, and thus the reduction in labour 
supply induced by a third child was not significant.
Finally, regarding the generality of the baseline findings of Chapter 7 in 
terms of the causal effect of fertility on female labour supply in Argentina, 
the evidence indicates that "same sex" compliers are not substantially dif­
ferent from the overall population in some key characteristics. This implies 
that the benchmark IV estimates of the previous Chapter can be generalised 
and extrapolated from the group of compliers to the whole population. It 
is then possible to say, with some confidence, that the significant negative 
effect of fertility on women's labour supply is not confined to a small sub­
group but that it is representative of the population average causal effect for 
women with two or more children.
C o n c l u s i o n s
The following pages review the main findings and contributions of the pre­
vious Chapters. The discussion focuses on the practical lessons on some 
key questions about the welfare evaluation of income dynamics in a time of 
crisis, and labour supply decisions and income prospects in Argentina. The 
two Sections below also draw attention to the policy implications that can 
be derived from the empirical results in Parts I and II of this thesis.
C o n c l u s io n  to  Part  I: P overty  a n d  In c o m e  Fl u c t u a t io n s
Methodological contributions: accounting for income fluctuations
The Chapters in Part I focused on poverty as a dynamic phenomenon. The 
motivation was the recurring economic crises that affect developing coun­
tries and the incidence of the resulting income fluctuations on household 
welfare. Indeed, a striking finding from Chapter 1 was that relatively m od­
est changes in poverty rates between two periods were the result of large 
but offsetting movements into and out of poverty in Argentina. Moreover, 
the results from Chapters 2 and 3 indicate that these large fluctuations of 
income over time have a significant negative effect on household welfare 
even during periods of aggregate growth.
The use of panels revealed some features of the data that could not 
have been captured with the cross-sectional datasets usually employed in 
poverty analysis. Chapters 1 to 4 went beyond the simple analysis of po­
verty transitions, and explored the theoretical basis for the incorporation of 
income fluctuations into the measurement of poverty and well-being over 
time.
Chapter 2 presented a general framework for the welfare evaluation of 
income dynamics, based on extensions of the existing methodology for sta­
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tic distributional analysis. An analogy with the concept of risk aversion pro­
vided a rationale for the incorporation of income fluctuations into the mea­
surement of household well-being. This welfare criterion was rationalised 
using intuition derived from the risk literature: households prefer a steady 
stream of income to a variable one with the same mean, at least in a second- 
best world with incomplete insurance and capital markets. The indicators 
derived from this evaluation framework accounted not only for the level of 
poverty, but also for the effects of income variability on welfare.
Moreover, existing alternative approaches for measuring well-being ba­
sed on panel data, such as the literatures on transient-chronic poverty and 
on vulnerability, were interpreted as special cases of this evaluation frame­
work. The following two Chapters presented variations of these special 
cases. Chapter 3 introduced a simple methodology to derive risk adjusted 
measures of income, and Chapter 4 analysed poverty over the same period 
based on a decomposition of a household's intertemporal poverty into its 
transient and chronic components. In both Chapters, regressions were used 
to identify a number of characteristics related to the income risk and the 
persistence of poverty faced by Argentine households.
These methodologies were illustrated with a panel dataset from the Gre­
ater Buenos Aires region for the 1995-2002 period, but the analysis carried 
out in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 can be applied to other contexts where panel 
data on household income or expenditure is available. The following pages 
deal with the main empirical findings and their policy implications for Ar­
gentina.
Empirical findings: fluctuations matter
The empirical findings of Chapters 1 to 4 imply that income fluctuations 
matter in at least four important dimensions.
The first dimension refers to the nature and extent of poverty analy­
sis. As mentioned above, Chapter 1, which documented different aspects 
of household welfare over the 1995-2002 period in Argentina, found that 
changes in poverty rates between two periods were the result of large off­
setting movements into and out of poverty. Moreover, these movements, 
which were not apparent in the simple analysis of changes in poverty rates 
between two periods, were not confined to economic crises: a substantial
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fraction of the population was found to enter poverty even when rates were 
falling on aggregate.
The high proportion of individuals who changed poverty status in a rel­
atively short period of time (about six months in the Argentine data), and 
the fact that these changes occurred in all stages of the business cycle, im­
ply that traditional poverty studies based on cross-sectional data might be 
missing some fundamental information.
The second dimension refers to the relative importance of income fluc­
tuations for household well-being. The framework developed in Chapter 2 
provided a rationale, based on an analogy with the concept of risk aversion, 
for imputing a negative impact of fluctuations on welfare. However, the 
magnitude of this effect is an empirical question.
The evidence for Argentina in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that in­
come fluctuations substantially reduced household welfare under relatively 
mild assumptions. There is, however, a trade-off: when income observa­
tions over time are aggregated at the household level, welfare measures 
increase and poverty evaluations decrease when compared to indices ba­
sed on punctual observations. This is because the averaging mitigates the 
impact of negative shocks. This smoothing effect, however, was more than 
offset once the disutility from income fluctuations was taken into account, 
assuming only moderate levels of risk aversion in line with most estimates 
of the uncertainty literature.
Most importantly, the sizeable effects of fluctuations on welfare and po­
verty were not limited to periods of crisis or downturns. The findings from 
Chapter 2 and 3 indicate that income fluctuations at the household level 
have substantial effects on well-being even during periods of aggregate 
growth, for instance during the 1996-1998 period in Argentina (see Figures 
1.2 and 1.3, pages 21 and 30 respectively). This result reflects the finding 
that a substantial fraction of the population entered poverty even when ag­
gregate rates were falling.
The third dimension refers to the effects of an economic crisis from a 
dynamic perspective. The empirical results in Part I indicate that major ma­
croeconomic shocks, like the 2001-2002 crisis in Argentina, not only reduce 
income levels, but also increase income risk, which magnifies their over­
all negative impact on poverty and well-being. Moreover, the decomposi­
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tion of a household's intertemporal poverty into its transient and chronic 
components, presented in Chapter 4, found that the chronic component ac­
counted for most of the large increase in poverty over the period. While 
income levels fell and their variability increased, the deterioration in living 
standards had a larger effect than the rise in fluctuations during this turbu­
lent period.
This evidence on the increase of chronic poverty is compatible with the 
results on short-term dynamics presented in Chapter 1: over the 1995-2002 
period, the fraction of the poor population staying in poverty increased al­
most constantly, while the proportion of those escaping poverty between 
two periods fell significantly.
Finally, the fourth dimension refers to the heterogeneity of the effects of 
income fluctuations on household welfare. The increase in chronic and tran­
sient poverty and the fall in risk adjusted income was not constant among 
households: the regression analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 identified some 
of the characteristics associated with income risk and poverty variability in 
Argentina.
The first result that stands out from both Chapters is that the education 
levels of the head of household and of the spouse were systematically cor­
related to lower levels of income risk, and of transient and chronic poverty. 
Households with better-educated members were found to have higher in­
comes and to face lower income risk, and all education and qualification 
indicators were associated with lower measures of intertemporal poverty 
(with no education and no qualification as the excluded category).
The larger effects in the income and poverty regressions, however, were 
related to labour market variables. Households with inactive or unem ­
ployed members bore a larger share of income risk than any other group. 
The indicators for relatively stable sources of income, such as pensions and 
public sector jobs, had a negative impact on transient poverty, whereas the 
opposite was true for variables reflecting more precarious jobs: the infor­
mality indicators contributed to higher levels of risk and poverty, and being 
self-employed was found to have a positive effect on transient poverty. Fi­
nally, the demographic variables indicated that households with children 
were more prone to suffer from income risk, and experienced higher lev­
els of intertemporal, chronic and transient poverty. The following Section
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derives some policy lessons from these results.
Policy implications: safety nets for rainy (and sunny) days
These household characteristics allow us to derive some recommendations 
for public interventions in times of crisis. In broad terms, however, these 
results confirm the policy consensus in Latin America on the importance 
of labour market outcomes and family composition as strong predictors of 
poverty (de Ferranti et al., 2000a). This consensus was reflected in the two 
major public intervention programmes in Argentina, reviewed in Chapter 
1: the Plan Trabajar, introduced in the wake of high unemployment levels 
after the Mexican financial crisis of 1995, and the Plan Jefes y  Jefas de Hogar 
Desempleados, implemented during the crisis of 2001-2002.
The designs of both programmes took into account, implicitly or explic­
itly, the household characteristics identified in the previous Section. Trabajar 
provided short-term jobs at low wages, usually related to public works in 
poor areas (Ravallion and Jalan, 2003). For practical purposes, Trabajar oper­
ated as a poverty alleviation programme targeted through unemployment 
(de Ferranti et al., 2000b), and thus recognised labour market outcomes as 
proxies of poverty. In the Plan Jefes y  Jefas, unemployed heads of house­
holds with dependent children received direct income support (Galasso and 
Ravallion, 2003). The programme design took into account the importance 
of labour market outcomes and also the demographic composition of the 
household as proxies for vulnerability.
At first glance, then, these results on the household characteristics asso­
ciated with higher levels of income risk and poverty variability do not seem 
particularly original. The main point, however, is that the regression analy­
ses in Chapters 3 and 4 included years of crisis but also periods of recovery. 
Labour market outcomes, education levels and family structure were cor­
related with the substantial income fluctuations observed during the whole 
1995-2002 period in Argentina.
While the importance of dealing with the effects of aggregate shocks 
has long been recognised, the main conclusion from Chapters 1-4 is that 
safety nets and other social protection mechanisms, while vital during ma­
jor crises, should also be implemented on a continuous basis, irrespective of 
the short term evolution of macroeconomic aggregates.
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This conclusion is based on the empirical findings of Part I on the inci­
dence of income fluctuations on household welfare. While the results in­
dicate that major macroeconomic shocks substantially reduce income levels 
and increase income risk, the detrimental effect of income fluctuations at the 
household level was also found to be significant during periods of stability 
or recovery. Moreover, irrespective of changes in GDP, during the whole 
1995-2002 period in Argentina a substantial proportion of the population 
entered poverty between two periods of time, even when poverty rates were 
falling, and a significant proportion of observed poverty was attributed to 
its transient component.
This conclusion is reinforced by recent figures that have uncovered some 
hysteresis of poverty in Argentina: the strong recovery in GDP growth ob­
served in 2003 (see Figure 1.2, page 21) has reduced unemployment levels, 
but poverty rates are not falling as fast (INDEC, 2004). The implication for 
future interventions is that it is as important to insure households against 
income risk and to avoid entry into poverty on a continual basis as it is to 
provide coping mechanisms during future crises.
Given the importance of labour market outcomes for poverty dynam­
ics and income risk, the design of a permanent social protection scheme in 
Argentina could draw on relatively successful welfare systems that m an­
age to balance work incentives with income support in developed coun­
tries (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1999b, review the recent experience for the 
United Kingdom). However, the peculiarities of labour markets in devel­
oping countries introduce further complications. For instance, the existing 
unemployment insurance programme in Argentina only covers a fraction 
of the population in formal employment, the least vulnerable group: ben­
eficiaries tend to be more numerous among middle and upper-middle in­
come groups, as in most Latin American countries with programmes of this 
type (de Ferranti et al., 2000b). The challenge resides in designing unem­
ployment insurance and other permanent social protection policies within 
economies with high levels of informality in the labour market. In the fol­
lowing pages, the Conclusion of Part II discusses the impact of fertility on 
female labour supply, and draws attention to the importance of childcare 
and early schooling programmes for the income prospects of poorer house­
holds.
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Beyond the need for short term emergency interventions in times of cri­
sis and for long term insurance mechanisms, the evidence in Chapters 3 
and 4 confirms the importance of education and qualifications for poverty 
alleviation in the long run. Moreover, the results of this thesis suggest that 
human capital investments pay off in terms of increased returns but also in 
lower levels of risk. In this area, public interventions are also concentrated 
on periods of crises: for instance, the Plan Jefes y  Jefas introduced some con­
ditionality on school attendance for the children of beneficiaries. While pri­
mary school enrolment rates are relatively high in Argentina (see Table 6.3, 
page 164), the much needed long term initiatives on education (for instance, 
in terms of incentives for completion of secondary schooling) are scattered 
among different levels of government.
Finally, the results in Part I indicate that the design of long term policies 
for social protection must draw both on traditional static poverty profiles 
and on studies of income dynamics. Panel datasets, though not without 
their problems, provide vital information about the underlying movements 
that result in aggregate poverty changes, and thus their collection should be 
given a higher priority within statistical agencies in developing countries.
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C o n c l u s io n  t o  Pa r t  II: F er t il it y  a n d  W o m e n 's L a b o u r  Su p p l y
Methodological contributions: female labour supply, fertility and endogeneity in 
developing countries
The Chapters in Part II discussed the determinants of the income genera­
ting process at the household level in Argentina, focusing on the potential 
causal effect of fertility on female labour supply. This research was moti­
vated by two main factors. The first consisted of the results of Part I on the 
correlations between poverty and fertility, on the one hand, and poverty and 
labour market indicators, on the other. The second factor was the significant 
fall of total fertility rates and the rise in female labour force participation in 
Argentina in the last twenty years, discussed in Chapter 5.
While the negative correlation between childbearing and labour force 
participation is an almost universal phenomenon, its interpretation in terms 
of causality is often marred by self-selection, endogeneity and simultaneity 
issues. The main results of Part II (presented in Chapter 7) were significant 
because they established the causal nature of this correlation in Argentina.
The methodological contributions of the Chapters in Part II were all re­
lated to the endogeneity problems that arise in models of fertility and female 
labour supply, and on how to deal with them with the "same sex" identifica­
tion strategy in the context of developing countries. This strategy is based 
on the observation that parents of two children of the same sex exhibit a 
higher propensity to have another child to obtain a gender-balanced sibling 
composition. Under certain conditions, analysed in Chapters 5, the sex mix 
of children can thus be used as an instrument for further childbearing.
Chapter 6 provided a detailed discussion of the identification strategy 
and its application to developing countries, where female participation is 
lower and fertility is higher than in the developed economies. The Chapter 
presented evidence on the effects of parental sex preferences on fertility, the 
first of its type for Argentina,1 and on the exogeneity of this relationship 
with respect to labour supply. Moreover, it presented a study of parental 
demographic and expenditure data, which failed to reveal any significant 
bias against girls in Argentine households. Based on these results, Chap­
1 Personal communication, Georgina Binstock and Alejandra Pantelides, Centro de Es- 
tudios de Poblacion (CENEP), Buenos Aires, Argentina.
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ter 7 presented the main instrumental variable estimates of the causal effect 
of fertility on female labour supply. Finally, Chapter 8 made two method­
ological contributions. On the one hand, it presented a test for the gener­
ality of instrumental variable estimates, establishing the conditions under 
which these estimates can be considered representative of the population 
under study. On the other hand, it presented an original decomposition of 
IV coefficients, which was applied to the study of the effects of fertility by 
education level in Argentina.
Empirical findings: childbearing matters
The main conclusion from Part II, presented in Chapter 7, is that in Ar­
gentina children significantly reduce the labour supply of their mothers. 
Using the estimated coefficients, the fall in fertility between 1980 and 2000 
accounted for almost a third of the large increase in female labour force par­
ticipation during the same period.
This finding was further qualified by the analysis conducted in Chap­
ter 8, which divided mothers into three groups according to their education 
levels -  those with some primary, some secondary or some higher educa­
tion.
The participation rate among women in the higher education group was 
just below 70 percent, higher than the overall averages in developed coun­
tries with high female participation like the United Kingdom and the United 
States (ILO, 2003). For this group of women, the reduction in labour supply 
induced by childbearing was small and not significantly different from zero. 
Moreover, women in this group were found to have a much higher propen­
sity towards employing live-in domestic help, which was interpreted as a 
proxy for childcare services consumption.
Meanwhile, the causal effect of childbearing was found to be stronger 
among women with lower education levels than in any of the other two 
groups. Women in poorer households (as proxied by the education level) 
experienced a large and significant reduction in labour supply: a third child 
implied a reduction of about 12 percentage points in participation. The 
analysis in Chapter 8 added a new dimension to this finding: it revealed 
that this effect operated at already low levels of participation. Those 12 per­
centage points represented a counterfactual reduction in participation from
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24.5 to 12.5 percent, both lower than the average of 30.5 percent for women 
in the three groups.
These results provide a rationale for the correlations between household 
size and poverty, and poverty and labour market outcomes. The sizeable 
causal effect of children on labour supply and the fact that it was stronger for 
women with lower education levels support the hypothesis that childbear­
ing hampers crucial income-generating opportunities, which contributes to 
poverty at the household level. This conclusion is backed by alternative 
data sources: for instance, the May 1991 EPH indicates that 39.9 percent of 
households with women aged 21-35 with two or more children were poor, 
compared to 31.1 percent for the whole population.2 Imputing the average 
income of poor women who worked for pay to poor women who did not 
work for pay reduces the incidence of poverty to 23 percent, a decrease in 
the rate of more than 40 percent. While this is an upper bound of the ef­
fect of fertility on poverty, it highlights the importance of women's labour 
force participation for the welfare of the household: even if the majority of 
these women were second earners, their income would still be decisive in a 
society where one average full-time salary does not always cover the basic 
needs of a typical family. These back of the envelope calculations are con­
sistent with other sources. For instance, Gasparini and Marchionni (2003) 
perform microsimulation exercises and find that the reduction of family size 
among poorer households in the Greater Buenos Aires area in the 1990s re­
duced poverty, a factor mainly driven by the "weakening of the relationship 
between the hours of work and the number of children in the case of female 
spouses."
Policy implications: childcare provision and social protection
The policy implications of this analysis are far-reaching. The robust causal 
link between fertility and female labour supply in Argentina rules out other 
explanations of the observed correlation. Most notably, the issue of self­
selection, often invoked to prove the futility of policy interventions in this
2This dataset contains women aged 21-35 with two or more children, as described in 
Appendix D (footnote 2, page 238). The poverty figures, based on equivalised household 
income, were constructed with the Greater Buenos Aires poverty line, since official national 
poverty lines are not available for 1991. See the discussion in Section 1.2 (page 22).
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area, can be discarded. In this context, self-selection implies that women 
with low expected labour market outcomes choose to specialise in house­
work and childbearing. If the observed correlation is due to self-selection, 
policies promoting work would fail because of the nature of the target group. 
The results of Part II, however, established that this is not the case in Ar­
gentina: the analysis of counterfactuals implies that a significant fraction 
of non-working mothers would work with lower fertility -  or with better 
ways to accommodate childbearing and work. Since fertility levels are rela­
tively low and falling, and family planning is freely available and well de­
veloped in Argentina, policy should concentrate on accommodating child­
bearing and work.
There is thus scope for policy interventions to promote work among wo­
men with children, especially considering the evidence on a stronger effect 
of fertility on the female labour supply of poorer women. In broad terms, 
the policy objective is to reduce the size of the coefficient linking fertility 
and female labour supply.
Recent policy developments in some industrialised countries, such as 
the working and family tax credits in the United States and the United King­
dom, focus specifically on improving work incentives for women and fam­
ilies with children. Initiatives such as the New Deal for Lone Parents have 
shown significant effects on employment levels among women in the UK 
(Dickens et al., 2004). While the scope for applying policies of this type is 
limited in countries lacking a comprehensive welfare system like Argentina, 
there still exist ways to ease the labour market participation of disadvan­
taged groups.
One option for reducing the negative link between fertility and female 
labour supply, especially for poorer women, is to provide free or low-cost 
childcare. In Argentina, the State only offers preschool facilities for children 
aged three to five, with no free childcare and no subsidies for newborns 
and children aged one or two (Cortes, 2003). The evidence presented in 
Part II suggests that a better supply of nurseries and day-care centres would 
improve the situation of the poorer sector of the population by easing the 
transition towards work.
The analysis presented in Chapters 5-8 also has important implications 
for market-oriented reforms in developing countries. Labour market re­
CONCLUSIONS 216
form in Latin America has been associated with the reduction of job secu­
rity and of other forms of labour protection (Heckman and Pages, 2003), 
without substantial improvements so far: one of the main conclusions of an 
IADB (2004) report on the region is that "structural reforms did not produce 
the changes that were expected in labour markets." The wave of reforms of 
the 1990s concentrated on market deregulation, but neglected other aspects 
of labour market flexibility. For instance, the evidence presented in Part II 
suggests that poorer households could benefit from measures that increase 
the opportunities for part-time work, which is relatively infrequent in Ar­
gentina, and from the promotion of flexible work arrangements for parents.
Nevertheless, these policies are second order considerations with respect 
to macroeconomic stability and growth: an increase in labour supply might 
not be met by a labour demand in a context of high unemployment, as ob­
served in Argentina over the 1999-2002 period.
Appendices and Bibliography
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A p p e n d i x  A  
A b b r e v i a t i o n s  a n d  N o t a t i o n
Table A.l: List of Abbreviations
INDEC: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, Argentina.
GBA: Greater Buenos Aires region.
US: United States.
EPH: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares.
ENGH: Encuesta Nacional de Gasto de los Hogares.
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.
2SLS: Two-stage least squares.
IV: Instrumental Variables.
LATE: Local Average Treatment Effect (Proposition 5.1, page 135).
SUR: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (Equation 3.8, page 88).
FGT: Foster et a l/s  (1984) class of poverty measures (Equation 1.6, 
page 35).
CPI: Consumer Price Index.
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Table A.2: Main Variables: Definitions and Usual Notation, Part I
ya Total equivalised household's i income, normalised by the
contemporaneous poverty line (Equation 1.3, page 27).
(\ij Coefficient of equivalent adult for member ; in household i
(Table 1.3, page 26).
X/ Household i's characteristics.
Zf, z\ Poverty line and extreme ("indigent") poverty line at time t.
yi Vector of observed incomes over time [y,i,..., y^] for i.
\}i, (J[ Average and standard deviation of income yn over the period
T  Total number of periods over which a household is observed
(f =  1/ •••/ T).
P(y , z) Poverty measure as a function of income y  and poverty line z.
u, U Household's ex-post and expected utility function defined
over an income aggregate. 
v, V  Evaluation functions defined over an income aggregate,
p Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk (or variability) aversion.
yse Stability equivalent income, defined by the evaluation func­
tion V  and derived from observed incomes [yzi , ..., y/j]. 
n V/ T7 Variability and proportional variability premia for i, defined
by Equations 2.8 and 2.9 respectively (page 61).
Note: A simple variable (y) designates a fixed quantity, a variable with
a hat (y) indicates an ex-ante prospect (a random variable), and a 
variable with a wiggle (y) denotes a (fixed) counterfactual quantity. 
Finally, a bar as (y) indicates the average of the underlying variable. 
When not required, the subscripts i and t are dropped for ease of 
exposition.
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Table A.3: Usual notation, Part II
Y: Outcome variable: labour supply.
X: Set of individual characteristics.
D: Endogenous treatment variable.
Z: Instrument for the endogenous treatment variable D.
Y0,Yi: Yz represents the potential treatment status given Z = z: Yz =
Y0 if Z =  0 and Yz = Y1 if Z =  1.
Do, Di: Dz represents the potential treatment status given Z =  z:
Dz =  Do if Z =  0 and Dz = Di if Z =  1.
Note: To ease the reading of the Equations in this Part, the superscritp "c"
is used to indicate a variable for the groups of compliers only, and
the conditioning of an expectation to this group: for instance, the
outcome for compliers is written as Y c = Y\Dq — 0, D\  = 1
and its expectation as EC[Y] = E[YC] =  E[Y|Dq =  0, Di =  1].
A p p e n d i x  B
A r g e n t i n a ' s  S t a t i s t i c a l  R e g i o n s  a n d  
U r b a n  A r e a s
B .l  R e g io n s  a n d  U r b a n  A r e a s
The map in this Appendix (Figure B.l) depicts the 23 provinces and one 
autonomous city (Buenos Aires) of Argentina and their division into six sta­
tistical regions as defined by INDEC (1996). Each of these regions contains 
the following urban areas:
Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) region: Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Partidos 
del Conurbano.
Noroeste region: San Salvador de Jujuy-Palpala, Gran Catamarca, Santi­
ago del Estero-La Banda, La Rioja, Salta, Gran Tucuman.
Noreste region: Formosa, Gran Resistencia, Corrientes, Concordia, 
Posadas, Gran Parana.
Pampeana region: Gran Cordoba, Gran La Plata, Mar del Plata, Rio 
Cuarto, Bahia Blanca-Cerri, Gran Rosario, Gran Santa Fe, Santa Rosa-Toay.
Cuyo region: Gran Mendoza, San Luis, Gran San Juan.
Patagonia region: Rio Gallegos, Ushuaia, Comodoro Rivadavia, 
Neuquen-Plottier.
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Table B.l: Poverty, Income and Labour Market Indicators by Region, Ar­
gentina, October 1998
P o p u la tion  
C overed  by  
E P H

















GBA 12,225,209 25.9% 6.9% 1,124 59.9% 13.4% 34.4% 24.4% 1.4%
NOROESTE 2,109,612 42.4% 11.9% 825 52.9% 12.3% 41.9% 29.6% 3.3%
NORESTE 1,140,157 50.3% 17.6% 725 51.7% 9.2% 42.3% 28.1% 3.7%
CUYO 1,445,808 32.7% 7.7% 852 52.2% 6.1% 42.8% 29.6% 2.3%
PAMPEANA 5,255,024 29.3% 8.5% 843 54.0% 12.7% 37.9% 24.0% 2.1%
PATAGONIA 591,652 22.4% 8.0% 1,270 60.1% 10.6% 32.6% 24.7% 2.2%
Total 22,767,462 29.9% 8.4% 998 57.1% 12.5% 36.5% 25.2% 1.9%
Source: Author's estimations based on EPH household survey data (INDEC). Household income is in current pesos. Active labour 
market status is defined as being 15 years or older, employed or actively looking for a job. The unemployment, informality and no 
job qualification indicators refer to active individuals. The illiteracy rate refers to individuals aged 25 and older.
B .2  R e g io n a l  H e t e r o g e n e it y
INDEC (1996) describes the sampling frame for the EPH, and divides the 28 
urban areas covered by the survey in the six regions depicted in Figure B.l. 
These six regions are highly heterogeneous from a socioeconomic perspec­
tive, as illustrated by indicators presented in Table B.l.
The Greater Buenos Aires is by far the largest, with more than 53 percent 
of the population covered by EPH. The following in size is the Pampeana 
region: its urban areas covered by EPH contain more than 5.2 million inhab­
itants. The Noroeste, Cuyo and Noreste regions cover between 1.1 and 2.1 
millions each. Finally, the four urban areas of the Patagonia region included 
in the EPH sampling frame cover less than 600,000 inhabitants.
Most of the regional heterogeneity is captured by the differences in po­
verty rates. While almost 29.9 percent of the population in all urban areas 
covered by EPH in October 1998 lived below the poverty line, the rate was 
much higher in the northern regions (50.3 percent for the Noreste and 42.4 
for the Noroeste), around the average in the Cuyo and Pampeana regions 
(32.7 and 29.3 percent, respectively), and below the national figure in the 
GBA (25.9 percent) and Patagonia regions (22.4 percent). The ranking in 
terms of extreme poverty (third column) is similar, and both partially reflect 
the large regional variation in average total household income (fourth col­
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umn), from 725 pesos in the Noreste region up to 1,270 pesos in Patagonia.
In terms of labour market indicators, the three richer regions (GBA, Pa­
tagonia and Pampeana) have higher rates of activity and lower rates of in­
formality,1 but also the highest rates of unemployment. Of the three poorest 
regions (Noroeste, Noreste and Cuyo, only the Noroeste has unemployment 
levels similar to the national average of October 1998. In terms of qualifica­
tions, the three poorest regions have the higher levels of active workers with 
no job qualifications, at 28.1-29.6 percent of the working populations, com­
pared to around 24-24.7 percent for the three regions with higher income. 
Finally, illiteracy is lower in the GBA region (1.4 percent of those aged 25 
or older), with much higher levels in the Noroeste and Noreste regions (3.3 
and 3.7 percent respectively).
For further references, SIEMPRO (2003) presents a broader set of indica­
tors of human development, covering demographics, health and education, 
by region, province and urban areas. INDEC (2003a) also covers some of 
these aspects, and contains a thorough analysis of the different sectors of 
the economy in every province.
1See the discussion of informality in footnote 5, page 95.
A p p e n d i x  C
D e t a i l e d  P o v e r t y  F i g u r e s , A r g e n t i n a
1995-2002
Tables C .l and C.2 present detailed prices, poverty lines and poverty mea­
sures as described in Chapter 1. The price index and the official poverty 
lines are based on INDEC (2002; 2003a).
Tables C.3-C.6 present some characteristics of the population broken do­
wn for the non-poor, the moderately poor and the extremely poor for four 
of the fifteen periods under study. These descriptive statistics are for illus­
tration only -  for detailed poverty profiles, see Cruces and Wodon (2003a) 
and World Bank (2000a; 2001; 2003). The Tables correspond to the follow­
ing four waves: October 1995 (corresponding to a recession period), October 
1998 (peak of the recovery), October 2001 (after three years of recession), and 
May 2002 (a few months after the crisis of 2001-2002). The characteristics of 
the households presented in these tables include (a) household level vari­
ables, including the number of babies, children, adults, and elderly house­
hold members, and their square; whether the household head has a spouse; 
whether the household head is a woman; indicators for the age and the mi­
gration status of the head (in the last five years); (b) characteristics of the 
household head, including h is/her level of education; whether he /she  is 
unemployed or inactive; whether he /she  is an employer, a self-employed 
worker, or a wage worker; the type of h is/her qualification, and whether 
he/she works in the public/is an informal worker; and (c) the same set of 
characteristics for the spouse of the household head, when there is one. Ge­
ographic indicators for five of the six regions are reported, with the GBA 
area as reference category.
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Table C.l: Detailed Prices, Poverty Lines and Income Figures, Urban Argentina, 1995-2002
C onsum er Price Index M ay 95 Oct. 95 M ay 96 O c t  96 M ay 97 O c t  97 M ay 98 O c t  98 M ay 99 Oct. 99 M ay 00 O c t  00 M ay 01 O c t  01 M ay 02
Base 9/2001=100 101.9 102.0 101.7 102.2 102.3 102.8 103.5 104.0 102.8 101.9 101.7 101.1 101.4 100.0 120.1
Inflation - 0.14% -0.35% 0.56% 0.09% 0.48% 0.68% 0.42% -1.15% -0.89% -0.19% -0.51% 0.28% -1.41% 20.05%
Implicit poverty line deflactor, GBA - 1.96% 0.08% 0.96% -0.45% 1.30% 1.36% 0.89% -3.00% -0.89% -1.32% -1.19% 2.12% -2.72% 29.09%
D escription CPI provided by INDEC (2003). Values in real terms throughout the paper are based on Sept. 2001 prices. The implicit poverty line deflactor is obtained from
N om inal Poverty line M ay 95 O c t  95 M ay 96 O c t  96 M ay 97 Oct. 97 M ay 98 O c t  98 M ay 99 O c t  99 M ay 00 O c t  00 M ay 01 O ct. 01 M ay 02
GBA 151.7 154.7 154.8 156.3 155.6 157.6 159.8 161.2 156.4 155.0 152.9 151.1 154.3 150.1 193.8
NOROESTE 131.4 133.9 134.0 135.3 134.7 136.5 138.3 139.5 135.3 134.1 132.4 130.8 133.6 130.0 167.6
NORESTE 134.6 137.3 137.4 138.7 138.1 139.9 141.8 143.0 138.7 137.5 135.7 134.1 136.9 133.2 171.8
CUYO 132.6 135.2 135.3 136.6 136.0 137.8 139.6 140.9 136.6 135.4 133.6 132.1 134.9 130.8 168.7
PAMPEANA 137.1 139.8 139.9 141.3 140.6 142.4 144.4 145.7 141.3 140.0 138.2 136.5 139.4 135.9 175.2
PATAGONIA 144.5 147.3 147.4 148.9 148.2 150.1 152.1 153.5 148.9 147.6 145.6 143.9 146.9 142.7 183.6
GBA-Real 148.9 151.6 152.3 152.9 152.1 153.3 154.3 155.0 152.1 152.1 150.4 149.4 152.1 150.1 161.4
D escription Poverty lines in nominal terms (italics indicate official values). Note: GBA values only are official (INDEC, 2002) for the whole period.
Regional values are INDEC's for 2001 and 2002, and constructed for 1995-2000 applying the GBA poverty lines rate o f  change to regional May 2001 values. See
Extrene Poverty L ine M ay 95 O c t  95 M ay 96 O c t  96 M ay 97 O c t  97 M ay 98 O c t  98 M ay 99 O ct. 99 M ay 00 O ct. 00 M ay 01 O ct. 01 M ay 02
GBA 64.8 66.1 65.9 67.4 65.4 67.4 68.3 69.8 66.0 64.6 62.9 62.4 63.2 61.0 81.8
NOROESTE 57.1 58.3 58.1 59.4 57.6 59.4 60.2 61.5 58.1 56.9 55.5 55.0 55.7 53.7 72.0
NORESTE 58.3 59.5 59.3 60.6 58.8 60.6 61.4 62.8 59.4 58.1 56.6 56.2 56.9 54.8 73.4
CUYO 58.3 59.4 59.2 60.6 58.8 60.6 61.4 62.7 59.3 58.1 56.6 56.1 56.9 54.5 73.0
PAMPEANA 60.7 61.9 61.7 63.1 61.2 63.1 64.0 65.4 61.8 60.5 59.0 58.5 59.2 57.6 77.2
PATAGONIA 67.1 68.4 68.2 69.8 67.7 69.7 70.7 72.2 68.3 66.8 65.1 64.6 65.5 63.2 84.6
D escription Indigence or extreme poverty line, nominal terms. See text for details.
Note: GBA values only are official (INDEC's) for the whole period. Regional values are INDEC's for 2001 and 2002, and constructed for 1995-2000.
Equivalised income M ay 95 O c t  95 M ay 96 O c t  96 M ay 97 Oct. 97 M ay 98 O ct. 98 M ay 99 Oct. 99 M ay 00 O c t  00 M ay 01 O ct. 01 M ay 02
GBA 401.1 406.1 388.7 393.1 406.5 419.3 448.0 444.9 424.7 413.8 395.0 404.3 387.0 369.2 329.5
NOROESTE 236.9 236.8 223.5 215.5 242.6 237.7 256.6 257.9 239.3 239.5 229.5 227.8 223.2 214.3 194.0
NORESTE 227.2 225.0 221.5 211.2 220.1 226.2 238.4 230.3 230.1 212.9 200.1 201.1 200.8 185.8 167.9
CUYO 291.2 256.3 279.4 268.6 266.9 302.1 295.0 285.6 286.5 284.9 260.2 272.4 255.1 246.5 229.4
PAMPEANA 296.3 304.7 300.0 274.1 304.8 310.3 318.8 321.0 318.7 307.7 303.0 305.2 290.7 269.1 244.1
PATAGONIA 468.4 411.7 410.6 403.0 407.8 420.8 441.3 422.5 411.6 398.6 400.0 394.7 400.4 381.9 373.2
Total 354.6 346.6 336.7 336.4 349.0 358.9 378.5 375.6 361.8 351.6 337.3 343.2 329.4 311.6 280.7
D escription Equivalised household income in nominal terms. Adult equivalence scale used by INDEC - see Moreles (1988).










Table C.2: Detailed Poverty Figures, Urban Argentina, 1995-2002
Indigent individuals headcount M ay 95 Oct. 95 M ay 96 Oct. 96 M ay 97 O c t  97 M ay 98 O c t  98 M ay 99 O c t  99 M ay 00 O ct. 00 M ay 01 O c t  01 M ay 02
GBA 0.0567 0.0629 0.0694 0.0760 0.0569 0.0644 0.0534 0.0687 0.0759 0.0674 0.0755 0.0765 0.1032 0.1218 0.2267
NOROESTE 0.0875 0.1120 0.1160 0.1313 0.1096 0.1187 0.1181 0.1186 0.1298 0.1107 0.1252 0.1331 0.1454 0.1615 0.2947
NORESTE 0.1343 0.1261 0.1480 0.1717 0.1479 0.1494 0.1499 0.1761 0.1769 0.1776 0.1848 0.1968 0.2302 0.2693 0.3876
CUYO 0.0558 0.0858 0.0783 0.0883 0.0922 0.0878 0.0701 0.0765 0.0795 0.0739 0.0843 0.1063 0.1102 0.1231 0.2471
PAMPEANA 0.0905 0.0746 0.0856 0.1073 0.0751 0.0793 0.0768 0.0851 0.0800 0.0838 0.0881 0.0902 0.1132 0.1367 0.2510
PATAGONIA 0.0310 0.0721 0.0699 0.0756 0.0602 0.0621 0.0654 0.0799 0.0690 0.0779 0.0757 0.0714 0.0692 0.0734 0.1534
Total 0.0676 0.0755 0.0823 0.0931 0.0732 0.0790 0.0715 0.0838 0.0877 0.0822 0.0899 0.0938 0.1163 0.1363 0.2477
D escription Headcount o f  indigent (extremely poor) individuals.
Poor individuals headcount M ay 95 Oct. 95 M ay 96 O c t  96 M ay 97 Oct. 97 M ay 98 O c t  98 M ay 99 Oct. 99 M ay 00 O c t  00 M ay 01 O c t  01 M ay 02
GBA 0.2217 0.2476 0.2668 0.2795 0.2629 0.2595 0.2427 0.2588 0.2711 0.2673 0.2973 0.2889 0.3267 0.3542 0.4965
NOROESTE 0.3783 0.4149 0.4419 0.4446 0.4066 0.4204 0.4023 0.4238 0.4558 0.4137 0.4455 0.4365 0.4742 0.4831 0.6355
NORESTE 0.4440 0.4531 0.4623 0.4889 0.4878 0.4837 0.4861 0.5026 0.5010 0.5061 0.5301 0.5314 0.5644 0.5730 0.6981
CUYO 0.2924 0.3599 0.3126 0.3496 0.3647 0.3204 0.3291 0.3274 0.3380 0.3342 0.3663 0.3917 0.3875 0.3966 0.5492
PAMPEANA 0.2848 0.2715 0.2916 0.3271 0.2921 0.2840 0.2863 0.2927 0.2936 0.2927 0.3092 0.3040 0.3387 0.3712 0.5271
PATAGONIA 0.1297 0.2203 0.2079 0.2269 0.2198 0.2183 0.2103 0.2242 0.2215 0.2476 0.2314 0.2417 0.2380 0.2325 0.3917
Total 0.2577 0.2870 0.3011 0.3200 0.3003 0.2954 0.2856 0.2991 0.3102 0.3048 0.3304 0.3262 0.3591 0.3831 0.5301
D escription Headcount o f  poor individuals.
Total poverty gap M ay 95 O ct. 95 M ay 96 O c t  96 M ay 97 O ct. 97 M ay 98 O ct. 98 M ay 99 O c t  99 M ay 00 O c t  00 M ay 01 O c t  01 M ay 02
GBA 0.0867 0.0979 0.1059 0.1147 0.1033 0.1042 0.0930 0.1081 0.1098 0.1071 0.1235 0.1219 0.1440 0.1632 0.2656
NOROESTE 0.1463 0.1637 0.1830 0.1875 0.1635 0.1732 0.1645 0.1693 0.1890 0.1699 0.1901 0.1877 0.2117 0.2211 0.3315
NORESTE 0.1875 0.1889 0.2008 0.2231 0.2108 0.2054 0.2120 0.2289 0.2292 0.2366 0.2501 0.2638 0.2863 0.3034 0.4139
CUYO 0.1010 0.1338 0.1221 0.1337 0.1429 0.1285 0.1162 0.1213 0.1313 0.1261 0.1424 0.1618 0.1607 0.1751 0.2812
PAMPEANA 0.1212 0.1081 0.1229 0.1410 0.1180 0.1158 0.1123 0.1171 0.1186 0.1207 0.1294 0.1322 0.1524 0.1780 0.2772
PATAGONIA 0.0474 0.0930 0.0882 0.0928 0.0849 0.0817 0.0885 0.0943 0.0889 0.1033 0.0973 0.0988 0.0964 0.1004 0.1830
Total 0.1019 0.1137 0.1228 0.1335 0.1200 0.1198 0.1119 0.1230 0.1270 0.1247 0.1390 0.1407 0.1604 0.1794 0.2822
D escription Poverty gap - FGT measure with alpha=l. See text for details.
Total squared poverty gap M ay 95 Oct. 95 M ay 96 O c t  96 M ay 97 Oct. 97 M ay 98 O c t  98 M ay 99 O ct. 99 M ay 00 O c t  00 M ay 01 O c t  01 M ay 02
GBA 0.0520 0.0578 0.0641 0.0690 0.0576 0.0606 0.0524 0.0628 0.0646 0.0622 0.0714 0.0712 0.0889 0.1041 0.1826
NOROESTE 0.0785 0.0896 0.1031 0.1080 0.0908 0.0970 0.0922 0.0939 0.1092 0.0963 0.1097 0.1101 0.1256 0.1357 0.2182
NORESTE 0.1085 0.1081 0.1182 0.1341 0.1215 0.1161 0.1224 0.1379 0.1382 0.1452 0.1541 0.1690 0.1845 0.2033 0.2933
CUYO 0.0502 0.0718 0.0662 0.0726 0.0793 0.0727 0.0590 0.0632 0.0711 0.0667 0.0778 0.0913 0.0929 0.1060 0.1846
PAMPEANA 0.0751 0.0636 0.0737 0.0881 0.0689 0.0695 0.0638 0.0685 0.0686 0.0727 0.0776 0.0804 0.0948 0.1164 0.1894
PATAGONIA 0.0271 0.0556 0.0550 0.0558 0.0506 0.0454 0.0524 0.0580 0.0500 0.0631 0.0576 0.0590 0.0560 0.0627 0.1176
Total 0.1019 0.1137 0.1228 0.1335 0.1200 0.1198 0.1119 0.1230 0.1270 0.1247 0.1390 0.1407 0.1604 0.1794 0.2822
D escription Poverty gap squared - FGT measure with alpha=2. See text for details.
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Table C.3: Poverty Profile, Urban Argentina, October 1995
Total N on-poor P oor Extrem e Poor
Log N orm alised Incom e 0.599 0.978 -0.327 -2.273
Norm alised Incom e 2.863 3.467 0.739 0.211
Dem ographic C om position
Number o f  Infants (ages 0-5) 0.389 0.288 0.701 0.961
Number o f  Infants squared 0.708 0.468 1.391 2.248
Number o f  Children (ages 6-14) 0.587 0.418 1.150 1.409
Number o f  Children Squared 1.287 0.780 2.827 4.245
Number o f  Youths (ages 15-24) 0.632 0.569 0.869 0.858
Number o f  Youths Squared 1.275 1.120 1.872 1.806
Number o f  Adults (ages 25-64) 1.547 1.506 1.719 1.650
Number o f  Adults Squared 3.270 3.182 3.685 3.338
Number o f  Elderly (ages 65+) 0.357 0.392 0.255 0.125
Number o f  Elderly Squared 0.532 0.586 0.389 0.167
H ousehold H ead
A ge - 19 and younger 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.004
A ge - 20-29 0.102 0.098 0.107 0.143
A ge - 30-39 0.201 0.184 0.260 0.276
A ge - 50-59 0.176 0.181 0.152 0.175
A ge - 60 and older 0.299 0.330 0.199 0.125
Female 0.246 0.258 0.186 0.243
Recent migrant 0.061 0.061 0.055 0.068
Inactive 0.298 0.314 0.250 0.203
Unemployed 0.076 0.045 0.123 0.386
Primary - Complete 0 .340 0.318 0.417 0.444
Secondary - Incomplete 0.158 0.158 0.163 0.150
Secondary - Complete 0.152 0.171 0.091 0.056
Further Education - Incomplete 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.001
Further Education - Complete 0.028 0.033 0.012 0.004
University Education 0.137 0.166 0.030 0.037
Boss 0.039 0.048 0.008 0.006
S elf Employed 0.158 0.149 0.195 0.189
Informal Worker 0.242 0.223 0.320 0.292
Public Sector 0.101 0.112 0.070 0.032
Qualification: Operative 0.283 0.286 0.304 0.172
Qualification: Technician 0.142 0.156 0.098 0.063
Qualification: Professional 0 .067 0.084 0.002 0.007
Spouse Not Present 0 .326 0.350 0.212 0.306
H ousehold Spouse
Unemployed 0.044 0.034 0.070 0.109
Primary - Complete 0.238 0.211 0.346 0.322
Secondary - Complete 0.127 0.140 0.084 0.055
Secondary - Incomplete 0.099 0.092 0.137 0.092
Further - Complete 0.033 0.040 0.010 0.001
Further - Incomplete 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.005
University 0.062 0.076 0.012 0.006
Boss 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.000
S e lf Employed 0.055 0.056 0.052 0.044
Informal Worker 0.104 0.101 0.121 0.101
Public Sector 0.049 0.058 0.016 0.006
Qualification: Operative 0.055 0.061 0.032 0.021
Qualification: Technician 0.052 0.062 0.017 0.007
Qualification: Professional 0.023 0.028 0.001 0.000
G eographic location
Noroeste 0 .079 0.067 0.126 0.127
Noreste 0 .044 0.036 0.073 0.079
Cuyo 0.061 0.056 0.082 0.072
Pampeana 0.239 0.242 0.220 0.237
Patagonia 0.025 0.026 0.018 0.026
Source: Author's estimations based on EPH household survey data (INDEC).
APPENDIX C. DETAILED POVERTY FIGURES 229
Table C.4: Poverty Profile, Urban Argentina, October 1998
Total N on-poor Poor Extrem e Poor
L og N orm alised Incom e 0.634 1.028 -0.338 -2.014
N orm alised Incom e 3.033 3.712 0.731 0.232
D em ographic C om position
Number o f  Infants (ages 0-5) 0.368 0.262 0.673 0.948
Number o f  Infants squared 0.653 0.402 1.327 2.175
Number o f  Children (ages 6-14) 0.571 0.389 1.122 1.501
Number o f  Children Squared 1.233 0.705 2.691 4.344
Number o f  Youths (ages 15-24) 0.627 0.552 0.881 0.931
Number o f  Youths Squared 1.264 1.062 1.944 2.117
Number o f  Adults (ages 25-64) 1.529 1.487 1.697 1.630
Number o f  Adults Squared 3.213 3.131 3.594 3.262
Number o f  Elderly (ages 65+) 0.348 0.384 0.262 0.108
Number o f  Elderly Squared 0.520 0.571 0.409 0.147
H ousehold H ead
A ge - 19 and younger 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005
A ge - 20-29 0.109 0.106 0.114 0.145
A ge - 30-39 0.195 0.177 0.254 0.277
A ge - 50-59 0.185 0.190 0.163 0.189
A ge - 60 and older 0.293 0.323 0.204 0.127
Female 0.266 0.276 0.209 0.292
Recent migrant 0.056 0.059 0.043 0.057
Inactive 0 .284 0.296 0.241 0.229
Unemployed 0.060 0.035 0.102 0.297
Primary - Complete 0.313 0.283 0.432 0.386
Secondary - Incomplete 0.174 0.171 0.190 0.168
Secondary - Complete 0.152 0.175 0.080 0.049
Further Education - Incomplete 0 .009 0.010 0.005 0.002
Further Education - Complete 0.027 0.033 0.005 0.005
University Education 0.156 0.191 0.031 0.026
Boss 0 .036 0.045 0.005 0.003
S e lf Employed 0.161 0.153 0.182 0.212
Informal Worker 0.256 0.231 0.348 0.328
Public Sector 0.107 0.116 0.084 0.044
Qualification: Operative 0.336 0.326 0.406 0.262
Qualification: Technician 0.111 0.135 0.032 0.012
Qualification: Professional 0 .069 0.088 0.004 0.001
Spouse N ot Present 0 .354 0.376 0.242 0.369
H ousehold Spouse
Unemployed 0.029 0.021 0.054 0.074
Primary - Complete 0 .219 0.189 0.341 0.289
Secondary - Complete 0.115 0.128 0.076 0.046
Secondary - Incomplete 0.113 0.107 0.150 0.096
Further - Complete 0.033 0.040 0.007 0.005
Further - Incomplete 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.002
University 0.072 0.090 0.011 0.002
Boss 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.000
S e lf Employed 0.058 0.059 0.053 0.052
Informal Worker 0.107 0.107 0.109 0.102
Public Sector 0.054 0.064 0.023 0.004
Qualification: Operative 0 .064 0.071 0.044 0.025
Qualification: Technician 0.055 0.068 0.008 0.007
Qualification: Professional 0 .024 0.030 0.001 0.000
G eographic location
Noroeste 0.080 0.068 0.121 0.122
Noreste 0 .044 0.034 0.074 0.100
Cuyo 0.061 0.058 0.075 0.053
Pampeana 0.230 0.231 0.227 0.234
Patagonia 0.026 0.028 0.018 0.027
Source: Author's estimations based on EPH household survey data (INDEC).
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Table C.5: Poverty Profile, Urban Argentina, October 2001
T otal N on-poor P oor Extrem e Poor
Log N orm alised Incom e 0.452 1.024 -0.360 -2.254
Norm alised Incom e 2.771 3.650 0.718 0.195
D em ographic Com position
Number o f  Infants (ages 0-5) 0.364 0.246 0.607 0.772
Number o f  Infants squared 0.618 0.365 1.111 1.546
Number o f  Children (ages 6-14) 0 .579 0.352 1.018 1.420
Number o f  Children Squared 1.281 0.624 2.378 4.063
Number o f  Youths (ages 15-24) 0.642 0.516 0.942 0.998
Number o f  Youths Squared 1.324 0.972 2.079 2.479
Number o f  Adults (ages 25-64) 1.529 1.436 1.805 1.681
Number o f  Adults Squared 3.260 3.036 4.027 3.442
Number o f  Elderly (ages 65+) 0.345 0.413 0.208 0.110
Number o f  Elderly Squared 0.512 0.617 0.296 0.154
H ousehold H ead
A ge - 19 and younger 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005
A ge - 20-29 0.108 0.102 0.109 0.154
A ge - 30-39 0 .196 0.181 0.225 0.259
A ge - 50-59 0.188 0.186 0.199 0.174
A ge - 60 and older 0.289 0.337 0.185 0.133
Female 0 .287 0.306 0.227 0.266
Recent migrant 0.055 0.062 0.036 0.038
Inactive 0.288 0.320 0.212 0.191
Unemployed 0.100 0.050 0.156 0.370
Primary - Complete 0.315 0.272 0.420 0.436
Secondary - Incomplete 0 .162 0.155 0.192 0.152
Secondary - Complete 0 .170 0.199 0.106 0.077
Further Education - Incomplete 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.004
Further Education - Complete 0 .034 0.043 0.007 0.012
University Education 0.159 0.209 0.039 0.019
Boss 0 .032 0.042 0.011 0.006
S elf Employed 0.159 0.141 0.199 0.210
Informal Worker 0.256 0.222 0.351 0.324
Public Sector 0.107 0.121 0.080 0.053
Qualification: Operative 0 .307 0.299 0.373 0.240
Qualification: Technician 0 .109 0.139 0.037 0.016
Qualification: Professional 0.061 0.084 0.002 0.002
Spouse N ot Present 0 .370 0.402 0.276 0.322
H ousehold Spouse
Unemployed 0.039 0.029 0.058 0.076
Primary - Complete 0 .207 0.162 0.327 0.305
Secondary - Complete 0 .118 0.135 0.084 0.057
Secondary - Incomplete 0 .104 0.089 0.143 0.137
Further - Complete 0.041 0.053 0.014 0.003
Further - Incomplete 0 .010 0.011 0.009 0.003
University 0 .077 0.101 0.017 0.010
Boss 0.007 0.010 0.001 0.000
S e lf Employed 0.051 0.046 0.065 0.060
Informal Worker 0.103 0.089 0.139 0.135
Public Sector 0 .056 0.069 0.027 0.020
Qualification: Operative 0 .066 0.075 0.051 0.031
Qualification: Technician 0.055 0.072 0.014 0.004
Qualification: Professional 0.025 0.034 0.002 0.000
G eographic location
Noroeste 0.087 0.076 0.119 0.115
Noreste 0 .047 0.036 0.066 0.094
Cuyo 0.064 0.062 0.073 0.059
Pampeana 0.236 0.239 0.225 0.233
Patagonia 0.030 0.034 0.020 0.018
Source: Author's estimations based on EPH household survey data (INDEC).
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Table C.6: Poverty Profile, Urban Argentina, May 2002
Total N on-poor P oor E xtrem e Poor
L og N orm alised Incom e 0.029 0.871 -0.379 -2.137
N orm alised Incom e 1.975 3.039 0.704 0.202
D em ographic C om position
Number o f  Infants (ages 0-5) 0.368 0.201 0.527 0.699
Number o f  Infants squared 0.627 0.280 0.930 1.349
Number o f  Children (ages 6-14) 0.572 0.276 0.802 1.224
Number o f  Children Squared 1.269 0.473 1.693 3.269
Number o f  Youths (ages 15-24) 0 .640 0.454 0.831 0.988
Number o f  Youths Squared 1.310 0.859 1.697 2.256
Number o f  Adults (ages 25-64) 1.534 1.400 1.729 1.713
Number o f  Adults Squared 3.304 2.977 3.878 3.613
Number o f  Elderly (ages 65+) 0 .346 0.438 0.279 0.136
Number o f  Elderly Squared 0.517 0.651 0.444 0.183
H ousehold Head
A ge - 19 and younger 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.008
A ge - 20-29 0.118 0.104 0.128 0.151
A ge - 30-39 0.192 0.166 0.218 0.240
A ge - 50-59 0 .189 0.186 0.194 0.189
A ge - 60 and older 0.289 0.364 0.218 0.141
Female 0 .287 0.323 0.225 0.253
Recent migrant 0.053 0.061 0.048 0.035
Inactive 0 .289 0.341 0.233 0.196
Unemployed 0 .124 0.052 0.137 0.339
Primary - Complete 0.311 0.250 0.393 0.403
Secondary - Incomplete 0.163 0.138 0.207 0.186
Secondary - Complete 0.173 0.211 0.142 0.093
Further Education - Incomplete 0 .014 0.018 0.008 0.009
Further Education - Complete 0.035 0.050 0.019 0.009
University Education 0.162 0.239 0.068 0.036
B oss 0.025 0.038 0.009 0.003
S e lf Employed 0.150 0.127 0.162 0.207
Informal Worker 0.251 0.206 0.303 0.327
Public Sector 0.115 0.135 0.097 0.072
Qualification: Operative 0.294 0.277 0.372 0.249
Qualification: Technician 0.101 0.144 0.057 0.021
Qualification: Professional 0.058 0.097 0.007 0.002
Spouse Not Present 0.372 0.432 0 .266 0.319
H ousehold Spouse
Unemployed 0.041 0.025 0.047 0.081
Primary - Complete 0.208 0.143 0.294 0.306
Secondary - Complete 0 .122 0.137 0.118 0.080
Secondary - Incomplete 0.099 0.072 0.148 0.125
Further - Complete 0.041 0.058 0.022 0.011
Further - Incomplete 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.005
University 0 .074 0.110 0.031 0.014
B oss 0.005 0.008 0.000 0.000
S e lf Employed 0 .049 0.037 0.062 0.068
Informal Worker 0.103 0.078 0 .136 0.141
Public Sector 0.057 0.073 0.035 0.033
Qualification: Operative 0.068 0.075 0.062 0.054
Qualification: Technician 0 .050 0.076 0 .018 0.008
Qualification: Professional 0.021 0.035 0.002 0.000
G eographic location
Noroeste 0 .086 0.069 0.111 0.109
Noreste 0 .049 0.034 0 .060 0.082
Cuyo 0.067 0.063 0.074 0.069
Pampeana 0 .236 0.236 0 .238 0.236
Patagonia 0 .030 0.035 0.025 0.019
Source: Author's estimations based on EPH household survey data (INDEC).
A p p e n d i x  D
F e r t il it y  a n d  L a b o u r  S u p p l y : 
R o b u s t n e s s  C h e c k s
D . l  R o b u s t n e s s  C h e c k s  w it h  D if f e r e n t  C o v a r ia t e s , S a m p l e s
a n d  Va r ia b l e  D e f in it io n s
This Appendix provides additional findings and robustness checks of the 
benchmark results of Chapter 7 on the effects of fertility on female labour 
supply in Argentina. This Section corroborates that the results presented in 
Section 7.2.2 (page 176) are robust to differences in the underlying samples, 
in the specification of the model and in the definition of the variables.
The first set of robustness checks consists of adding covariates X to the 
estimation of Equation 5.7 (page 137). Table D .l estimates the same model 
w ith two instruments as in Table 7.3 (page 181), with Two boys and Two 
girls as the instruments, and Age, Age at first birth, and the sex of the first 
two children as exogenous covariates, but it adds indicators for Argentina's 
522 municipalities. These geographic controls capture the wide variation 
of socioeconomic conditions within the country, with a few relatively rich 
cities and extremely poor urban and rural areas. The results in Table D.l 
are very close to those discussed in Section 7.2.2 (page 176): the coefficients 
are slightly smaller (in absolute value) once the geographic controls are in­
troduced, but the differences are not significant. This finding reinforces the 
plausibility of the randomness of the instrument, since it indicates that it is 
orthogonal to the additional geographic controls, as indicated by the simi­
larity of the coefficients with those in previous Tables and by the p-values 
of the Sargan overidentification tests.
Table D.2 presents the estimation of the same 2SLS model with demo-
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Table D.l: Robustness Checks: OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares Results with Geographic Controls
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653,213 497,194 599,941 456,437 653,213 
522 Municipalities
497,194 599,941 456,437
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include the age and the age 
at first birth of the women or her spouse, in addition to the sex of the first and second children (where indicated). The samples correspond to 
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graphic and geographic controls, with the age variable replaced by cohort 
dummies and with additional covariates in X. The first panel in the Table 
presents the results with the three education level indicators of Section 7.3.2 
(page 186) included as right hand side variables. Most of the coefficients 
are lower in absolute value than their counterparts in Table 7.3, but again 
these differences are not statistically significant. The main difference is that 
the Sargan exogeneity null is now rejected (at the 5 percent level) for four of 
the eight coefficients estimated, indicating that the education variables are 
probably endogenous in the labour supply model. The results in the other 
three panels are substantially the same: in the second panel, an indicator for 
rural areas is added to the demographic, educational and geographic con­
trols, while the third panel adds a household indicator of structural poverty 
constructed by INDEC. Finally, the last panel computes the model with the 
woman and her husband's education status as right hand side variables. 
All these models are consistent with the findings presented in Table 7.3, al­
though the overidentification tests indicate that the extra covariates are, in 
most cases, endogenous.
While the addition of covariates does not affect the essence of the bench­
mark results, there might still be an impact from the definitions of the un­
derlying samples and the variables, and from measurement error. These 
issues are addressed in Table D.3.
In the first panel of Table D.3, the dependent variable Worked for pay was 
replaced by an indicator of labour force participation, Active labour force sta­
tus, equal to 1 for women who worked for pay or were unemployed during 
the reference week, and 0 otherwise. It is thus possible to test the robust­
ness of the main results with respect to the definition of the dependent vari­
able. In the main results of Chapters 7 and 8, the Worked for pay indicator 
was employed because it was considered to be more reliable, since the dis­
tinction between unemployment and inactivity might not be reflected cor­
rectly in the data. This is because the 1991 Census data was collected mostly 
by teachers and other civil servants, unlike smaller household surveys like 
EPH that are carried out by specialised staff who are better trained and use a 
more specific questionnaire on labour market issues. Gregg and Wadsworth 
(1999a) provide a discussion of the sometimes subtle distinction between 
the unemployed and the inactive. In any case, the difference between the
Table D.2: Robustness Checks: OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares Results with Additional Covariates











AE Sample Sample, 
married
IV: Two Boys and Two Girls -0.0261 -0.0342 -0.0303 -0.0420 -0.0561 -0.0679 -0.0652 -0.0828
Controls: education level and birth cohort [0.0157]* [0.0161]** [0.0153]** [0.0156]*** [0.0301]* [0.0298]** [0.0292]** [0.0288]***
Sargan p-value 0.0436 0.0777 0.0144 0.0354 0.0677 0.1212 0.0264 0.0651
DWH p-value 0.4751 0.9916 0.6158 0.6367 0.4740 0.9853 0.5765 0.6840
OLS with same controls -0.0373 -0.0340 -0.0380 -0.0347 -0.0776 -0.0684 -0.0814 -0.0711
[0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0014]***
IV: Two Boys and Two Girls -0.0265 -0.0344 -0.0307 -0.0422 -0.0571 -0.0684 -0.0658 -0.0832
Controls: education level, birth cohort and urban dummy [0.0157]* [0.0161]** [0.0153]** [0.0156]*** [0.0300]* [0.0297]** [0.0291]** [0.0288]***
Sargan p-value 0.0433 0.0780 0.0141 0.0352 0.0677 0.1221 0.0260 0.0649
DWH p-value 0.5034 0.9721 0.6421 0.6235 0.4984 0.9993 0.5973 0.6745
OLS with same controls -0.0370 -0.0339 -0.0377 -0.0346 -0.0774 -0.0684 -0.0812 -0.0711
[0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0014]***
IV: Two Boys and Two Girls -0.0271 -0.0348 -0.0311 -0.0426 -0.0574 -0.0685 -0.0661 -0.0833
Controls: education level, birth cohort, NBI and urban dummy [0.0159]* [0.0162]** [0.0154]** [0.0157]*** [0.0302]* [0.0298]** [0.0292]** [0.0288]***
Sargan p-value 0.0445 0.0800 0.0144 0.0365 0.0684 0.1220 0.0262 0.0651
DWH p-value 0.4621 0.9968 0.5744 0.6614 0.4965 0.9952 0.5899 0.6717
OLS with same controls -0.0388 -0.0349 -0.0398 -0.0358 -0.0779 -0.0683 -0.0819 -0.0711
[0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0014]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0014]***
IV: Two Boys and Two Girls -0.0297 -0.0416 -0.0621 -0.0820
Controls: woman and spouse education, spouse age [0.0155]* [0.0156]*** [0.0294]** [0.0288]***
Sargan p-value 0.0277 0.0365 0.0434 0.0667
DWH p-value 0.7961 0.6742 0.8105 0.7085
OLS with same controls -0.0337 -0.0351 -0.0691 -0.0713
[0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0014]***
Observations 653,213 497,194 599,941 456,437 653,213 497,194 599,941 456,437
Geographic Controls 522 Municipalities
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; 1** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include the age (as cohort indicators in this
Table) and the age at first birth of the women or her spouse, in addition to the sex of the first child. The education level indicators correspond to some primary,
some secondary and some tertiary education. NBI is an indicator of structural poverty (basic needs) defined by INDEC. The samples correspond to women aged 21-
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two measures is relatively small, with 31.38 percent of the women in the 
complete sample working for pay and 33.82 percent in the labour force. The 
results with Active labour force status as the dependent variable are close (and 
qualitatively the same) to those using Worked for pay (as in Table 7.3), both 
in terms of levels and significance.
Another source of concern might be the narrow age group -  21 to 35 
years old -  for women in the final samples. The second panel in Table D.3 
presents the results obtained by adding women in the age group 36-45 that 
complied with the selection criteria of Section 5.4.1 (page 142). This implies 
an additional 330,000 extra observations in the full samples, and around 
280,000 in the married samples. These results (with Worked for pay as the 
dependent variable) are again similar to the those in Table 7.3. In fact, it can 
be noted that the increase in sample sizes boosts the precision of the esti­
mates, since all the coefficients are significant at least at the 5 percent level. 
This suggests that the inclusion of the extra age group does not attenuate 
nor bias the results, but instead increases their precision.
Finally, some important adjustments were made to match women with 
their children in the Census data: Section 5.4.1 states that around 100,000 ob­
servations were discarded from the final sample because the total number 
of surviving children did not correspond to the number of matched children 
in the household. This was the most important adjustment in the sample, 
due to the lack of detail of the kinship variable. The final panel in Table D.3 
estimates the same model as in Table 7.3 without discarding these 100,000 
observations. The coefficients are smaller in absolute value than those in 
Table 7.3, but in the same range as those discussed in this Section. The mea­
surement error in the fertility variables does affect the results in an impor­
tant manner. Alternatively, this might be suggesting that children in the 
household seem to affect the labour supply of women even if they are not 
their own children.
D.2 E s t im a t io n  w it h  a n  A l t e r n a t iv e  D a t a se t
Instrumental variables estimation with a relatively weak instruments such 
as the Same sex indicator usually requires large sample sizes to obtain co­
efficients estimated with precision, which is why Angrist and Evans (1998)
Table D.3: Robustness Checks: Alternative Dependent Variable and Different Sample Definitions






AE Sample Sample, 
married
Complete jy[arrje<j Sample Sample, 
Sample ’married
Using labor force status instead of worked for pay as dependent variable
IV: Same Sex -0.0403 -0.0457 -0.0438 -0.0530 -0.0748 -0.0820 -0.0809 -0.0948
[0.0182]** [0.0188]** [0.0176]** [0.0182]*** [0.0338]** [0.0338]** [0.0326]** [0.0327]***
DWH p-value 0.7211 0.8587 0.8189 0.5963 0.5396 0.9779 0.5430 0.7584
OLS with same controls -0.0468 -0.0423 -0.0478 -0.0433 -0.0956 -0.0811 -0.1007 -0.0847
[0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0015]***
Observations 653,213 497,194 599,941 456,437 653,213 497,194 599,941 456,437
Women 21-45
IV: Same Sex -0.0386 -0.0462 -0.0403 -0.0499 -0.0719 -0.0840 -0.0749 -0.0907
[0.0126]*** [0.0129]*** [0.0123]*** [0.0127]*** [0.0235]*** [0.0236]*** [0.0229]*** [0.0231]***
DWH p-value 0.7802 0.4824 0.8241 0.3464 0.7344 0.3551 0.6995 0.2641
OLS with same controls -0.0421 -0.0371 -0.0431 -0.0379 -0.0798 -0.0622 -0.0838 -0.0649
[0.0004]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0012]***
Observations 989,113 774,059 932,166 730,542 989,113 774,059 932,166 730,542
Women with mismatching surviving children and children in household
IV: Same Sex -0.0350 -0.0442 -0.0378 -0.0501 -0.0698 -0.0827 -0.0732 -0.0920
[0.0171]** [0.0179]** [0.0167]** [0.0174]*** [0.0341]** [0.0335]** [0.0328]** [0.0323]***
DWH p-value 0.8000 0.7852 0.9089 0.5567 0.4325 0.9721 0.3897 0.8243
OLS with same controls -0.0393 -0.0394 -0.0397 -0.0399 -0.0966 -0.0816 -0.1015 -0.0848
[0.0004]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0014]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0014]***
Observations 748,157 541,529 690,103 499,000 748,157 541,529 690,103 499,000
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include the age 
and the age at first birth of the women or her spouse, in addition to the sex of the first and second children (where indicated). The 
samples correspond to women aged 21-35 (except where noted) with two or more children aged 18 or younger from the extended 
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use datasets from the United States Census, and this Part employs the 1991 
Census from Argentina. Applications of the "same sex" strategy to smaller 
datasets, as in Iacovou's (2001) study of the United Kingdom, tend to pro­
duce instrumental variables estimates with high standard errors.
This can be shown by following Dee and Evans' (2003) analysis of the 
power of the statistical significance test for IV coefficients. When a reduced 
form OLS regression of Y on Z generates unbiased estimates, the coeffi­
cient is (pRp = E[Y\Z = 1] — E[Y|Z =  0]. This estimate is statistically 
significant if the ratio of (pRF and its standard error a Rp is greater than 
a cut-off value 77 from the normal distribution -  for instance, 77 =  1.96 
for a 5 percent level of significance in a two-sided test. Defining p\ = 
E[Y\Z = 1] and po =  E[Y|Z =  0], and with treatment and control groups 
defined by Z with observations each, cr|f  is approximately equal to 
[pi(l -  p i) +  po(l -  pq) \ / \N .  Since by definition px =  p0 +  (pRF, using 
these expressions in 14>Rp / a Rp | >  77 allows to solve for the minimum num ­
ber of observations N  needed for a statistically significant value of (pRF. For 
the Argentine Census dataset employed in Part II, there are just enough ob­
servations for testing the IV coefficients at the 1 percent level of significance 
for most samples, and there are largely more than enough observations for 
the usual 5 percent tests for all four samples.1
However, using smaller alternative datasets covering the same region 
and period is valuable as a validation exercise, since at least the results from 
first-stages and OLS estimations can be compared with the main applica­
tion. While no other Census dataset is available for Argentina, Table D.4 
presents the estimation of a model equivalent to the one in Table 7.3 (page 
181), but using a sample from INDEC's 1987 Expenditure Survey ("Encuesta 
Nacional de Gasto de los Hogares"-ENGH), which is the basis of the ex­
penditure figures in Table 6.4 (page 166). While this survey did not cover 
smaller rural areas, it only excluded very small and isolated communities. 
It is thus broadly representative at the national level, and comparable to 
the 1991 Census data.2 The four samples in the Table were constructed fol­
lrThe ratios of available to needed observations for a two-sided 1 percent test are 0.98, 
1.01,1.09 and 1.37 for the Complete, Married, AE Sample and AE Sample, married respectively. 
For a two-sided 5 percent test, the ratios are 1.7,1.73,1.88 and 2.37.
2The data from the May 1991 Household Survey ("Encuesta Permanente de Hogares," 
presented in Section 1.2, page 22), corresponding to the month of the 1991 Census, is
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lowing the criteria set in Section 5.4.1 (page 142), resulting in about 6,500 
women in total and 4,500 in the married categories, which as discussed in 
the previous paragraph are not enough observations for obtaining precise 
IV estimates.
In Table D.4, the Same sex indicator has sizeable and significant first-stage 
effects on both the Number of children and More than two children variables. 
Moreover, these effects are close in size to those reported for the 1991 Census 
in Table 7.2 (page 179). The same is true for the OLS estimations of the effect 
of fertility on labour supply, where these two variables appear to have a 
significant negative effect on women's labour supply (Worked for pay). These 
effects are also within the range of the OLS coefficients in Table 7.3.
Finally, as expected from the small sample size, none of the instrumental 
variables estimates are significant, either with Same sex or Two boys and Two 
girls as instruments, but despite the lack of precision, the two-stage least 
squares coefficients are also in range with those in Table 7.3. These results 
suggest that the low significance of instrumental variables estimates is prob­
ably due to a problem of precision rather than the lack of a causal effect in 
the ENGH, and that the benchmark results of Section 7.2.2 (page 176) are 
not confined to one particular dataset for Argentina.
limited, with only seven urban areas with complete information (INDEC, 1996): Greater 
Buenos Aires, Greater Mendoza, Greater C6rdoba, Neuquen, Jujuy, Rio Gallegos and Santa 
Rosa. The resulting dataset of women with two children is too small, and it is not repre­
sentative of the country. However, some of the results are still remarkably similar to the 
benchmark of this Chapter: in a sample of 1,398 women aged 21-35 with two or more chil­
dren aged 18 or less, the average of the Worked for pay indicator is 0.38. The first-stage 
coefficient of Same sex, significant at the 5 percent level, is 0.0539, while the OLS coefficient 
of More than two children is -0.0438. The Conclusion to Part II (page 212) uses this data to 
discuss the implications of the main results in terms of poverty.
Table D.4: OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares Results, 1987 Expenditure Survey
Instrumented: Number of children Instrumented: More than two children
Dependent variable: 
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married
First stages 




























































IV: Two Boys and Two Girls -0.0716 
Controls for sexes of 1 st & 2nd children [0.1611 ] 






























Observations 6,355 4,589 6,028 4,361 6,355 4,589 6,028 4,361
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include controls for the 
age and the age at first birth o f  the women and the sex o f  the first two children. The samples correspond to women aged 21-35 with two or 
more children aged 18 or younger from the Encuesta Nacional de Gasto de los Hogares, INDEC, 1987. The subsamples are analogous to 












A p p e n d i x  E
C o m p u t a t i o n  o f  R e s u l t s  f o r  C o m p l i e r s
E .l  C o m p u t a t io n  o f  O u t c o m e s  f o r  
C o m p l ie r s  by  R e g r e s s io n  M e t h o d s
This Appendix provides the details of the computation of the parameters 
and tests presented in Chapter 8.
Proposition 8.2 (page 195) identifies the expectation of potential out­
comes Y\ and Yo for compliers, while Proposition 8.3 (page 196) shows how 
to compute the expectation of Y  for the same group. Obtaining these aver­
ages and of the test in Equation 8.8 (page 198) from observed data is straight­
forward, but finding the correct standard errors of the estimates can prove 
more difficult. The results below are based on an analogy with LATE-Wald 
estimates of a binary instrument and one endogenous regressor by instru­
mental variables.
For any variable M7, with Z and D binary, the coefficient y  is given by:
. . .  E[¥|Z =  1 ] - E M Z  =  0]
T E[D|Z =  1 ]-E [D |Z  =  0] y ' }
This coefficient can be obtained by means of an instrumental variable regres­
sion of ¥  on D and a constant with Z as an instrument for D (Proposition 
5.5, page 135). The advantage of using a regression instead of Equation E.l 
for finding y  is that the statistical software computes the standard errors for 
the parameter automatically.
E[Y{] in Equation 8.3 can be obtained by setting M7 in Equation E.l to 
W = YD: this provides the potential outcome and its standard error.
The parameter E[Yq] in Equation 8.2 can also be computed by defining
241
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D =  1 — D, using T  =  YD  and instrumenting D instead of D. However, a 
variable transformation ensures that it can also be obtained by instrument­
ing D, as shown by the following result:
E [Y (1-D ) Z=1 - E Y (l—D )|Z=0]
E [ ( l-D ) Z=1 - E (1 D) |Z=0]










The same reasoning applies by setting T  =  Y(D — 1) in Equation E.l.
This result is useful for the computation of the average outcome for com­
pliers from Proposition 8.3 and its standard error. Using the previous re­
sults:
E[YC} =  E[YC|Z =  0 ]E [1 -Z ] +  E[YC|Z =  1]E[Z]
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where Y =  Y(D — 1)E[1 — Z] +  YDE[Z],  With large sample sizes, E[Z] 
and E[1 — Z] can be considered non-stochastic. The last line in the previ­
ous Equation is analogous to Equation E.l, which implies that the expected 
outcome for compliers, E[YC], can be obtained by setting T  = Y  and com­
puting y. Alternatively, it can be computed by a regression of Y on D and a 
constant with Z as an instrument for D.
E .2  C o m p u t a t io n  o f  t h e  A u x il ia r y  Te st  f o r  C o m p l ie r s  by
R e g r e s s io n  M e t h o d s
Finally, Chapter 8 also presented a test for the generality of IV results for 
compliers. The test exploited the additional identification result presented 
in Proposition 8.3 (page 196), which identified the expected potential out­
come for compliers. The intuition is that if the expected outcome for the 
general population is not different from that of compliers, then the two are 
similar in one important dimension, and it is thus more likely that other re­
sults for compliers concerning the outcome variable can be extrapolated to
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the whole population. The test is in Equation 8.8, and given by:
A =  E[Y] -  E [Y°]
This test can be performed by means of the instrumental variable estima­
tion described in the previous paragraph: the parameter y  in Equation E.l 
estimates E [Yc] when T  =  Y, which amounts to regressing Y on D with Z 
as an instrument for D. Using this regression, a t-test of whether y  =  E[Y] 
is equivalent to testing the hypothesis A = 0 in Equation 8.8.
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